From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: tom@herbertland.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@fb.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/8] xdp: Infrastructure to generalize XDP
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 10:12:08 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170210.101208.1693704737584245625.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALx6S3695kv=Rr9V48k_CByCGvXLKzoM2XgpHiysB+cpaA4tzg@mail.gmail.com>
From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 20:55:34 -0800
> On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 7:33 PM, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> wrote:
>> From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
>> Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2017 18:29:54 -0800
>>
>>> So we have thousands or LOC coming into drivers every day anyway with
>>> all those properties anyway, so this "restricted" environment solves
>>> at best 1% of the problem.
>>
>> What you must understand is that no matter what someone outside of
>> upstream writes into an eBPF program, it's safe, and we can absolutely
>> prove this with the verifier and the invariants of the execution
>> environment.
>>
> This is the exact same argument the userspace stack proponents will
> use-- put your stack in userspace and you can't crash the host.
Sounds like we can therefore meet that requirement and keep them in
the kernel networking path, which supports all of our values and goals
precisely.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-02-10 17:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-08 23:41 [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] xdp: Generalize XDP Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/8] xdp: Infrastructure to generalize XDP Tom Herbert
2017-02-09 7:49 ` Jiri Pirko
2017-02-09 14:22 ` Mintz, Yuval
2017-02-09 22:17 ` David Miller
2017-02-09 22:26 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-09 22:34 ` David Miller
2017-02-09 22:45 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-10 1:42 ` David Miller
2017-02-10 2:29 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-10 3:33 ` David Miller
2017-02-10 4:55 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-10 15:12 ` David Miller [this message]
2017-02-09 23:08 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-10 1:48 ` David Miller
2017-02-10 2:30 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-10 5:42 ` Jason Wang
2017-02-13 2:41 ` [lkp-robot] [xdp] 543d41bf78: INFO:suspicious_RCU_usage kernel test robot
2017-02-14 20:31 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/8] xdp: Infrastructure to generalize XDP Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2017-02-14 20:47 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-14 21:07 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-14 22:08 ` Edward Cree
2017-02-14 22:28 ` Tom Herbert
2017-02-14 22:29 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/8] mlx4: Changes to use generic XDP infrastructure Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/8] nfp: " Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/8] qede: " Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 5/8] virt_net: " Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 6/8] mlx5: " Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 7/8] bnxt: " Tom Herbert
2017-02-08 23:41 ` [PATCH RFC v2 8/8] xdp: Cleanup after API changes Tom Herbert
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