From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Thomas Graf Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: Convert skb->csum_(start|offset) integrity BUG_ON() to WARN_ON() & drop Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2013 10:18:53 +0000 Message-ID: <20130214101853.GC21829@casper.infradead.org> References: <20130213234021.GA21829@casper.infradead.org> <20130213234843.GB21829@casper.infradead.org> <20130213.193759.1094469499685059296.davem@davemloft.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org To: David Miller Return-path: Received: from casper.infradead.org ([85.118.1.10]:49144 "EHLO casper.infradead.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933837Ab3BNKS4 (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Feb 2013 05:18:56 -0500 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20130213.193759.1094469499685059296.davem@davemloft.net> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 02/13/13 at 07:37pm, David Miller wrote: > From: Thomas Graf > Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 23:48:43 +0000 [...] > > b) No longer collapse if the new skb would result in a > > a headroom + data that exceeds 64K. This seems to be the > > most trivial fix. [...] > > Other ideas? > > "b" is a good idea. OK, patch to do so being tested by original reporter. > Let's not paper over this, this BUG_ON() is really a BUG_ON() > meaning "FIX ME NOW" :-) Maybe it's my general dislike of BUG_ON() in the processing path, especially if the bug condition can be influenced remotely. It looks absolutely doable to trigger the previously mentioned partial acking & collapsing on purpose by a malicious receiver even with an MTU of 1500. I believe we should avoid total DoS in future similar situations that we don't think of yet.