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From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] nfc: af_nfc: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:47:53 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181221214753.GA2799@embeddedor> (raw)

proto is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/nfc/af_nfc.c:42 nfc_sock_create() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing proto before using it to index proto_tab.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 net/nfc/af_nfc.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/nfc/af_nfc.c b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c
index d3e594eb36d0..256f3c57059e 100644
--- a/net/nfc/af_nfc.c
+++ b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/nfc.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "nfc.h"
 
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ static int nfc_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto,
 
 	if (proto < 0 || proto >= NFC_SOCKPROTO_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	proto = array_index_nospec(proto, NFC_SOCKPROTO_MAX);
 
 	read_lock(&proto_tab_lock);
 	if (proto_tab[proto] &&	try_module_get(proto_tab[proto]->owner)) {
-- 
2.20.1

             reply	other threads:[~2018-12-21 21:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-21 21:47 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-12-22 23:09 ` [PATCH] nfc: af_nfc: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability David Miller
2018-12-22 23:37   ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-12-23  2:42     ` David Miller
     [not found]       ` <20181222.184217.692941087610805245.davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
2018-12-23  3:03         ` Gustavo A. R. Silva

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