[PATCH v2] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors

["Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>]

iovec addresses coming from vhost are assumed to be
pre-validated, but in fact can be speculated to a value
out of range.

Userspace address are later validated with array_index_nospec so we can
be sure kernel info does not leak through these addresses, but vhost
must also not leak userspace info outside the allowed memory table to
guests.

Following the defence in depth principle, make sure
the address is not validated out of node range.

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
---

changes from v1: fix build on 32 bit

 drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
index 5dc174ac8cac..34ea219936e3 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -2071,8 +2071,10 @@ static int translate_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, u64 addr, u32 len,
 		_iov = iov + ret;
 		size = node->size - addr + node->start;
 		_iov->iov_len = min((u64)len - s, size);
-		_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)
-			(node->userspace_addr + addr - node->start);
+		_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)
+			((unsigned long)node->userspace_addr +
+			 array_index_nospec((unsigned long)(addr - node->start),
+					    node->size));
 		s += size;
 		addr += size;
 		++ret;
-- 
MST