From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: ast@kernel.org
Cc: jannh@google.com, davem@davemloft.net,
jakub.kicinski@netronome.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: [PATCH bpf v3 1/9] bpf: move {prev_,}insn_idx into verifier env
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 00:58:27 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190102235835.3311-2-daniel@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190102235835.3311-1-daniel@iogearbox.net>
Move prev_insn_idx and insn_idx from the do_check() function into
the verifier environment, so they can be read inside the various
helper functions for handling the instructions. It's easier to put
this into the environment rather than changing all call-sites only
to pass it along. insn_idx is useful in particular since this later
on allows to hold state in env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index c233efc..3f84f3e 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
* one verifier_env per bpf_check() call
*/
struct bpf_verifier_env {
+ u32 insn_idx;
+ u32 prev_insn_idx;
struct bpf_prog *prog; /* eBPF program being verified */
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *head; /* stack of verifier states to be processed */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 71d86e3..afa8515 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5650,7 +5650,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i;
- int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
@@ -5670,19 +5669,19 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
0 /* frameno */,
0 /* subprogno, zero == main subprog */);
- insn_idx = 0;
+
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
- if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
+ if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
- insn_idx, insn_cnt);
+ env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
return -EFAULT;
}
- insn = &insns[insn_idx];
+ insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
@@ -5692,7 +5691,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -E2BIG;
}
- err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
+ err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 1) {
@@ -5700,9 +5699,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (env->log.level) {
if (do_print_state)
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
- prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
+ env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx);
else
- verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
}
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
@@ -5715,10 +5714,10 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
if (env->log.level > 1)
- verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
else
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:",
- prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
+ env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx);
print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
do_print_state = false;
}
@@ -5729,20 +5728,20 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
.private_data = env,
};
- verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
- verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
+ verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
+ verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
}
if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
- err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, insn_idx,
- prev_insn_idx);
+ err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
+ env->prev_insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
- env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
@@ -5768,13 +5767,13 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
- insn->dst_reg, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
- prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+ prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
/* saw a valid insn
@@ -5799,10 +5798,10 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
- err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
+ err = check_xadd(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
if (err)
return err;
- insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_idx++;
continue;
}
@@ -5818,13 +5817,13 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
- insn->src_reg, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
- prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+ prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
@@ -5852,9 +5851,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
- -1, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5872,9 +5871,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
- err = check_func_call(env, insn, &insn_idx);
+ err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
else
- err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
+ err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5887,7 +5886,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
- insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
+ env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
@@ -5901,8 +5900,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (state->curframe) {
/* exit from nested function */
- prev_insn_idx = insn_idx;
- err = prepare_func_exit(env, &insn_idx);
+ env->prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
+ err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
do_print_state = true;
@@ -5932,7 +5931,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (err)
return err;
process_bpf_exit:
- err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &insn_idx);
+ err = pop_stack(env, &env->prev_insn_idx,
+ &env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0) {
if (err != -ENOENT)
return err;
@@ -5942,7 +5942,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
continue;
}
} else {
- err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
+ err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -5959,8 +5959,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (err)
return err;
- insn_idx++;
- env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
+ env->insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -5970,7 +5970,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
- insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_idx++;
}
verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ",
--
2.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-02 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-02 23:58 [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/9] bpf: move tmp variable into ax register in interpreter Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 3/9] bpf: enable access to ax register also from verifier rewrite Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 4/9] bpf: restrict map value pointer arithmetic for unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 5/9] bpf: restrict stack " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 6/9] bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds " Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 7/9] bpf: fix check_map_access smin_value test when pointer contains offset Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 8/9] bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-03 21:13 ` Jann Horn
2019-01-03 23:22 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-02 23:58 ` [PATCH bpf v3 9/9] bpf: add various test cases to selftests Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-03 0:08 ` [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation Alexei Starovoitov
2019-01-22 14:36 ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? [was: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation] Jann Horn
2019-01-22 16:44 ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? David Miller
2019-01-23 1:55 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-01-23 17:04 ` stable backport for the BPF speculation series? [was: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 0/9] bpf fix to prevent oob under speculation] Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-01-23 17:12 ` Jann Horn
2019-01-24 11:53 ` Daniel Borkmann
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