From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: core: scm: fix information leak to userland Date: Sat, 30 Oct 2010 12:12:38 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <20101030.121238.189687981.davem@davemloft.net> References: <1288448796-6147-1-git-send-email-segooon@gmail.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, tj@kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: segooon@gmail.com Return-path: Received: from 74-93-104-97-Washington.hfc.comcastbusiness.net ([74.93.104.97]:42322 "EHLO sunset.davemloft.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754965Ab0J3TMR (ORCPT ); Sat, 30 Oct 2010 15:12:17 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1288448796-6147-1-git-send-email-segooon@gmail.com> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Your patches are almost entirely baseless. You haven't even made an effort to show a real case, in detail, where your patches actually fix a bug. The CMSG case shows that you didn't even bother to look at the assembly of even one architecture to see if padding bytes even existed in the structure, and that furthermore even if they existed that they would leak out ever. I don't even buy the "preventative nature" argument for the address[128] thing. If a protocol is leaking kernel memory in that case, it also isn't filling in the address value properly, which is a bug times two. I absolutely am not applying these patches, sorry.