From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: aes-cmac: remove VLA usage
Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 08:42:47 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180321134247.GA1275@embeddedgus> (raw)
In preparation to enabling -Wvla, remove VLAs and replace them
with dynamic memory allocation instead.
The use of stack Variable Length Arrays needs to be avoided, as they
can be a vector for stack exhaustion, which can be both a runtime bug
or a security flaw. Also, in general, as code evolves it is easy to
lose track of how big a VLA can get. Thus, we can end up having runtime
failures that are hard to debug.
Also, fixed as part of the directive to remove all VLAs from
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
index 2fb6558..c9444bf 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
@@ -27,30 +27,42 @@ static const u8 zero[CMAC_TLEN_256];
void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *aad,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- desc->tfm = tfm;
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash)
+ return;
- crypto_shash_init(desc);
- crypto_shash_update(desc, aad, AAD_LEN);
- crypto_shash_update(desc, data, data_len - CMAC_TLEN);
- crypto_shash_finup(desc, zero, CMAC_TLEN, out);
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+ crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ crypto_shash_update(shash, aad, AAD_LEN);
+ crypto_shash_update(shash, data, data_len - CMAC_TLEN);
+ crypto_shash_finup(shash, zero, CMAC_TLEN, out);
memcpy(mic, out, CMAC_TLEN);
+ kfree(shash);
}
void ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *aad,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
+
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash)
+ return;
- desc->tfm = tfm;
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
- crypto_shash_init(desc);
- crypto_shash_update(desc, aad, AAD_LEN);
- crypto_shash_update(desc, data, data_len - CMAC_TLEN_256);
- crypto_shash_finup(desc, zero, CMAC_TLEN_256, mic);
+ crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ crypto_shash_update(shash, aad, AAD_LEN);
+ crypto_shash_update(shash, data, data_len - CMAC_TLEN_256);
+ crypto_shash_finup(shash, zero, CMAC_TLEN_256, mic);
+ kfree(shash);
}
struct crypto_shash *ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(const u8 key[],
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-03-21 13:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-21 13:42 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-03-21 13:48 ` [PATCH] mac80211: aes-cmac: remove VLA usage Johannes Berg
2018-03-21 13:57 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-03-21 13:58 ` Johannes Berg
2018-03-21 14:02 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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