From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, jasowang@redhat.com,
maximmi@mellanox.com, willemb@google.com,
syzkaller@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: validate untrusted gso packets without csum offload
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 20:31:28 -0800 (PST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190215.203128.1003165694631138290.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190215171547.247018-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 12:15:47 -0500
> From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
>
> Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input.
> By building an excessively large packet to cause an skb field to wrap.
>
> If VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM was set this would have been dropped in
> skb_partial_csum_set.
>
> GSO packets that do not set checksum offload are suspicious and rare.
> Most callers of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb already pass them to
> skb_probe_transport_header.
>
> Move that test forward, change it to detect parse failure and drop
> packets on failure as those cleary are not one of the legitimate
> VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO types.
>
> Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
> Fixes: f43798c27684 ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr")
> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Willem.
> This captures a variety of bad gso packets, but to tighten further:
>
> - drop SKB_GSO_DODGY packets with ipip/sit/.. , which cannot be legal.
> by ipip_gso_segment wrappers around inet_gso_segment
> expands on 121d57af308d ("gso: validate gso_type in GSO handlers")
>
> - limit the number of ipv6 exthdrs allowed from dodgy sources.
> not sure where to draw the line. but not at 64K ;)
>
> - validate the network and transport protocol returned in
> skb_probe_transport_header against the VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO type
>
> - probe all dodgy GSO packets, also those that set checksum offload.
> this will have a performance impact, discussed previously in
> http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/861874/
> but it would have blocked this latest bug as well
>
> All but the last one seem pretty uncontroversial to me. If no one
> objects I plan to send those to net-next.
No objections from me.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-16 4:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-15 17:15 [PATCH net] net: validate untrusted gso packets without csum offload Willem de Bruijn
2019-02-15 17:36 ` Eric Dumazet
2019-02-16 4:31 ` David Miller [this message]
2019-02-18 19:12 ` Willem de Bruijn
2019-02-19 4:40 ` Willem de Bruijn
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