From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Dave Jones Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core_initcall time Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 13:45:10 -0500 Message-ID: <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com> References: <2ea03f60bb65429cbe5d74a6d356fde3eefcf06c.1384160397.git.dborkman@redhat.com> <20131111134357.GC10104@thunk.org> <20131112000307.GB14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131112115350.GA14077@thunk.org> <20131112131627.GD14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131112134603.GE14929@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131114025448.GB31602@thunk.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" , Daniel Borkmann , "David S. Miller" , shemminger-OTpzqLSitTUnbdJkjeBofR2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org, Florian Weimer , netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Eric Dumazet , linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Kees Cook Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-wireless-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > Ingo wanted even more > unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic > sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the > boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should > at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the > start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I > hope. Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations. On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside, things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different. Dave -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-wireless" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html