Re: [net-next v3 0/2] eBPF seccomp filters

[Tycho Andersen <tycho-E0fblnxP3wo@public.gmane.org>]

On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 07:46:19PM -0800, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 5:01 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho-E0fblnxP3wo@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 03:20:15PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 3:04 PM, Alexei Starovoitov
> >> <alexei.starovoitov-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 07:26:54AM +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> >> >> This patchset enables seccomp filters to be written in eBPF. Although, this
> >> >> [...]
> >> > The main statement I want to hear from seccomp maintainers before
> >> > proceeding any further on this that enabling eBPF in seccomp won't lead
> >> > to seccomp folks arguing against changes in bpf core (like verifier)
> >> > just because it's used by seccomp.
> >> > It must be spelled out in the commit log with explicit Ack.
> >>
> >> The primary thing I'm concerned about with eBPF and seccomp is
> >> side-effects from eBPF programs running at syscall time. This is an
> >> extremely sensitive area, and I want to be sure there won't be
> >> feature-creep here that leads to seccomp getting into a bad state.
> >>
> >> As long as seccomp can continue have its own verifier,
> >
> > I guess these patches should introduce some additional restrictions in
> > kernel/seccomp.c then? Based on my reading now, it's whatever the eBPF
> > verifier allows.
> >
> Like what? The helpers allowed are listed in seccomp.c. You have the
> same restrictions as the traditional eBPF verifier (no unsafe memory
> access, jumps backwards, etc..). I'm not sure which built-in eBPF
> functionality presents risk.

I think that's the $64,000 question that Kees is trying to answer r.e.
maps, etc.

There's also the possibility that eBPF grows something new
that's unsafe for seccomp.

Cheers,

Tycho