From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>,
Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>,
davem@davemloft.net, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
nhorman@redhat.com, sassmann@redhat.com,
Kiran Patil <kiran.patil@intel.com>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [net-next v2 1/1] virtual-bus: Implementation of Virtual Bus
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 09:15:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191120084358-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191120133835.GC22515@ziepe.ca>
On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 09:38:35AM -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 10:59:20PM -0500, Jason Wang wrote:
>
> > > > The interface between vfio and userspace is
> > > > based on virtio which is IMHO much better than
> > > > a vendor specific one. userspace stays vendor agnostic.
> > >
> > > Why is that even a good thing? It is much easier to provide drivers
> > > via qemu/etc in user space then it is to make kernel upgrades. We've
> > > learned this lesson many times.
> >
> > For upgrades, since we had a unified interface. It could be done
> > through:
> >
> > 1) switch the datapath from hardware to software (e.g vhost)
> > 2) unload and load the driver
> > 3) switch teh datapath back
> >
> > Having drivers in user space have other issues, there're a lot of
> > customers want to stick to kernel drivers.
>
> So you want to support upgrade of kernel modules, but runtime
> upgrading the userspace part is impossible? Seems very strange to me.
It's still true, you have to kill userspace to update a shared library.
Not to mention that things like rust encourage static builds so you
can't update a library even if you were willing to risk doing
that.
> > > This is why we have had the philosophy that if it doesn't need to be
> > > in the kernel it should be in userspace.
> >
> > Let me clarify again. For this framework, it aims to support both
> > kernel driver and userspce driver. For this series, it only contains
> > the kernel driver part. What it did is to allow kernel virtio driver
> > to control vDPA devices. Then we can provide a unified interface for
> > all of the VM, containers and bare metal. For this use case, I don't
> > see a way to leave the driver in userspace other than injecting
> > traffic back through vhost/TAP which is ugly.
>
> Binding to the other kernel virtio drivers is a reasonable
> justification, but none of this comes through in the patch cover
> letters or patch commit messages.
Yea this could have been communicated better.
> > > > That has lots of security and portability implications and isn't
> > > > appropriate for everyone.
> > >
> > > This is already using vfio. It doesn't make sense to claim that using
> > > vfio properly is somehow less secure or less portable.
> > >
> > > What I find particularly ugly is that this 'IFC VF NIC' driver
> > > pretends to be a mediated vfio device, but actually bypasses all the
> > > mediated device ops for managing dma security and just directly plugs
> > > the system IOMMU for the underlying PCI device into vfio.
> >
> > Well, VFIO have multiple types of API. The design is to stick the VFIO
> > DMA model like container work for making DMA API work for userspace
> > driver.
>
> Well, it doesn't, that model, for security, is predicated on vfio
> being the exclusive owner of the device. For instance if the kernel
> driver were to perform DMA as well then security would be lost.
The assumption at least IFC driver makes is that the kernel
driver does no DMA.
> > > I suppose this little hack is what is motivating this abuse of vfio in
> > > the first place?
> > >
> > > Frankly I think a kernel driver touching a PCI function for which vfio
> > > is now controlling the system iommu for is a violation of the security
> > > model, and I'm very surprised AlexW didn't NAK this idea.
> > >
> > > Perhaps it is because none of the patches actually describe how the
> > > DMA security model for this so-called mediated device works? :(
> > >
> > > Or perhaps it is because this submission is split up so much it is
> > > hard to see what is being proposed? (I note this IFC driver is the
> > > first user of the mdev_set_iommu_device() function)
> >
> > Are you objecting the mdev_set_iommu_deivce() stuffs here?
>
> I'm questioning if it fits the vfio PCI device security model, yes.
If you look at the IFC patch you'll find it doesn't do DMA, that's
what makes it secure.
> > > > It is kernel's job to abstract hardware away and present a unified
> > > > interface as far as possible.
> > >
> > > Sure, you could create a virtio accelerator driver framework in our
> > > new drivers/accel I hear was started. That could make some sense, if
> > > we had HW that actually required/benefited from kernel involvement.
> >
> > The framework is not designed specifically for your card. It tries to be
> > generic to support every types of virtio hardware devices, it's not
> > tied to any bus (e.g PCI) and any vendor. So it's not only a question
> > of how to slice a PCIE ethernet device.
>
> That doesn't explain why this isn't some new driver subsystem and
> instead treats vfio as a driver multiplexer.
>
> Jason
That motivation's missing.
--
MST
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-20 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-15 22:33 [net-next v2 1/1] virtual-bus: Implementation of Virtual Bus Jeff Kirsher
2019-11-15 23:25 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-19 3:58 ` Ertman, David M
2019-11-19 4:31 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-19 4:39 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-19 17:46 ` Ertman, David M
2019-11-19 18:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-19 17:44 ` Ertman, David M
2019-11-19 4:08 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-19 4:36 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-19 6:51 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-19 7:13 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-19 7:37 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-19 15:14 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-20 3:15 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 3:38 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-20 4:07 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 13:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-21 4:06 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 8:52 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-20 12:03 ` Jiri Pirko
2019-11-19 16:46 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-19 18:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-19 19:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-19 21:34 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-19 19:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-19 21:33 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-19 23:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 0:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-20 1:46 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 3:59 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 5:34 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 13:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 14:15 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2019-11-20 17:28 ` Alex Williamson
2019-11-20 18:11 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 22:07 ` Alex Williamson
2019-11-20 22:39 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-21 8:17 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-21 3:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-21 4:24 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-21 13:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-23 16:50 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-21 7:21 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-21 14:17 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-22 8:45 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-22 18:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-23 4:39 ` Tiwei Bie
2019-11-23 23:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-24 11:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-24 14:56 ` Tiwei Bie
2019-11-25 0:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-24 14:51 ` Tiwei Bie
2019-11-24 15:07 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-25 0:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-25 12:59 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-23 16:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-21 5:22 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-21 6:59 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-21 3:52 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 7:38 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-20 13:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 13:43 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-20 14:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 14:57 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-20 16:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-20 22:05 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2019-11-21 1:38 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-21 4:53 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 3:29 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 3:24 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-20 13:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-11-21 3:57 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-21 15:10 ` Martin Habets
2019-11-22 9:13 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-22 16:19 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-26 12:26 ` Martin Habets
2019-11-27 10:58 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-27 11:03 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-15 23:42 ` Parav Pandit
2019-11-18 7:48 ` Greg KH
2019-11-18 22:57 ` Ertman, David M
2019-11-19 8:04 ` Jason Wang
2019-11-19 17:50 ` Ertman, David M
2019-11-18 7:49 ` Greg KH
2019-11-18 22:55 ` Ertman, David M
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