From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
alan@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 11:04:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180109100410.GA11968@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7187306.jmXyF4vJKt@avalon>
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 10:40:21AM +0200, Laurent Pinchart wrote:
> On Saturday, 6 January 2018 11:40:26 EET Greg KH wrote:
> > On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 10:09:07AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> >
> > While I'm all for fixing this type of thing, I feel like we need to do
> > something "else" for this as playing whack-a-mole for this pattern is
> > going to be a never-ending battle for all drivers for forever.
>
> That's my concern too, as even if we managed to find and fix all the
> occurrences of the problematic patterns (and we won't), new ones will keep
> being merged all the time.
And what about the millions of lines of out-of-tree drivers that we all
rely on every day in our devices? What about the distro kernels that
add random new drivers?
We need some sort of automated way to scan for this.
Intel, any chance we can get your coverity rules? Given that the date
of this original patchset was from last August, has anyone looked at
what is now in Linus's tree? What about linux-next? I just added 3
brand-new driver subsystems to the kernel tree there, how do we know
there isn't problems in them?
And what about all of the other ways user-data can be affected? Again,
as Peter pointed out, USB devices. I want some chance to be able to at
least audit the codebase we have to see if that path is an issue.
Without any hint of how to do this in an automated manner, we are all
in deep shit for forever.
> > Either we need some way to mark this data path to make it easy for tools
> > like sparse to flag easily, or we need to catch the issue in the driver
> > subsystems, which unfortunatly, would harm the drivers that don't have
> > this type of issue (like here.)
>
> But how would you do so ?
I do not know, it all depends on the access pattern, right?
> > I'm guessing that other operating systems, which don't have the luxury
> > of auditing all of their drivers are going for the "big hammer in the
> > subsystem" type of fix, right?
>
> Other operating systems that ship closed-source drivers authored by hardware
> vendors and not reviewed by third parties will likely stay vulnerable forever.
> That's a small concern though as I expect those drivers to contain much large
> security holes anyway.
Well yes, but odds are those operating systems are doing something to
mitigate this, right? Slowing down all user/kernel data paths?
Targeted code analysis tools? Something else? I doubt they just don't
care at all about it. At the least, I would think Coverity would be
trying to sell licenses for this :(
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-09 10:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 157+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-06 1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:09 ` [PATCH 01/18] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 5:23 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:08 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] Documentation: document " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 16:29 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-08 17:09 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-08 21:19 ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-10 2:04 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-10 7:40 ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 17:24 ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] x86: implement nospec_barrier() Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 3:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 23:31 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07 1:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 21:09 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 23:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:53 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 5:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 12:32 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 18:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:39 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:54 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:25 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:36 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:02 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-06 18:38 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:55 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 20:09 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 20:22 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 21:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 21:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 23:05 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07 3:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 6:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 19:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:23 ` David Miller
2018-01-08 7:38 ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 22:15 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 2:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 12:00 ` David Laight
2018-01-08 12:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 12:33 ` David Laight
2018-01-07 10:08 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:09 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 13:59 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 2:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08 9:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-06 20:42 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 1:36 ` David Miller
2018-01-07 17:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-07 18:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 2:04 ` David Miller
2018-01-07 19:24 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 21:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 21:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:59 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 22:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 22:35 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:09 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:40 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 17:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07 9:09 ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 8:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 10:04 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-01-09 14:26 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 14:47 ` Greg KH
2018-01-08 11:23 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 2:11 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:23 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 15:06 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 16:38 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 16:34 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:03 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:42 ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:27 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] Thermal/int340x: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:53 ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 1:57 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:24 ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 10:03 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 13/18] ipv6: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:48 ` Stephen Hemminger
2018-01-06 18:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 9:00 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 9:01 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 12:23 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 15:14 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 16:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:10 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:05 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:06 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-09 3:11 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 3:42 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 4:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 4:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 1:33 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 1:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 2:22 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 3:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10 3:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 16:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 18:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10 0:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-10 1:31 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 17/18] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:20 ` Jan Kara
2018-01-06 1:11 ` [PATCH 18/18] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87y3lbpvzp.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-06 6:30 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:43 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11 9:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34 ` Daniel Borkmann
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