[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 05/84] mwifiex: fix possible heap overflow in mwifiex_process_country_ie()

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 05/84] mwifiex: fix possible heap overflow in mwifiex_process_country_ie()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.com>

[ Upstream commit 3d94a4a8373bf5f45cf5f939e88b8354dbf2311b ]

mwifiex_process_country_ie() function parse elements of bss
descriptor in beacon packet. When processing WLAN_EID_COUNTRY
element, there is no upper limit check for country_ie_len before
calling memcpy. The destination buffer domain_info->triplet is an
array of length MWIFIEX_MAX_TRIPLET_802_11D(83). The remote
attacker can build a fake AP with the same ssid as real AP, and
send malicous beacon packet with long WLAN_EID_COUNTRY elemen
(country_ie_len > 83). Attacker can  force STA connect to fake AP
on a different channel. When the victim STA connects to fake AP,
will trigger the heap buffer overflow. Fix this by checking for
length and if found invalid, don not connect to the AP.

This fix addresses CVE-2019-14895.

Reported-by: huangwen <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
index 74e50566db1f..6dd835f1efc2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
@@ -229,6 +229,14 @@ static int mwifiex_process_country_ie(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 			    "11D: skip setting domain info in FW\n");
 		return 0;
 	}
+
+	if (country_ie_len >
+	    (IEEE80211_COUNTRY_STRING_LEN + MWIFIEX_MAX_TRIPLET_802_11D)) {
+		mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR,
+			    "11D: country_ie_len overflow!, deauth AP\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	memcpy(priv->adapter->country_code, &country_ie[2], 2);
 
 	domain_info->country_code[0] = country_ie[2];
@@ -272,8 +280,9 @@ int mwifiex_bss_start(struct mwifiex_private *priv, struct cfg80211_bss *bss,
 	priv->scan_block = false;
 
 	if (bss) {
-		if (adapter->region_code == 0x00)
-			mwifiex_process_country_ie(priv, bss);
+		if (adapter->region_code == 0x00 &&
+		    mwifiex_process_country_ie(priv, bss))
+			return -EINVAL;
 
 		/* Allocate and fill new bss descriptor */
 		bss_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct mwifiex_bssdescriptor),
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 07/84] netfilter: ctnetlink: netns exit must wait for callbacks

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 18a110b022a5c02e7dc9f6109d0bd93e58ac6ebb ]

Curtis Taylor and Jon Maxwell reported and debugged a crash on 3.10
based kernel.

Crash occurs in ctnetlink_conntrack_events because net->nfnl socket is
NULL.  The nfnl socket was set to NULL by netns destruction running on
another cpu.

The exiting network namespace calls the relevant destructors in the
following order:

1. ctnetlink_net_exit_batch

This nulls out the event callback pointer in struct netns.

2. nfnetlink_net_exit_batch

This nulls net->nfnl socket and frees it.

3. nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list

This removes all remaining conntrack entries.

This is order is correct. The only explanation for the crash so ar is:

cpu1: conntrack is dying, eviction occurs:
 -> nf_ct_delete()
   -> nf_conntrack_event_report \
     -> nf_conntrack_eventmask_report
       -> notify->fcn() (== ctnetlink_conntrack_events).

cpu1: a. fetches rcu protected pointer to obtain ctnetlink event callback.
      b. gets interrupted.
 cpu2: runs netns exit handlers:
     a runs ctnetlink destructor, event cb pointer set to NULL.
     b runs nfnetlink destructor, nfnl socket is closed and set to NULL.
cpu1: c. resumes and trips over NULL net->nfnl.

Problem appears to be that ctnetlink_net_exit_batch only prevents future
callers of nf_conntrack_eventmask_report() from obtaining the callback.
It doesn't wait of other cpus that might have already obtained the
callbacks address.

I don't see anything in upstream kernels that would prevent similar
crash: We need to wait for all cpus to have exited the event callback.

Fixes: 9592a5c01e79dbc59eb56fa ("netfilter: ctnetlink: netns support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 47e5a076522d..7ba9ea55816a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -3576,6 +3576,9 @@ static void __net_exit ctnetlink_net_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
 
 	list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list)
 		ctnetlink_net_exit(net);
+
+	/* wait for other cpus until they are done with ctnl_notifiers */
+	synchronize_rcu();
 }
 
 static struct pernet_operations ctnetlink_net_ops = {
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 08/84] mwifiex: Fix heap overflow in mmwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame()

[Sasha Levin]

From: qize wang <wangqize888888888@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 1e58252e334dc3f3756f424a157d1b7484464c40 ]

mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame() without checking
the incoming tdls infomation element's vality before use it,
this may cause multi heap buffer overflows.

Fix them by putting vality check before use it.

