From: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@parallels.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2015 16:34:22 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150909223422.GE26679@smitten> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150905002727.GA3890@hopstrocity>
On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 06:27:27PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 04:08:53PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 3:28 PM, Tycho Andersen
> > <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:48:03PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 1:45 PM, Tycho Andersen
> > >> <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> > >> > On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 01:17:30PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 9:04 AM, Tycho Andersen
> > >> >> <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> > >> >> > This commit adds a way to dump eBPF programs. The initial implementation
> > >> >> > doesn't support maps, and therefore only allows dumping seccomp ebpf
> > >> >> > programs which themselves don't currently support maps.
> > >> >> >
> > >> >> > We export the GPL bit as well as a unique ID for the program so that
> > >> >>
> > >> >> This unique ID appears to be the heap address for the prog. That's a
> > >> >> huge leak, and should not be done. We don't want to introduce new
> > >> >> kernel address leaks while we're trying to fix the remaining ones.
> > >> >> Shouldn't the "unique ID" be the fd itself? I imagine KCMP_FILE
> > >> >> could be used, for example.
> > >> >
> > >> > No; we acquire the fd per process, so if a task installs a filter and
> > >> > then forks N times, we'll grab N (+1) copies of the filter from N (+1)
> > >> > different file descriptors. Ideally, we'd have some way to figure out
> > >> > that these were all the same. Some sort of prog_id is one way,
> > >> > although there may be others.
> > >>
> > >> I disagree a bit. I think we want the actual hierarchy to be a
> > >> well-defined thing, because I have plans to make the hierarchy
> > >> actually do something. That means that we'll need to have a more
> > >> exact way to dump the hierarchy than "these two filters are identical"
> > >> or "these two filters are not identical".
> > >
> > > Can you elaborate on what this would look like? I think with the
> > > "these two filters are the same" primitive (the same in the sense that
> > > they were inherited during a fork, not just that
> > > memcmp(filter1->insns, filter2->insns) == 0) you can infer the entire
> > > hierarchy, however clunky it may be to do so.
> > >
> > > Another issue is that KCMP_FILE won't work in this case, as it
> > > effectively compares the struct file *, which will be different since
> > > we need to call anon_inode_getfd() for each call of
> > > ptrace(PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD). We could add a KCMP_BPF (or just
> > > a KCMP_FILE_PRIVATE_DATA, since that's effectively what it would be).
> > > Does that make sense? [added Cyrill]
> > >
> >
> > I don't really know what it would look like. I think we want a way to
> > compare struct seccomp_filter pointers.
Here's a thought,
The set I'm currently proposing effectively separates the ref-counting
of the struct seccomp_filter from the struct bpf_prog (by necessity,
since we're referring to filters from fds). What if we went a little
futher, and made a copy of each seccomp_filter on fork(), keeping it
pointed at the same bpf_prog but adding some metadata about how it was
inherited (tsk->seccomp.filter->inheritence_count++ perhaps). This
would still require this change:
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 9c6bea6..efc3f36 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
> if (parent == NULL)
> return 1;
> for (; child; child = child->prev)
> - if (child == parent)
> + if (child->prog == parent->prog)
> return 1;
> return 0;
> }
to get the ancestry right on restore, but the change would make more
sense given that the seccomp_filter pointers were in fact unique at
this point.
To access it, we can change the current set to instead of iterating on
bpf_prog, to iterate on seccomp_filter, and add a few seccomp
commands, so the whole sequence looks like this:
seccomp_fd = ptrace(PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER_FD, pid);
if (seccomp(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF, SECCOMP_EBPF_INHERITANCE, fd) > 0) {
/* mark this as inherited from parent */
} else {
bpf_fd = seccomp(SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER_EBPF, SECCOMP_EBPF_GET_FD, seccomp_fd);
bpf(BPF_PROG_DUMP, &attr, sizeof(attr));
/* save things as normal */
}
Then we need some way to restore this inheritance_count; the only
thing I can think of right now is to let people specify it when they
add the filter via SECCOMP_EBPF_ADD_FD, but that doesn't seem ideal
since these are potentially unprivileged users (root in their user
ns). However, it's not clear to me how one would abuse it given that
is_ancestor actually checks the bpf_prog pointers.
Tycho
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-09 22:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-04 16:04 c/r of seccomp filters via underlying eBPF Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:08 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 15:50 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 16:09 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-09 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 16:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 17:31 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-09 16:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] seccomp: make underlying bpf ref counted as well Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:45 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:00 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 22:28 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-05 0:27 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 22:34 ` Tycho Andersen [this message]
2015-09-09 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-10 0:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-05 0:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 20:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:42 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <1441382664-17437-6-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-04 20:41 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKke44txdYqEgPRrkn8SyWGjJuHxT2qMdq2ztp_16mQyw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-05 7:13 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
[not found] ` <55EA95FE.7000006-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-08 13:40 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 0:07 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKS0yX92XXhL6ZkqMrxkqFpPyyBd7wbsvEEx4rqZ0VG6g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 14:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 15:14 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <20150909151402.GA3429-2RGepAHry04KGsCuBW9QBvb0xQGhdpdCAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 15:55 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] ebpf: allow BPF_REG_X in src_reg conditional jumps Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 22:43 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-05 4:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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