* [PATCH] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces
@ 2016-01-29 13:00 Tycho Andersen
[not found] ` <1454072433-20137-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2016-01-29 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pravin Shelar, David S. Miller
Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, containers, Tycho Andersen, Eric Biederman,
Justin Pettit
Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
Instead, let's do permissions checks in each function, but use the netlink
socket's user ns instead of the initial one, to allow management of
openvswitch resources from inside a user ns.
The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged
containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no
idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be
much appreciated.
Reported-by: James Page <james.page@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit@nicira.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
---
net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
index deadfda..aacfb11 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
@@ -557,6 +557,10 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
int err;
bool log = !a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PROBE];
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ goto err;
+
err = -EINVAL;
if (!a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET] || !a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY] ||
!a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS])
@@ -654,7 +658,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = packet_policy,
.doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute
}
@@ -920,6 +924,10 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
int error;
bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ goto error;
+
/* Must have key and actions. */
error = -EINVAL;
if (!a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
@@ -1104,6 +1112,10 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
bool ufid_present;
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ goto error;
+
/* Extract key. */
error = -EINVAL;
if (!a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
@@ -1274,6 +1286,9 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
bool ufid_present;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
ufid_present = ovs_nla_get_ufid(&ufid, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID], log);
if (a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
ovs_match_init(&match, &key, NULL);
@@ -1391,12 +1406,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del
},
@@ -1407,7 +1422,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set,
},
@@ -1530,8 +1545,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct datapath *dp;
struct vport *vport;
struct ovs_net *ovs_net;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err, i;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
err = -EINVAL;
if (!a[OVS_DP_ATTR_NAME] || !a[OVS_DP_ATTR_UPCALL_PID])
goto err;
@@ -1655,8 +1674,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct datapath *dp;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
if (!reply)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1688,8 +1711,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct datapath *dp;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
if (!reply)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1721,8 +1748,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct datapath *dp;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
if (!reply)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1777,12 +1808,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del
},
@@ -1793,7 +1824,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set,
},
@@ -1920,9 +1951,13 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct vport *vport;
struct datapath *dp;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
u32 port_no;
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_NAME] || !a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_TYPE] ||
!a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_UPCALL_PID])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1994,8 +2029,12 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct nlattr **a = info->attrs;
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct vport *vport;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
reply = ovs_vport_cmd_alloc_info();
if (!reply)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2046,8 +2085,12 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct nlattr **a = info->attrs;
struct sk_buff *reply;
struct vport *vport;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int err;
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
reply = ovs_vport_cmd_alloc_info();
if (!reply)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2158,12 +2201,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del
},
@@ -2174,7 +2217,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = 0,
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set,
},
--
2.5.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces
[not found] ` <1454072433-20137-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
@ 2016-01-29 14:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <8760yccvbw.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2016-01-29 14:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen
Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Pravin Shelar, Justin Pettit,
David S. Miller
Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> writes:
> Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
> this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
>
> Instead, let's do permissions checks in each function, but use the netlink
> socket's user ns instead of the initial one, to allow management of
> openvswitch resources from inside a user ns.
>
> The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged
> containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no
> idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be
> much appreciated.
So at a quick look using ns_capable this way is probably buggy.
netlink is goofy (because historically we got this wrong), and I forget
what the specific rules are. The general rule is that you need to do
your permission checks on open/create/connect and not inside send/write
while processing data. Otherwise there is a class of privileged
applications where you can set their stdout to some precreated file
descriptor and their output can be made to act as a command, bypassing
your permission checks.
Eric
> Reported-by: James Page <james.page-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
> CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
> CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar-LZ6Gd1LRuIk@public.gmane.org>
> CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
> index deadfda..aacfb11 100644
> --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
> +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
> @@ -557,6 +557,10 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> int err;
> bool log = !a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PROBE];
>
> + err = -EPERM;
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + goto err;
> +
> err = -EINVAL;
> if (!a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET] || !a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY] ||
> !a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS])
> @@ -654,7 +658,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = {
> { .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = packet_policy,
> .doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute
> }
> @@ -920,6 +924,10 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> int error;
> bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
>
> + error = -EPERM;
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + goto error;
> +
> /* Must have key and actions. */
> error = -EINVAL;
> if (!a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
> @@ -1104,6 +1112,10 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
> bool ufid_present;
>
> + error = -EPERM;
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + goto error;
> +
> /* Extract key. */
> error = -EINVAL;
> if (!a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
> @@ -1274,6 +1286,9 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> bool log = !a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE];
> bool ufid_present;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> ufid_present = ovs_nla_get_ufid(&ufid, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID], log);
> if (a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY]) {
> ovs_match_init(&match, &key, NULL);
> @@ -1391,12 +1406,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
> { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = flow_policy,
> .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = flow_policy,
> .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del
> },
> @@ -1407,7 +1422,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
> .dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = flow_policy,
> .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set,
> },
> @@ -1530,8 +1545,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> struct datapath *dp;
> struct vport *vport;
> struct ovs_net *ovs_net;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err, i;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> err = -EINVAL;
> if (!a[OVS_DP_ATTR_NAME] || !a[OVS_DP_ATTR_UPCALL_PID])
> goto err;
> @@ -1655,8 +1674,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> {
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct datapath *dp;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
> if (!reply)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -1688,8 +1711,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> {
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct datapath *dp;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
> if (!reply)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -1721,8 +1748,12 @@ static int ovs_dp_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> {
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct datapath *dp;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> reply = ovs_dp_cmd_alloc_info(info);
> if (!reply)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -1777,12 +1808,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
> { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = datapath_policy,
> .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = datapath_policy,
> .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del
> },
> @@ -1793,7 +1824,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
> .dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = datapath_policy,
> .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set,
> },
> @@ -1920,9 +1951,13 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct vport *vport;
> struct datapath *dp;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> u32 port_no;
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> if (!a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_NAME] || !a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_TYPE] ||
> !a[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_UPCALL_PID])
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1994,8 +2029,12 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> struct nlattr **a = info->attrs;
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct vport *vport;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> reply = ovs_vport_cmd_alloc_info();
> if (!reply)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -2046,8 +2085,12 @@ static int ovs_vport_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
> struct nlattr **a = info->attrs;
> struct sk_buff *reply;
> struct vport *vport;
> + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
> int err;
>
> + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> reply = ovs_vport_cmd_alloc_info();
> if (!reply)
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -2158,12 +2201,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
>
> static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
> { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = vport_policy,
> .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = vport_policy,
> .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del
> },
> @@ -2174,7 +2217,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
> .dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump
> },
> { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET,
> - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
> + .flags = 0,
> .policy = vport_policy,
> .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set,
> },
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces
[not found] ` <8760yccvbw.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
@ 2016-01-29 16:37 ` Tycho Andersen
2016-02-01 20:50 ` pravin shelar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2016-01-29 16:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Pravin Shelar, Justin Pettit,
David S. Miller
Hi Eric,
Thanks for the review.
