Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok

Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09T21:49:02Z

On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:47:09PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:41 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 06:52:07PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> >> > From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> >> >
> >> > When access_ok fails we should always stop speculating.
> >> > Add the required barriers to the x86 access_ok macro.
> >>
> >> Honestly, this seems completely bogus.
> >>
> >> The description is pure garbage afaik.
> >>
> >> The fact is, we have to stop speculating when access_ok() does *not*
> >> fail - because that's when we'll actually do the access. And it's that
> >> access that needs to be non-speculative.
> >>
> >> That actually seems to be what the code does (it stops speculation
> >> when __range_not_ok() returns false, but access_ok() is
> >> !__range_not_ok()). But the explanation is crap, and dangerous.
> >
> > The description also seems to be missing the "why", as it's not
> > self-evident (to me, at least).
> >
> > Isn't this (access_ok/uaccess_begin/ASM_STAC) too early for the lfence?
> >
> > i.e., wouldn't the pattern be:
> >
> > get_user(uval, uptr);
> > if (uval < array_size) {
> > lfence();
> > foo = a2[a1[uval] * 256];
> > }
> >
> > Shouldn't the lfence come much later, *after* reading the variable and
> > comparing it and branching accordingly?
>
> The goal of putting the lfence in uaccess_begin() is to prevent
> speculation past access_ok().

Right, but what's the purpose of preventing speculation past
access_ok()?

--
Josh