From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] bpf: rather use get_random_int for randomizations
Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 11:24:06 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <20160520.112406.286390667027285394.davem@davemloft.net>
References: <24461974e8402395c12b3e36b9ac7935b88ef1c2.1463572456.git.daniel@iogearbox.net>
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Cc: hannes@stressinduktion.org, alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com,
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From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 14:14:28 +0200

> Start address randomization and blinding in BPF currently use
> prandom_u32(). prandom_u32() values are not exposed to unpriviledged
> user space to my knowledge, but given other kernel facilities such as
> ASLR, stack canaries, etc make use of stronger get_random_int(), we
> better make use of it here as well given blinding requests successively
> new random values. get_random_int() has minimal entropy pool depletion,
> is not cryptographically secure, but doesn't need to be for our use
> cases here.
> 
> Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Ok, applied, thanks Daniel.