From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: GTSM and TCP accept problem Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2010 22:12:58 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <20100814.221258.35029372.davem@davemloft.net> References: <20100814214634.24a87715@s6510> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: dada1@cosmosbay.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, netdev@vger.kernel.org To: shemminger@vyatta.com Return-path: Received: from 74-93-104-97-Washington.hfc.comcastbusiness.net ([74.93.104.97]:33778 "EHLO sunset.davemloft.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751006Ab0HOFMk (ORCPT ); Sun, 15 Aug 2010 01:12:40 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20100814214634.24a87715@s6510> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Stephen Hemminger Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2010 21:46:34 -0400 > The implementation of Generalized TTL Security has a problem > on the TCP accept side. Since there can be different number of > hops for each peer, the listener ends up doing > > socket > bind > set TTL to 255 > listen > while (nfd = accept(peer)) { > info = lookup(peer) > set MINTTL to 255 - info->ttl_hops Surely when creating the initial listening socket we should use the minimum TTL over the set of peers right? That surely takes most of the fun out of this problem for the attacker.