From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: sri@us.ibm.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add CAP_NET_RAW checks to bind() and sendmsg() on a AF_PACKET socket
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 16:03:30 -0800 (PST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100112.160330.13265292.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1263340440.6844.110.camel@w-sridhar.beaverton.ibm.com>
From: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 15:54:00 -0800
> So when a packet socket fd is passed to an un-privileged process, it
> can do a re-bind or send a message to any interface.
I think passing such fd's to an unprivileged process is a
very serious security hole.
There are so many anti-social things you can do with
that even if you control how it is bound.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-01-13 0:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-01-12 23:54 [PATCH] Add CAP_NET_RAW checks to bind() and sendmsg() on a AF_PACKET socket Sridhar Samudrala
2010-01-13 0:03 ` David Miller [this message]
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