IE is TLV struct, but ht_cap and  ht_oper aren’t TLV struct.
the origin marvell driver code is wrong:

memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos,....
memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos,...

Fix the bug by changing pos(the address of IE) to
pos+2 ( the address of IE value ).

Signed-off-by: qize wang <wangqize888888888@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c
index 27779d7317fd..6058c48d56dc 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c
@@ -956,59 +956,117 @@ void mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 
 		switch (*pos) {
 		case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES:
+			if (pos[1] > 32)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len = pos[1];
 			for (i = 0; i < pos[1]; i++)
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates[i] = pos[i + 2];
 			break;
 
 		case WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES:
+			if (pos[1] > 32)
+				return;
 			basic = sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len;
+			if (pos[1] > 32 - basic)
+				return;
 			for (i = 0; i < pos[1]; i++)
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates[basic + i] = pos[i + 2];
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rates_len += pos[1];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY:
-			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos,
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap) - 2)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap))
+				return;
+			/* copy the ie's value into ht_capb*/
+			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos + 2,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap));
 			sta_ptr->is_11n_enabled = 1;
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION:
-			memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos,
+			if (pos > end -
+			    sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation) - 2)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation))
+				return;
+			/* copy the ie's value into ht_oper*/
+			memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos + 2,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_operation));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_BSS_COEX_2040:
+			if (pos > end - 3)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != 1)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.coex_2040 = pos[2];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_EXT_CAPABILITY:
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] < sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] > 8)
+				return;
 			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.extcap, pos,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee_types_header) +
 			       min_t(u8, pos[1], 8));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_RSN:
+			if (pos > end - sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] < sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE -
+			    sizeof(struct ieee_types_header))
+				return;
 			memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.rsn_ie, pos,
 			       sizeof(struct ieee_types_header) +
 			       min_t(u8, pos[1], IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE -
 				     sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)));
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_QOS_CAPA:
+			if (pos > end - 3)
+				return;
+			if (pos[1] != 1)
+				return;
 			sta_ptr->tdls_cap.qos_info = pos[2];
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION:
-			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable)
-				memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtoper, pos,
+			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
+				if (pos > end -
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation) - 2)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] !=
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation))
+					return;
+				/* copy the ie's value into vhtoper*/
+				memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtoper, pos + 2,
 				       sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_operation));
+			}
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_VHT_CAPABILITY:
 			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
-				memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtcap, pos,
+				if (pos > end -
+				    sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap) - 2)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] != sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap))
+					return;
+				/* copy the ie's value into vhtcap*/
+				memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.vhtcap, pos + 2,
 				       sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_cap));
 				sta_ptr->is_11ac_enabled = 1;
 			}
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_AID:
-			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable)
+			if (priv->adapter->is_hw_11ac_capable) {
+				if (pos > end - 4)
+					return;
+				if (pos[1] != 2)
+					return;
 				sta_ptr->tdls_cap.aid =
 					get_unaligned_le16((pos + 2));
+			}
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 12/84] netfilter: nf_queue: enqueue skbs with NULL dst

[Sasha Levin]

From: Marco Oliverio <marco.oliverio@tanaza.com>

[ Upstream commit 0b9173f4688dfa7c5d723426be1d979c24ce3d51 ]

Bridge packets that are forwarded have skb->dst == NULL and get
dropped by the check introduced by
b60a77386b1d4868f72f6353d35dabe5fbe981f2 (net: make skb_dst_force
return true when dst is refcounted).

To fix this we check skb_dst() before skb_dst_force(), so we don't
drop skb packet with dst == NULL. This holds also for skb at the
PRE_ROUTING hook so we remove the second check.

Fixes: b60a77386b1d ("net: make skb_dst_force return true when dst is refcounted")
Signed-off-by: Marco Oliverio <marco.oliverio@tanaza.com>
Signed-off-by: Rocco Folino <rocco.folino@tanaza.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
index a96a8c16baf9..ee6d98355081 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state,
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	if (!skb_dst_force(skb) && state->hook != NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) {
+	if (skb_dst(skb) && !skb_dst_force(skb)) {
 		status = -ENETDOWN;
 		goto err;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 19/84] netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: bogus lookup/get on consecutive elements in named sets

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit db3b665dd77b34e34df00e17d7b299c98fcfb2c5 ]

The existing rbtree implementation might store consecutive elements
where the closing element and the opening element might overlap, eg.

	[ a, a+1) [ a+1, a+2)

This patch removes the optimization for non-anonymous sets in the exact
matching case, where it is assumed to stop searching in case that the
closing element is found. Instead, invalidate candidate interval and
keep looking further in the tree.

The lookup/get operation might return false, while there is an element
in the rbtree. Moreover, the get operation returns true as if a+2 would
be in the tree. This happens with named sets after several set updates.

