From: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com>
To: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Cc: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@umn.edu>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)"
<netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)"
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] bpf: btf: Fix a missing-check bug
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 17:26:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181024172514.l33dsaqdvs5yewvm@kafai-mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1540386020-30680-1-git-send-email-wang6495@umn.edu>
On Wed, Oct 24, 2018 at 08:00:19AM -0500, Wenwen Wang wrote:
> In btf_parse(), the header of the user-space btf data 'btf_data' is firstly
> parsed and verified through btf_parse_hdr(). In btf_parse_hdr(), the header
> is copied from user-space 'btf_data' to kernel-space 'btf->hdr' and then
> verified. If no error happens during the verification process, the whole
> data of 'btf_data', including the header, is then copied to 'data' in
> btf_parse(). It is obvious that the header is copied twice here. More
> importantly, no check is enforced after the second copy to make sure the
> headers obtained in these two copies are same. Given that 'btf_data'
> resides in the user space, a malicious user can race to modify the header
> between these two copies. By doing so, the user can inject inconsistent
> data, which can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and introduce
> potential security risk.
>
> To avoid the above issue, this patch copies the parsed header from
> 'btf->hdr' to 'data'. The remaining part in 'data' is still copied from the
> user-space 'btf_data'.
LGTM.
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/btf.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> index 378cef7..b52a834a 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
> @@ -2152,6 +2152,7 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size,
> struct btf_verifier_env *env = NULL;
> struct bpf_verifier_log *log;
> struct btf *btf = NULL;
> + u32 hdr_len;
> u8 *data;
> int err;
>
> @@ -2200,7 +2201,15 @@ static struct btf *btf_parse(void __user *btf_data, u32 btf_data_size,
> btf->data_size = btf_data_size;
> btf->nohdr_data = btf->data + btf->hdr.hdr_len;
>
> - if (copy_from_user(data, btf_data, btf_data_size)) {
> + /*
> + * The header at btf_data could be modified by a malicious user
> + * after it is parsed. So we copy the parsed header here. The
> + * remaining part is still copied from btf_data.
> + */
> + hdr_len = min_t(u32, btf->hdr.hdr_len, sizeof(btf->hdr));
> + memcpy(data, &btf->hdr, hdr_len);
> + if (copy_from_user(data + hdr_len, (u8 __user *)btf_data + hdr_len,
> + btf_data_size - hdr_len)) {
> err = -EFAULT;
> goto errout;
> }
> --
> 2.7.4
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-24 17:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-24 13:00 [PATCH v2] bpf: btf: Fix a missing-check bug Wenwen Wang
2018-10-24 17:26 ` Martin Lau [this message]
2018-10-24 18:22 ` Martin Lau
2018-10-24 20:42 ` Martin Lau
2018-10-24 21:50 ` Song Liu
2018-10-25 22:58 ` Daniel Borkmann
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