From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
eric.dumazet@gmail.com, tgraf@infradead.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.org, kees.cook@canonical.com,
davem@davemloft.net, a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, eparis@parisplace.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 14:03:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101222130349.GB13412@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1292708499.10804.89.camel@dan>
* Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> wrote:
> +kptr_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
> +exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When
> +kptr_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no
> +restrictions. When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers
> +printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
> +unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When kptr_restrict is set to
> +(2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0's
> +regardless of privileges.
Hm, why is it off by default? Is there some user-space regression that is caused by
this?
We really want good security measures to be active by default (and to work by
default) - they are not worth much if they are not.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-12-22 13:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-12-18 21:41 [PATCH v4] kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 13:03 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2010-12-22 13:13 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-12-22 13:48 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-12-22 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-12-22 20:34 ` Andrew Morton
2010-12-22 16:20 ` Ingo Molnar
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