[net-next 09/15] ice: Extend malicious operations detection logic

[Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>]

From: Anirudh Venkataramanan <anirudh.venkataramanan@intel.com>

This patch extends the existing malicious driver operation detection
logic to cover malicious operations by the VF driver as well.

Signed-off-by: Anirudh Venkataramanan <anirudh.venkataramanan@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
---
 .../net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_hw_autogen.h   |  8 ++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c     | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h  |  8 +++-
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_hw_autogen.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_hw_autogen.h
index 5a4fa22d0a83..a6679a9bfd3a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_hw_autogen.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_hw_autogen.h
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@
 #define PF_MDET_TX_PQM_VALID_M			BIT(0)
 #define PF_MDET_TX_TCLAN			0x000FC000
 #define PF_MDET_TX_TCLAN_VALID_M		BIT(0)
+#define VP_MDET_RX(_VF)				(0x00294400 + ((_VF) * 4))
+#define VP_MDET_RX_VALID_M			BIT(0)
+#define VP_MDET_TX_PQM(_VF)			(0x002D2000 + ((_VF) * 4))
+#define VP_MDET_TX_PQM_VALID_M			BIT(0)
+#define VP_MDET_TX_TCLAN(_VF)			(0x000FB800 + ((_VF) * 4))
+#define VP_MDET_TX_TCLAN_VALID_M		BIT(0)
+#define VP_MDET_TX_TDPU(_VF)			(0x00040000 + ((_VF) * 4))
+#define VP_MDET_TX_TDPU_VALID_M			BIT(0)
 #define GLNVM_FLA				0x000B6108
 #define GLNVM_FLA_LOCKED_M			BIT(6)
 #define GLNVM_GENS				0x000B6100
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
index d7cbc2e6e5c5..948c97defeba 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
@@ -951,6 +951,7 @@ static void ice_handle_mdd_event(struct ice_pf *pf)
 	struct ice_hw *hw = &pf->hw;
 	bool mdd_detected = false;
 	u32 reg;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!test_bit(__ICE_MDD_EVENT_PENDING, pf->state))
 		return;
@@ -1040,6 +1041,51 @@ static void ice_handle_mdd_event(struct ice_pf *pf)
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* see if one of the VFs needs to be reset */
+	for (i = 0; i < pf->num_alloc_vfs && mdd_detected; i++) {
+		struct ice_vf *vf = &pf->vf[i];
+
+		reg = rd32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_PQM(i));
+		if (reg & VP_MDET_TX_PQM_VALID_M) {
+			wr32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_PQM(i), 0xFFFF);
+			vf->num_mdd_events++;
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "TX driver issue detected on VF %d\n",
+				 i);
+		}
+
+		reg = rd32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_TCLAN(i));
+		if (reg & VP_MDET_TX_TCLAN_VALID_M) {
+			wr32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_TCLAN(i), 0xFFFF);
+			vf->num_mdd_events++;
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "TX driver issue detected on VF %d\n",
+				 i);
+		}
+
+		reg = rd32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_TDPU(i));
+		if (reg & VP_MDET_TX_TDPU_VALID_M) {
+			wr32(hw, VP_MDET_TX_TDPU(i), 0xFFFF);
+			vf->num_mdd_events++;
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "TX driver issue detected on VF %d\n",
+				 i);
+		}
+
+		reg = rd32(hw, VP_MDET_RX(i));
+		if (reg & VP_MDET_RX_VALID_M) {
+			wr32(hw, VP_MDET_RX(i), 0xFFFF);
+			vf->num_mdd_events++;
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "RX driver issue detected on VF %d\n",
+				 i);
+		}
+
+		if (vf->num_mdd_events > ICE_DFLT_NUM_MDD_EVENTS_ALLOWED) {
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev,
+				 "Too many MDD events on VF %d, disabled\n", i);
+			dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev,
+				 "Use PF Control I/F to re-enable the VF\n");
+			set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* re-enable MDD interrupt cause */
 	clear_bit(__ICE_MDD_EVENT_PENDING, pf->state);
 	reg = rd32(hw, PFINT_OICR_ENA);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
index a493cb1bb89d..10131e0180f9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
@@ -9,10 +9,13 @@
 #define ICE_VLAN_PRIORITY_S		12
 #define ICE_VLAN_M			0xFFF
 #define ICE_PRIORITY_M			0x7000
-#define ICE_MAX_VLAN_PER_VF		8 /* restriction for non-trusted VF */
 
-/* Restrict number of MACs a non-trusted VF can program */
+/* Restrict number of MAC Addr and VLAN that non-trusted VF can programmed */
+#define ICE_MAX_VLAN_PER_VF		8
 #define ICE_MAX_MACADDR_PER_VF		12
+
+/* Malicious Driver Detection */
+#define ICE_DFLT_NUM_MDD_EVENTS_ALLOWED		3
 #define ICE_DFLT_NUM_INVAL_MSGS_ALLOWED		10
 
 /* Static VF transaction/status register def */
@@ -56,6 +59,7 @@ struct ice_vf {
 	u8 trusted;
 	u16 lan_vsi_idx;		/* index into PF struct */
 	u16 lan_vsi_num;		/* ID as used by firmware */
+	u64 num_mdd_events;		/* number of mdd events detected */
 	u64 num_inval_msgs;		/* number of continuous invalid msgs */
 	u64 num_valid_msgs;		/* number of valid msgs detected */
 	unsigned long vf_caps;		/* vf's adv. capabilities */
-- 
2.17.1