From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To: jlee@suse.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jforbes@redhat.com,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Gary Lin <GLin@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 16:00:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171020230040.qlz5rnegldcpzzb7@ast-mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171020155748.kzrvg6565oxh6gmb@linux-rasp2>
On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 11:57:48PM +0800, jlee@suse.com wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 09:08:48AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
> > Hi Joey,
> >
> > Should I just lock down sys_bpf() entirely for now? We can always free it up
> > somewhat later.
> >
> > David
>
> OK~~ Please just remove my patch until we find out a way to
> verify bpf code or protect sensitive data in memory.
>
> I think that we don't need to lock down sys_bpf() now because
> we didn't lock down other interfaces for reading arbitrary
> address like /dev/mem and /dev/kmem.
If you want to lock down read access you'd need to disable
not only bpf, but all of kprobe and likey ftrace, since
untrusted root can infer kernel data by observing function
execution even if it cannot load modules and bpf progs.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 23:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
[not found] ` <150842476953.7923.18174368926573855810.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
2017-10-19 22:18 ` [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Alexei Starovoitov
2017-10-19 22:48 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <482.1508453314-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-19 23:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-11-09 17:15 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 2:47 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 8:08 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 15:57 ` jlee
2017-10-20 16:03 ` David Howells
2017-10-20 16:43 ` jlee
2017-10-23 14:53 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <21530.1508770380-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-10-25 7:07 ` joeyli
2017-10-20 23:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message]
2017-10-23 14:51 ` David Howells
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