From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDA1BC3A5A8 for ; Wed, 4 Sep 2019 18:43:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A78F32168B for ; Wed, 4 Sep 2019 18:43:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1567622619; bh=uIyD+HkiEx4GwgLAnwaVLq8MIE+STB7mGwuTx/gv6Sc=; h=From:To:CC:Subject:Date:List-ID:From; b=ov1wfQAkOFzxUIUVIgF+srcmaJr9IqNGCUKCR1lJCaqc9EbUwMy91zXZlhFq6x0Ed HZI8kp3ppO27wyHndtmEqmjpahw0dAie1R3/KH2PFj2MRt8XnIe0JXsbcyqbt7P5L5 hV48axMYqrf/qA/PQ+9RT8PeXLPpBtV+adEEdi0c= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1733037AbfIDSni convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Sep 2019 14:43:38 -0400 Received: from mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com ([67.231.145.42]:4510 "EHLO mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732682AbfIDSni (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Sep 2019 14:43:38 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0109334.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id x84IhLmQ032563 for ; Wed, 4 Sep 2019 11:43:37 -0700 Received: from maileast.thefacebook.com ([163.114.130.16]) by mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2usu2fp5cy-19 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 04 Sep 2019 11:43:37 -0700 Received: from mx-out.facebook.com (2620:10d:c0a8:1b::d) by mail.thefacebook.com (2620:10d:c0a8:82::c) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1713.5; Wed, 4 Sep 2019 11:43:36 -0700 Received: by devbig007.ftw2.facebook.com (Postfix, from userid 572438) id 4FC587609CE; Wed, 4 Sep 2019 11:43:35 -0700 (PDT) Smtp-Origin-Hostprefix: devbig From: Alexei Starovoitov Smtp-Origin-Hostname: devbig007.ftw2.facebook.com To: CC: , , , , , , Smtp-Origin-Cluster: ftw2c04 Subject: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/3] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 11:43:33 -0700 Message-ID: <20190904184335.360074-1-ast@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT X-FB-Internal: Safe Content-Type: text/plain X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.70,1.0.8 definitions=2019-09-04_05:2019-09-04,2019-09-04 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=fb_default_notspam policy=fb_default score=0 mlxscore=0 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 clxscore=1034 suspectscore=1 lowpriorityscore=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 bulkscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-1906280000 definitions=main-1909040187 X-FB-Internal: deliver Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Split BPF and perf/tracing operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into corresponding CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING. For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well. The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF: - for tracing program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING - for networking program types BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, CGROUP_SKB, SK_SKB, etc} use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN There are few exceptions from this simple rule: - bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using ftrace mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_TRACING. - cpumap is used by XDP programs. Currently it's kept under CAP_SYS_ADMIN, but could be relaxed to CAP_NET_ADMIN in the future. - BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only to discourage production use. - BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. - cg_sysctl, cg_device, lirc program types are neither networking nor tracing. They can be loaded under CAP_BPF, but attach is allowed under CAP_NET_ADMIN. This will be cleaned up in the future. userid=nobody + (CAP_TRACING | CAP_NET_ADMIN) + CAP_BPF is safer than typical setup with userid=root and sudo by existing bpf applications. It's not secure, since these capabilities: - allow bpf progs access arbitrary memory - let tasks access any bpf map - let tasks attach/detach any bpf prog bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should not be installed with cap_bpf+cap_tracing, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets. CAP_BPF, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_TRACING are roughly equal in terms of damage they can make to the system. Example: CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic. CAP_BPF can write into map and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog the network traffic may stop. CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system. CAP_TRACING allows many kprobes that can slow down the system. In the future more fine-grained bpf permissions may be added. v2->v3: - dropped ftrace and kallsyms from CAP_TRACING description. In the future these mechanisms can start using it too. - added CAP_SYS_ADMIN backward compatibility. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- include/linux/capability.h | 18 +++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +-- 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index ecce0f43c73a..13eb49c75797 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -247,6 +247,24 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ + +static inline bool capable_bpf(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF); +} +static inline bool capable_tracing(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_TRACING); +} +static inline bool capable_bpf_tracing(void) +{ + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (capable(CAP_BPF) && capable(CAP_TRACING)); +} +static inline bool capable_bpf_net_admin(void) +{ + return (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF)) && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN); +} + extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct inode *inode); extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index 240fdb9a60f6..fb71dee0ac2b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -366,8 +366,54 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* + * CAP_BPF allows the following BPF operations: + * - Loading all types of BPF programs + * - Creating all types of BPF maps except: + * - stackmap that needs CAP_TRACING + * - devmap that needs CAP_NET_ADMIN + * - cpumap that needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * - Advanced verifier features + * - Indirect variable access + * - Bounded loops + * - BPF to BPF function calls + * - Scalar precision tracking + * - Larger complexity limits + * - Dead code elimination + * - And potentially other features + * - Use of pointer-to-integer conversions in BPF programs + * - Bypassing of speculation attack hardening measures + * - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data + * - Iterate system wide loaded programs, maps, BTF objects + * - Retrieve xlated and JITed code of BPF programs + * - Access maps and programs via id + * - Use bpf_spin_lock() helper + * + * CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING together allow the following: + * - bpf_probe_read to read arbitrary kernel memory + * - bpf_trace_printk to print data to ftrace ring buffer + * - Attach to raw_tracepoint + * - Query association between kprobe/tracepoint and bpf program + * + * CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN together allow the following: + * - Attach to cgroup-bpf hooks and query + * - skb, xdp, flow_dissector test_run command + * + * CAP_NET_ADMIN allows: + * - Attach networking bpf programs to xdp, tc, lwt, flow dissector + */ +#define CAP_BPF 38 + +/* + * CAP_TRACING allows: + * - Full use of perf_event_open(), similarly to the effect of + * kernel.perf_event_paranoid == -1 + * - Creation of [ku][ret]probe + * - Attach tracing bpf programs to perf events + */ +#define CAP_TRACING 39 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRACING #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 201f7e588a29..0b364e245163 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap" #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "bpf", "tracing" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRACING #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. #endif -- 2.20.0