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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov, davem@davemloft.net,
	shemminger@linux-foundation.org, kees@ubuntu.com,
	morgan@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, dwalsh@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] security: introducing security_request_module
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 13:40:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090813184009.GA8391@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090813134457.29186.7182.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com>

Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com):
> Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
> new module into the kernel.  This can be a dangerous event if the process
> able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
> binary or the module binary.  This patch adds a new security hook to
> request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
> to call request_module().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Looks fine code-wise.

Just to match the rest of the documentation, the description in
security.h should probably mention 'Return 0 if allowed'.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>

> ---
> 
>  include/linux/security.h |   10 ++++++++++
>  kernel/kmod.c            |    4 ++++
>  security/capability.c    |    6 ++++++
>  security/security.c      |    5 +++++
>  4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index d5f6578..34c5465 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
>   *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
>   *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
>   *	Return 0 if successful.
> + * @kernel_module_request:
> + *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
> + *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
>   * @task_setuid:
>   *	Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
>   *	attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates
> @@ -1500,6 +1503,7 @@ struct security_operations {
>  	void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
>  	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
> +	int (*kernel_module_request)(void);
>  	int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
>  	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  				int flags);
> @@ -1755,6 +1759,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
>  void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
>  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
>  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
> +int security_kernel_module_request(void);
>  int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
>  int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
>  			     int flags);
> @@ -2306,6 +2311,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> +static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
>  				       int flags)
>  {
> diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
> index 385c31a..5a7ae57 100644
> --- a/kernel/kmod.c
> +++ b/kernel/kmod.c
> @@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
>  #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
>  	static int kmod_loop_msg;
> 
> +	ret = security_kernel_module_request();
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
> +
>  	va_start(args, fmt);
>  	ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
>  	va_end(args);
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index 4f23f4f..06400cf 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -396,6 +396,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> +static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
>  {
>  	return 0;
> @@ -961,6 +966,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b98c684..f88eaf6 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -709,6 +709,11 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
>  	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
>  }
> 
> +int security_kernel_module_request(void)
> +{
> +	return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
> +}
> +
>  int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
>  {
>  	return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
> 
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-08-13 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-08-13 13:44 [PATCH 1/3] Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module Eric Paris
2009-08-13 13:44 ` [PATCH 2/3] security: introducing security_request_module Eric Paris
2009-08-13 14:03   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-13 15:28     ` Eric Paris
2009-08-13 17:54       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-13 18:19         ` Eric Paris
2009-08-13 18:31           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-13 18:40   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2009-08-13 13:45 ` [PATCH 3/3] SELinux: add selinux_kernel_module_request Eric Paris
2009-08-13 18:43   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-13 14:01 ` [PATCH 1/3] Networking: use CAP_NET_ADMIN when deciding to call request_module Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-13 18:45 ` Paul Moore
2009-08-13 22:55   ` James Morris
2009-08-13 23:14   ` David Miller
2009-08-14  1:56 ` James Morris
     [not found] <20090813033537.27287.18981.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com>
     [not found] ` <20090813033543.27287.95970.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com>
2009-08-13 17:17   ` [PATCH 2/3] security: introducing security_request_module Daniel J Walsh

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