From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Miller Subject: Re: [PATCH] phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Sat, 22 Dec 2018 15:08:42 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <20181222.150842.1563344934152542563.davem@davemloft.net> References: <20181221214117.GA1539@embeddedor> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: courmisch@gmail.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: gustavo@embeddedor.com Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20181221214117.GA1539@embeddedor> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2018 15:41:17 -0600 > protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > net/phonet/af_phonet.c:48 phonet_proto_get() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] (local cap) > > Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Applied, thanks.