From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 15:49:02 -0600
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Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:47:09PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:41 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 06:52:07PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> >> > From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> >> >
> >> > When access_ok fails we should always stop speculating.
> >> > Add the required barriers to the x86 access_ok macro.
> >>
> >> Honestly, this seems completely bogus.
> >>
> >> The description is pure garbage afaik.
> >>
> >> The fact is, we have to stop speculating when access_ok() does *not*
> >> fail - because that's when we'll actually do the access. And it's that
> >> access that needs to be non-speculative.
> >>
> >> That actually seems to be what the code does (it stops speculation
> >> when __range_not_ok() returns false, but access_ok() is
> >> !__range_not_ok()). But the explanation is crap, and dangerous.
> >
> > The description also seems to be missing the "why", as it's not
> > self-evident (to me, at least).
> >
> > Isn't this (access_ok/uaccess_begin/ASM_STAC) too early for the lfence?
> >
> > i.e., wouldn't the pattern be:
> >
> >         get_user(uval, uptr);
> >         if (uval < array_size) {
> >                 lfence();
> >                 foo = a2[a1[uval] * 256];
> >         }
> >
> > Shouldn't the lfence come much later, *after* reading the variable and
> > comparing it and branching accordingly?
> 
> The goal of putting the lfence in uaccess_begin() is to prevent
> speculation past access_ok().

Right, but what's the purpose of preventing speculation past
access_ok()?

-- 
Josh