Re: README: [PATCH RFC 11/11] net/mlx5e: XDP TX xmit more

[Jesper Dangaard Brouer via iovisor-dev <iovisor-dev-9jONkmmOlFHEE9lA1F8Ukti2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>]

On Mon, 12 Sep 2016 12:56:28 -0700
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 01:30:25PM +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:
> > On Thu, 8 Sep 2016 23:30:50 -0700
> > Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >   
> > > On Fri, Sep 09, 2016 at 07:36:52AM +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:  
> > [...]  
> > > > Imagine you have packets intermixed towards the stack and XDP_TX. 
> > > > Every time you call the stack code, then you flush your icache.  When
> > > > returning to the driver code, you will have to reload all the icache
> > > > associated with the XDP_TX, this is a costly operation.    
> > >   
> > [...]  
> > > To make further progress in this discussion can we talk about
> > > the use case you have in mind instead? Then solution will
> > > be much clear, I hope.  
> > 
> > The DDoS use-case _is_ affected by this "hidden" bulking design.
> > 
> > Lets say, I want to implement a DDoS facility. Instead of just
> > dropping the malicious packets, I want to see the bad packets.  I
> > implement this by rewriting the destination-MAC to be my monitor
> > machine and then XDP_TX the packet.  
> 
> not following the use case. you want to implement a DDoS generator?
> Or just forward all bad packets from affected host to another host
> in the same rack? so two servers will be spammed with traffic and
> even more load on the tor? I really don't see how this is useful
> for anything but stress testing.

As I wrote below, the purpose of the monitor machine is to diagnose
false positives.  If you worry about the added load I would either,
forward out another interface (which is not supported yet) or simply do
sampling of packets being forwarded to the monitor host.

> > In the DDoS use-case, you have loaded your XDP/eBPF program, and 100%
> > of the traffic is delivered to the stack. (See note 1)  
> 
> hmm. DoS prevention use case is when 99% of the traffic is dropped.

As I wrote below, until the DDoS attack starts, all packets are
delivered to the stack.

> > Once the DDoS attack starts, then the traffic pattern changes, and XDP
> > should (hopefully only) catch the malicious traffic (monitor machine can
> > help diagnose false positive).  Now, due to interleaving the DDoS
> > traffic with the clean traffic, then efficiency of XDP_TX is reduced due to
> > more icache misses...
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Note(1): Notice I have already demonstrated that loading a XDP/eBPF
> > program with 100% delivery to the stack, actually slows down the
> > normal stack.  This is due to hitting a bottleneck in the page
> > allocator.  I'm working removing that bottleneck with page_pool, and
> > that solution is orthogonal to this problem.  
> 
> sure. no one arguing against improving page allocator.
> 
> >  It is actually an excellent argument, for why you would want to run a
> > DDoS XDP filter only on a restricted number of RX queues.  
> 
> no. it's the opposite. If the host is under DoS there is no way
> the host can tell in advance which rx queue will be seeing bad
> packets.

Sorry, this note was not related to the DoS use-case.  You
misunderstood it.

-- 
Best regards,
  Jesper Dangaard Brouer
  MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat
  Author of http://www.iptv-analyzer.org
  LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer