From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/3] tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 01:46:57 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160825234657.GA13469@breakpoint.cc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1472162771.14381.167.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com>
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-08-18 at 14:48 +0200, Florian Westphal wrote:
> > commit ceaa1fef65a7c2e ("tcp: adding a per-socket timestamp offset")
> > added the main infrastructure that is needed for per-connection
> > randomization, in particular writing/reading the on-wire tcp header
> > format takes the offset into account so rest of stack can use normal
> > tcp_time_stamp (jiffies).
[..]
> > +secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
> > + __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
> > {
> > u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
> > u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
> > + struct secure_tcp_seq seq;
> > u32 i;
> >
> > net_secret_init();
> > @@ -58,7 +60,9 @@ __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
> >
> > md5_transform(hash, secret);
> >
> > - return seq_scale(hash[0]);
> > + seq.seq = seq_scale(hash[0]);
> > + seq.tsoff = hash[1];
> > + return seq;
> > }
>
>
> I am not a super fan of this "struct secure_tcp_seq" being returned by
> functions. This adds unnecessary overhead.
>
> I would instead add a "u32 *ts_off" parameter, as you already did for
> tcp_v4_init_sequence()
>
> Patch on top of yours :
[..]
Looks great, I squashed it into my working branch.
Wrt. making randomization optional:
Would you go for another sysctl or should I just change
secure_tcpvX_sequence_number to check for tcp_timestamps == 2 mode?
*tsoff = sysctl_tcp_timestamps == 2 ? hash[1] : 0;
Could also use a static key but I don't think its worth it vs. md5 cost.
What do you think?
Thanks,
Florian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-25 23:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-18 12:48 [RFC 0/3] tcp: increase resilence vs. blind data injection Florian Westphal
2016-08-18 12:48 ` [RFC 1/3] tcp: randomize tcp timestamp offsets for each connection Florian Westphal
2016-08-18 16:18 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-18 22:32 ` Florian Westphal
2016-08-25 9:06 ` Florian Westphal
2016-08-25 14:15 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-25 14:49 ` Florian Westphal
2016-08-25 16:05 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-25 19:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-25 20:31 ` Florian Westphal
2016-08-25 21:06 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-25 22:06 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-25 23:46 ` Florian Westphal [this message]
2016-08-26 2:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2016-08-18 12:48 ` [RFC 2/3] tcp: add tcp_timestamps=2 mode to force tsecr validation on ofo segments Florian Westphal
2016-08-18 12:48 ` [RFC 3/3] tcp: add mib counter to track ts tsecr validation failures Florian Westphal
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