The existing lookup optimization (that only works for the anonymous
sets) might not reach the opening [ a+1,... element if the closing
...,a+1) is found in first place when walking over the rbtree. Hence,
walking the full tree in that case is needed.

This patch fixes the lookup and get operations.

Fixes: e701001e7cbe ("netfilter: nft_rbtree: allow adjacent intervals with dynamic updates")
Fixes: ba0e4d9917b4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: get set elements via netlink")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
index b3e75f9cb686..0221510328d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
@@ -77,8 +77,13 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set
 				parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
 				continue;
 			}
-			if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe))
-				goto out;
+			if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe)) {
+				if (nft_set_is_anonymous(set))
+					return false;
+				parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
+				interval = NULL;
+				continue;
+			}
 
 			*ext = &rbe->ext;
 			return true;
@@ -91,7 +96,7 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set
 		*ext = &interval->ext;
 		return true;
 	}
-out:
+
 	return false;
 }
 
@@ -139,8 +144,10 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_get(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 		} else if (d > 0) {
 			parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_right);
 		} else {
-			if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, genmask))
+			if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, genmask)) {
 				parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
+				continue;
+			}
 
 			if (!nft_set_ext_exists(&rbe->ext, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS) ||
 			    (*nft_set_ext_flags(&rbe->ext) & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END) ==
@@ -148,7 +155,11 @@ static bool __nft_rbtree_get(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
 				*elem = rbe;
 				return true;
 			}
-			return false;
+
+			if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe))
+				interval = NULL;
+
+			parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 20/84] netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit bffc124b6fe37d0ae9b428d104efb426403bb5c9 ]

Only NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY and NFTA_SET_ELEM_FLAGS make sense for elements
whose NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END flag is set on.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index 0e1b1f7f4745..42f79f9532c6 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -4351,14 +4351,20 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 		if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] == NULL &&
 		    !(flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] != NULL &&
-		    flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
 		if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] != NULL)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if ((flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END) &&
+	     (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] ||
+	      nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_OBJREF] ||
+	      nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_TIMEOUT] ||
+	      nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPIRATION] ||
+	      nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_USERDATA] ||
+	      nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPR]))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	timeout = 0;
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_TIMEOUT] != NULL) {
 		if (!(set->flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT))
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 21/84] netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFT_DATA_VALUE after nft_data_init()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit 0d2c96af797ba149e559c5875c0151384ab6dd14 ]

Userspace might bogusly sent NFT_DATA_VERDICT in several netlink
attributes that assume NFT_DATA_VALUE. Moreover, make sure that error
path invokes nft_data_release() to decrement the reference count on the
chain object.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Fixes: 0f3cd9b36977 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add range expression")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c |  4 +++-
 net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c   |  4 ++--
 net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c       |  6 ++++++
 net/netfilter/nft_range.c     | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index 42f79f9532c6..4711a8b56f32 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -4117,8 +4117,10 @@ static int nft_get_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 		return err;
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
-	if (desc.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE || desc.len != set->klen)
+	if (desc.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE || desc.len != set->klen) {
+		nft_data_release(&elem.key.val, desc.type);
 		return err;
+	}
 
 	priv = set->ops->get(ctx->net, set, &elem, flags);
 	if (IS_ERR(priv))
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c b/net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c
index fff8073e2a56..058ee84ea531 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int nft_bitwise_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 			    tb[NFTA_BITWISE_MASK]);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
-	if (d1.len != priv->len) {
+	if (d1.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE || d1.len != priv->len) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto err1;
 	}
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static int nft_bitwise_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
 			    tb[NFTA_BITWISE_XOR]);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto err1;
-	if (d2.len != priv->len) {
+	if (d2.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE || d2.len != priv->len) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto err2;
 	}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c b/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c
index 79d48c1d06f4..7007045c0849 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_cmp.c
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ static int nft_cmp_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr,
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+	if (desc.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		nft_data_release(&priv->data, desc.type);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	priv->sreg = nft_parse_register(tb[NFTA_CMP_SREG]);
 	err = nft_validate_register_load(priv->sreg, desc.len);
 	if (err < 0)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_range.c b/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
index cedb96c3619f..2e1d2ec2f52a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
@@ -70,11 +70,21 @@ static int nft_range_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
+	if (desc_from.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err1;
+	}
+
 	err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data_to, sizeof(priv->data_to),
 			    &desc_to, tb[NFTA_RANGE_TO_DATA]);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto err1;
 
+	if (desc_to.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err2;
+	}
+
 	if (desc_from.len != desc_to.len) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto err2;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 22/84] netfilter: bridge: make sure to pull arp header in br_nf_forward_arp()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 5604285839aaedfb23ebe297799c6e558939334d ]

syzbot is kind enough to remind us we need to call skb_may_pull()

