From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Al Viro Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: sched: Fix memory exposure from short TCA_U32_SEL Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 16:59:38 +0100 Message-ID: <20180828155938.GF6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <20180826055801.GA42063@beast> <20180826061534.GT6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20180826173236.GU6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20180826225749.GY6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20180828000310.GE6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim , Kees Cook , LKML , Jiri Pirko , David Miller , Linux Kernel Network Developers To: Cong Wang Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20180828000310.GE6515@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Aug 28, 2018 at 01:03:10AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > if (tcf_exts_get_net(&n->exts)) > tcf_queue_work(&n->rwork, u32_delete_key_freepf_work); > else > u32_destroy_key(n->tp, n, true); > ... and we hit u32_destroy_key(, , true), which does Speaking of which, we'd better never hit that branch for other reasons - there's no RCU delay between removal of knode from the hash chain and its kfree(). tcf_queue_work() does guarantee such delay (by use of queue_rcu_work()), direct call doesn't... Anyway, whichever branch is taken, the memory corruption problem remains - the comments below are accurate, AFAICS. > Incidentally, if we hit > tcf_queue_work(&n->rwork, u32_delete_key_freepf_work); > instead of u32_destroy_key(), the things don't seem to be any better - we > won't do anything to until rtnl is dropped, so u32_destroy() won't > break on the second pass through the loop - it'll free there and > return. Setting us up for trouble, since when u32_delete_key_freepf_work() > finally gets to u32_destroy_key() we'll have ->ht_down pointing > to freed memory and decrementing its contents...