From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] irda: prevent heap corruption on invalid nickname
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2011 17:59:14 -0700 (PDT)
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From: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2011 02:14:30 -0400

> Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in
> a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and
> panicking.
> 
> v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the
> buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
> Cc: stable@kernel.org

Applied.