From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered
Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 08:59:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180729135906.lgqo5ue6it3hl2da@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180727224302.5503-3-jcline@redhat.com>
On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 10:43:02PM +0000, Jeremy Cline wrote:
> 'family' can be a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds
> check to avoid speculative out-of-bounds access.
>
> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
> ---
> net/socket.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
> index f15d5cbb3ba4..608e29ae6baf 100644
> --- a/net/socket.c
> +++ b/net/socket.c
> @@ -2672,7 +2672,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_unregister);
>
> bool sock_is_registered(int family)
> {
> - return family < NPROTO && rcu_access_pointer(net_families[family]);
> + return family < NPROTO &&
> + rcu_access_pointer(net_families[array_index_nospec(family, NPROTO)]);
> }
>
> static int __init sock_init(void)
This is another one where I think it would be better to do the nospec
clamp higher up the call chain. The untrusted 'family' value comes from
__sock_diag_cmd():
__sock_diag_cmd
sock_load_diag_module
sock_is_registered
That function has a bounds check, and also uses the value in some other
array accesses:
if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (sock_diag_handlers[req->sdiag_family] == NULL)
sock_load_diag_module(req->sdiag_family, 0);
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
hndl = sock_diag_handlers[req->sdiag_family];
...
So I think clamping 'req->sdiag_family' right after the bounds check
would be the way to go.
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-29 13:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-27 22:43 [PATCH 0/2] net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadgets Jeremy Cline
2018-07-27 22:43 ` [PATCH 1/2] net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall Jeremy Cline
2018-07-29 13:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-07-27 22:43 ` [PATCH 2/2] net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered Jeremy Cline
2018-07-29 13:59 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2018-07-29 15:59 ` Jeremy Cline
2018-08-13 17:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-08-13 19:03 ` Jeremy Cline
2018-07-29 5:45 ` [PATCH 0/2] net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadgets David Miller
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