From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 19:14:34 +0100
Message-ID: <20120227181434.GA13903@redhat.com>
References: <1330140111-17201-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1330140111-17201-7-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <20120227171132.GB10608@redhat.com> <CAGXu5jJQhfSSwTU5fSGR_Q57LAQBFW25A_FtR2GFsxyT_ibnzQ@mail.gmail.com>
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To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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On 02/27, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
> >>
> >>  static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
> >>  {
> >>       struct seccomp_filter *f;
> >> -     u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
> >>       static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
> >>               bpf_load,
> >>               sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
> >>       };
> >> +     u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> >>       const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
> >>
> >> +     /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
> >> +     if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
> >> +             ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
> >
> > Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
>
> It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
> closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
> this code given its intended use.

Can't resists... Sorry, I know I am troll but personally I think
in this case the most defensive code is BUG_ON(->filter == NULL)
or at least WARN_ON().

Nevermind, I won't pretend I really understand the intended use,
please ignore.

Oleg.