From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH next v0] bonding: Display LACP info only to
 CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable user
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 15:22:57 -0700 (PDT)
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From: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 17:19:56 -0700

> Actor and Partner details can be accessed via proc-fs and sys-fs
> entries. These interfaces are world readable at this moment. The
> earlier patch-series made the LACP communication secure to avoid
> nuisance attack from within the same L2 domain but it did not
> prevent "someone unprivileged" looking at that information on host
> and perform the same act.
> 
> This patch essentially avoids spitting those entries if the user
> in question does not have enough privileges.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>

I agree with Stephen Hemminger in that you should probably be using
CAP_NET_ADMIN here.