Re: [PATCH 3.2 085/115] veth: don???t modify ip_summed; doing so treats packets with bad checksums as good.

[Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>]

On Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 03:43:51PM -0700, Ben Greear wrote:
> On 04/30/2016 03:01 PM, Vijay Pandurangan wrote:
> > Consider:
> > 
> > - App A  sends out corrupt packets 50% of the time and discards inbound data.
(...)
> How can you make a generic app C know how to do this?  The path could be,
> for instance:
> 
> eth0 <-> user-space-A <-> vethA <-> vethB <-> { kernel routing logic } <-> vethC <-> vethD <-> appC
> 
> There are no sockets on vethB, but it does need to have special behaviour to elide
> csums.  Even if appC is hacked to know how to twiddle some thing on it's veth port,
> mucking with vethD will have no effect on vethB.
> 
> With regard to your example above, why would A corrupt packets?  My guess:
> 
> 1)  It has bugs (so, fix the bugs, it could equally create incorrect data with proper checksums,
>     so just enabling checksumming adds no useful protection.)

I agree with Ben here, what he needs is the ability for userspace to be
trusted when *forwarding* a packet. Ideally you'd only want to receive
the csum status per packet on the packet socket and pass the same value
on the vethA interface, with this status being kept when the packet
reaches vethB.

If A purposely corrupts packet, it's A's problem. It's similar to designing
a NIC which intentionally corrupts packets and reports "checksum good".

The real issue is that in order to do things right, the userspace bridge
(here, "A") would really need to pass this status. In Ben's case as he
says, bad checksum packets are dropped before reaching A, so that
simplifies the process quite a bit and that might be what causes some
confusion, but ideally we'd rather have recvmsg() and sendmsg() with
these flags.

I faced the exact same issue 3 years ago when playing with netmap, it was
slow as hell because it would lose all checksum information when packets
were passing through userland, resulting in GRO/GSO etc being disabled,
and had to modify it to let userland preserve it. That's especially
important when you have to deal with possibly corrupted packets not yet
detected in the chain because the NIC did not validate their checksums.

Willy