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 08:29:55AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
> > Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
> > this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
> >
> > Instead, let's do permissions checks in each function, but use the netlink
> > socket's user ns instead of the initial one, to allow management of
> > openvswitch resources from inside a user ns.
> >
> > The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged
> > containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no
> > idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be
> > much appreciated.
>
> So at a quick look using ns_capable this way is probably buggy.
>
> netlink is goofy (because historically we got this wrong), and I forget
> what the specific rules are. The general rule is that you need to do
> your permission checks on open/create/connect and not inside send/write
> while processing data. Otherwise there is a class of privileged
> applications where you can set their stdout to some precreated file
> descriptor and their output can be made to act as a command, bypassing
> your permission checks.
It's worth noting that this patch doesn't move the checks (i.e., they
are still done at write time currently in the kernel), it just relaxes
them to root in the user ns instead of real root. This means I can
currently exploit netlink this way as an unprivileged, just not from
within an unprivileged container.
An alternate version of this patch below might be more favorable, as
we may want to do something like this elsewhere in netlink. I think it
also clarifies the situation a bit, at the cost of adding another
flag.
A third option would be to move this check to connect time, but that
would force everything in the family (since that's the only thing you
connect /to/ in netlink) to have the same required permissions, which
might (probably?) break stuff; e.g. you can call OVS_FLOW_CMD_GET
without CAP_NET_ADMIN, but if we changed everything in the family to
require it, that would break.
Tycho
---
include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 +
net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++--
net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
index c3363ba..5512c90 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr {
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08
+#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10
/*
* List of reserved static generic netlink identifiers:
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index f830326..6bbb3eb 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family,
if (ops == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
+ !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ||
+ ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) &&
+ !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
return -EPERM;
if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
index deadfda..d6f7fe9 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = packet_policy,
.doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute
}
@@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del
},
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set,
},
@@ -1777,12 +1777,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del
},
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set,
},
@@ -2158,12 +2158,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del
},
@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set,
},
--
2.5.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces
2016-01-29 16:37 ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2016-02-01 20:50 ` pravin shelar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: pravin shelar @ 2016-02-01 20:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, David S. Miller,
Linux Kernel Network Developers, linux-kernel, containers,
Justin Pettit
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 8:37 AM, Tycho Andersen
<tycho.andersen@canonical.com> wrote:
> Hi Eric,
>
> Thanks for the review.
>
> On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 08:29:55AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> writes:
>>
>> > Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
>> > this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
>> >
>> > Instead, let's do permissions checks in each function, but use the netlink
>> > socket's user ns instead of the initial one, to allow management of
>> > openvswitch resources from inside a user ns.
>> >
>> > The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged
>> > containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no
>> > idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be
>> > much appreciated.
>>
>> So at a quick look using ns_capable this way is probably buggy.
>>
>> netlink is goofy (because historically we got this wrong), and I forget
>> what the specific rules are. The general rule is that you need to do
>> your permission checks on open/create/connect and not inside send/write
>> while processing data. Otherwise there is a class of privileged
>> applications where you can set their stdout to some precreated file
>> descriptor and their output can be made to act as a command, bypassing
>> your permission checks.
>
> It's worth noting that this patch doesn't move the checks (i.e., they
> are still done at write time currently in the kernel), it just relaxes
> them to root in the user ns instead of real root. This means I can
> currently exploit netlink this way as an unprivileged, just not from
> within an unprivileged container.
>
> An alternate version of this patch below might be more favorable, as
> we may want to do something like this elsewhere in netlink. I think it
> also clarifies the situation a bit, at the cost of adding another
> flag.
>
> A third option would be to move this check to connect time, but that
> would force everything in the family (since that's the only thing you
> connect /to/ in netlink) to have the same required permissions, which
> might (probably?) break stuff; e.g. you can call OVS_FLOW_CMD_GET
> without CAP_NET_ADMIN, but if we changed everything in the family to
> require it, that would break.
>
> Tycho
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 +
> net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++--
> net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
> 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
> index c3363ba..5512c90 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr {
> #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02
> #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04
> #define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08
> +#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10
>
This approach looks good to me.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-02-01 20:50 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2016-01-29 13:00 [PATCH] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces Tycho Andersen
[not found] ` <1454072433-20137-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-29 14:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <8760yccvbw.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2016-01-29 16:37 ` Tycho Andersen
2016-02-01 20:50 ` pravin shelar
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