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From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 20:22:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180106202213.23e553fb@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180106200912.zhzdt4qmfrojeeqe@ast-mbp>

> "Value prediction consists of predicting entire 32- and 64-bit register values
> based  on  previously-seen values"

For their implementation yes

> 
> > In other words there are at least two problems with Linus proposal
> > 
> > 1. The ffff/0000 mask has to be generated and that has to involve
> > speculative flows.  
> 
> to answer above and Thomas's
> "For one particular architecture and that's not a solution for generic code."
> 
> The following:
> #define array_access(base, idx, max) ({                         \
>         union { typeof(base[0]) _val; unsigned long _bit; } __u;\
>         unsigned long _i = (idx);                               \
>         unsigned long _m = (max);                               \
>         unsigned long _mask = ~(long)(_m - 1 - _i) >> 63;       \
>         __u._val = base[_i & _mask];                            \
>         __u._bit &= _mask;                                      \
>         __u._val; })
> 
> is generic and no speculative flows.

In the value speculation case imagine it's been called 1000 times for
process A which as a limit of say 16 so that file->priv->max is 16, and
then is run for process B which is different.

A value speculating processor waiting for file->priv->max which has been
pushed out of cache by an attacker is at liberty to say 'I've no idea
what max is but hey it was 16 last time so lets plug 16 in and keep going"

So while the change in the mask computation is clever and (subject to
compiler cleverness) safe against guesses of which path will be taken I
don't think it's generically safe.

Unfortunately a lot of things we index are of different sizes as seen by
different tasks, or when passed different other index values so this does
matter.

> Even if 'mask' in 'index & mask' example is a stall the educated
> guess will come from the prior value (according to the quoted paper)

Which might be for a different set of variables when the table is say per
process like file handles, or the value is different each call.

If we have single array of fixed size then I suspect you are right but
usually we don't.

Alan

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-06 20:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-06  1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:09 ` [PATCH 01/18] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  5:23     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:08       ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] Documentation: document " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 16:29   ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-08 17:09     ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-08 21:19       ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-10  2:04   ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-10  7:40     ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 17:24       ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] x86: implement nospec_barrier() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:52   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  3:09     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 23:31       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  1:20         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 21:09           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 23:44             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:53               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  5:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 12:32     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 17:56       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 18:13       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:39           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:54             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:25               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:36                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:41                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:02                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-06 18:38         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 18:51           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:55             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 20:09               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 20:22                 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2018-01-06 21:17                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 21:21                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 23:05                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07  3:38                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07  6:33                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 19:47                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:12                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:17                               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:56                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:23                                   ` David Miller
2018-01-08  7:38                                     ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 22:15                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:15                             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08  2:24                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:51                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:21                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 12:00                             ` David Laight
2018-01-08 12:12                               ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 12:33                                 ` David Laight
2018-01-07 10:08                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:09                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 13:59                         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08  2:57                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:57                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-06 20:42           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07  1:36             ` David Miller
2018-01-07 17:19               ` James Bottomley
2018-01-07 18:31                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:04                   ` David Miller
2018-01-07 19:24                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 21:41     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:47       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 21:49         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:59           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 22:23             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 22:35               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:09   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:40     ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 17:41       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  9:09         ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 19:37           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  8:40       ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 10:04         ` Greg KH
2018-01-09 14:26           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 14:47             ` Greg KH
2018-01-08 11:23   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09  2:11     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:23   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 15:06     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 16:38       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 16:34     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:03   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:42     ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:27       ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25         ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] Thermal/int340x: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:53   ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06  1:57     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:24       ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 10:03   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 13/18] ipv6: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:48   ` Stephen Hemminger
2018-01-06 18:05     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:00   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:01   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 12:23     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 15:14       ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 16:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:10           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:05   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:06   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-09  3:11   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09  3:42     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  4:13       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  4:21         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10  0:48         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:33           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:57           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  2:22             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  3:07               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  3:27           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 16:17       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 18:01         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  0:54           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-10  1:31             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 17/18] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:20   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 18/18] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
     [not found]   ` <87y3lbpvzp.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-06  6:30     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:43         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55           ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33           ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20       ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11  9:54       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34           ` Daniel Borkmann
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-09  0:12 [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Linus Torvalds

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