From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 9/9] Add explicit bound checks in net/socket.c
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2009 12:57:57 -0700 (PDT)
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From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2009 21:23:02 +0200

> The sys_socketcall() function has a very clever system for the copy
> size of its arguments. Unfortunately, gcc cannot deal with this in
> terms of proving that the copy_from_user() is then always in bounds.
> This is the last (well 9th of this series, but last in the kernel) such
> case around.
> 
> With this patch, we can turn on code to make having the boundary provably
> right for the whole kernel, and detect introduction of new security
> accidents of this type early on.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>

Applied, thanks.