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From: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2015 09:50:35 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150909155035.GA26679@smitten> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKGBuD15KBfXKoYbGB40cNsbh=Dz8GM=bmUL-oECRhzxA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:08:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Tycho Andersen
> <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 01:34:12PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Tycho Andersen
> >> <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> >> > +static const struct bpf_func_proto *
> >> > +seccomp_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
> >> > +{
> >> > +       /* Right now seccomp eBPF loading doesn't support maps; seccomp filters
> >> > +        * are considered to be read-only after they're installed, so map fds
> >> > +        * probably need to be invalidated when a seccomp filter with maps is
> >> > +        * installed.
> >> > +        *
> >> > +        * The rest of these might be reasonable to call from seccomp, so we
> >> > +        * export them.
> >> > +        */
> >> > +       switch (func_id) {
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns:
> >> > +               return &bpf_ktime_get_ns_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_trace_printk:
> >> > +               return bpf_get_trace_printk_proto();
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32:
> >> > +               return &bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id:
> >> > +               return &bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
> >> > +               return &bpf_tail_call_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_get_current_pid_tgid:
> >> > +               return &bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_get_current_uid_gid:
> >> > +               return &bpf_get_current_uid_gid_proto;
> >> > +       case BPF_FUNC_get_current_comm:
> >> > +               return &bpf_get_current_comm_proto;
> >> > +       default:
> >> > +               return NULL;
> >> > +       }
> >> > +}
> >>
> >> While this list is probably fine, I don't want to mix the addition of
> >> eBPF functions to the seccomp ABI with the CRIU changes. No function
> >> calls are currently possible and it should stay that way.
> >
> > Ok, I can remove them.
> >
> >> I was expecting to see a validator, similar to the existing BPF
> >> validator that is called when creating seccomp filters currently. Can
> >> we add a similar validator for new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP?
> >
> > That's effectively what this patch does; when the eBPF is loaded via
> > bpf(), you tell bpf() you want a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP, and it invokes
> > this validation/translation code, i.e. it uses
> > seccomp_is_valid_access() to check and make sure access are aligned
> > and inside struct seccomp_data.
> 
> What about limiting the possible instructions?

I totally overlooked this. A quick glance through the eBPF verifier
makes me think that we can just add another function to struct
bpf_verifier_ops called valid_instruction, which shouldn't be too
hard. Perhaps a more interesting question is what to allow:

BPF_LD(X) and BPF_ST(X): it looks like all types of stores are
  allowed, and only BPF_MEM and BPF_IMM loads are allowed; I think
  these can stay the same. BPF_XADD is new in eBPF, and I don't think
  we need it for seccomp (yet), since we don't have any shared memory
  via maps.

BPF_ALU: It looks like we're also not allowing regular BPF_ALU
  instruction BPF_MOD; eBPF adds a few ones: BPF_MOV (register move),
  BPF_ARSH (sign extended right shift), and BPF_END (endianness
  conversion), wich I think should all be safe. In particular, we need
  to allow BPF_MOV at least, since that's how the converter implements
  BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX from classic.

BPF_ALU64: I think we can safely allow all these as above, since
  they're just the 64-bit versions.

BPF_JMP: eBPF adds BPF_JNE, BPF_JSGT, BPF_JSGE, BPF_CALL, and
  BPF_EXIT, which I think all should be safe (except maybe BPF_CALL
  since we're not allowing functions really). Again we have to allow
  one of the new eBPF codes, as the converter implements BPF_RET as
  BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT.

Thoughts?

Tycho

  reply	other threads:[~2015-09-09 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-04 16:04 c/r of seccomp filters via underlying eBPF Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:09     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:34   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 21:06     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:08       ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 15:50         ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2015-09-09 16:07           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 16:09             ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-09 16:37               ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 16:52                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 17:27                   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 17:31                     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07           ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 21:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-09 16:13     ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] seccomp: make underlying bpf ref counted as well Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:45     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:50       ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:58         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:00           ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:48       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 22:28         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:08           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-05  0:27             ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 22:34               ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 23:44                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10  0:13                   ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-10  0:44                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10  0:58                       ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:27           ` Kees Cook
2015-09-05  0:08             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 20:27   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:42     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:26   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:29     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:58       ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:40   ` Alexei Starovoitov
     [not found]   ` <1441382664-17437-6-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-04 20:41     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]       ` <CAGXu5jKke44txdYqEgPRrkn8SyWGjJuHxT2qMdq2ztp_16mQyw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-05  7:13         ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
     [not found]           ` <55EA95FE.7000006-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-08 13:40             ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09  0:07               ` Kees Cook
     [not found]                 ` <CAGXu5jKS0yX92XXhL6ZkqMrxkqFpPyyBd7wbsvEEx4rqZ0VG6g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 14:47                   ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 15:14                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
     [not found]                       ` <20150909151402.GA3429-2RGepAHry04KGsCuBW9QBvb0xQGhdpdCAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 15:55                         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] ebpf: allow BPF_REG_X in src_reg conditional jumps Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:06   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 22:43     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-05  4:12       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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