From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Michael Stone <michael@laptop.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4)
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 01:10:58 -0500
Message-ID: <20100112061058.GA5231@heat>
References: <20100111174922.GA17285@us.ibm.com>
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Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, David Lang <david@lang.hm>,
	Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>,
	Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@gmail.com>,
	Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>,
	"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@cscott.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Bernie Innocenti <bernie@codewiz.org>,
	Mark Seaborn <mrs@mythic-beasts.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>,
	=?iso-8859-1?Q?Am=E9rico?= Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	K
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
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Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Michael, I'm sorry, I should go back and search the thread for the
> answer, but don't have time right now - do you really need
> disablenetwork to be available to unprivileged users? 

Rainbow can only drop the networking privileges when we know at app launch time
(e.g. based on a manifest or from the human operator) that privileges can be
dropped. Unfortunately, most of the really interesting uses of disablenetwork
happen *after* rainbow has dropped privilege and handed control the app.
Therefore, having an API which can be used by at least some low-privilege
processes is important to me.

> is it ok to require CAP_SETPCAP (same thing required for dropping privs from
> bounding set)?  

Let me try to restate your idea:

   We can make disablenetwork safer by permitting its use only where explicitly
   permitted by some previously privileged ancestor. The securebits facility
   described in 

     http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/

   may be a good framework in which to implement this control.

Did I understand correctly? If so, then yes, this approach seems like it would
work for me.

Regards, and thanks very much for your help,

Michael