From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 2/6] net/ipv6: use constant time memory comparison for mac Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2017 04:59:08 +0200 Message-ID: <20170610025912.6499-3-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20170610025912.6499-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , "David S. Miller" , netdev@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Return-path: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: In-Reply-To: <20170610025912.6499-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c index f950cb53d5e3..54213c83b44e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output)) return false; - if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN)) return false; return true; -- 2.13.1