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in br_nf_forward_arp+0xe61/0x1230 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:665
CPU: 1 PID: 11631 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc8-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 kmsan_report+0x128/0x220 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108
 __msan_warning+0x64/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:245
 br_nf_forward_arp+0xe61/0x1230 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c:665
 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:135 [inline]
 nf_hook_slow+0x18b/0x3f0 net/netfilter/core.c:512
 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:260 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
 __br_forward+0x78f/0xe30 net/bridge/br_forward.c:109
 br_flood+0xef0/0xfe0 net/bridge/br_forward.c:234
 br_handle_frame_finish+0x1a77/0x1c20 net/bridge/br_input.c:162
 nf_hook_bridge_pre net/bridge/br_input.c:245 [inline]
 br_handle_frame+0xfb6/0x1eb0 net/bridge/br_input.c:348
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x20b9/0x51a0 net/core/dev.c:4830
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:4927 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:5043 [inline]
 process_backlog+0x610/0x13c0 net/core/dev.c:5874
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6311 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x7a6/0x1aa0 net/core/dev.c:6379
 __do_softirq+0x4a1/0x83a kernel/softirq.c:293
 do_softirq_own_stack+0x49/0x80 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1091
 </IRQ>
 do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:338 [inline]
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x184/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:190
 local_bh_enable+0x36/0x40 include/linux/bottom_half.h:32
 rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:688 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x38e8/0x4200 net/core/dev.c:3819
 dev_queue_xmit+0x4b/0x60 net/core/dev.c:3825
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2959 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8234/0x9100 net/packet/af_packet.c:2984
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:657 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0xc44/0xc70 net/socket.c:1952
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1960
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1960
 do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45a679
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f0a3c9e5c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 000000000045a679
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 00000000200000c0 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f0a3c9e66d4
R13: 00000000004c8ec1 R14: 00000000004dfe28 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:149 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:132
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x97/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:86
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2773 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe27/0x11a0 mm/slub.c:4381
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x306/0xa10 net/core/skbuff.c:209
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x18c/0xa80 net/core/skbuff.c:5662
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xafd/0x10a0 net/core/sock.c:2244
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2807 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2902 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x63a6/0x9100 net/packet/af_packet.c:2984
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:657 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0xc44/0xc70 net/socket.c:1952
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto+0x107/0x130 net/socket.c:1960
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6e/0x90 net/socket.c:1960
 do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: c4e70a87d975 ("netfilter: bridge: rename br_netfilter.c to br_netfilter_hooks.c")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
index 212c184c1eee..ccab290c14d4 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
@@ -646,6 +646,9 @@ static unsigned int br_nf_forward_arp(void *priv,
 		nf_bridge_pull_encap_header(skb);
 	}
 
+	if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr))))
+		return NF_DROP;
+
 	if (arp_hdr(skb)->ar_pln != 4) {
 		if (IS_VLAN_ARP(skb))
 			nf_bridge_push_encap_header(skb);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 26/84] selftests: forwarding: Delete IPv6 address at the end

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>

[ Upstream commit 65cb13986229cec02635a1ecbcd1e2dd18353201 ]

When creating the second host in h2_create(), two addresses are assigned
to the interface, but only one is deleted. When running the test twice
in a row the following error is observed:

$ ./router_bridge_vlan.sh
TEST: ping                                                          [ OK ]
TEST: ping6                                                         [ OK ]
TEST: vlan                                                          [ OK ]
$ ./router_bridge_vlan.sh
RTNETLINK answers: File exists
TEST: ping                                                          [ OK ]
TEST: ping6                                                         [ OK ]
TEST: vlan                                                          [ OK ]

Fix this by deleting the address during cleanup.

Fixes: 5b1e7f9ebd56 ("selftests: forwarding: Test routed bridge interface")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/router_bridge_vlan.sh | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/router_bridge_vlan.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/router_bridge_vlan.sh
index fef88eb4b873..fa6a88c50750 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/router_bridge_vlan.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/router_bridge_vlan.sh
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ h2_destroy()
 {
 	ip -6 route del 2001:db8:1::/64 vrf v$h2
 	ip -4 route del 192.0.2.0/28 vrf v$h2
-	simple_if_fini $h2 192.0.2.130/28
+	simple_if_fini $h2 192.0.2.130/28 2001:db8:2::2/64
 }
 
 router_create()
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 28/84] af_packet: set defaule value for tmo

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit b43d1f9f7067c6759b1051e8ecb84e82cef569fe ]

There is softlockup when using TPACKET_V3:
...
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 60010ms!
(__irq_svc) from [<c0558a0c>] (_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x54)
(_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore) from [<c027b7e8>] (mod_timer+0x210/0x25c)
(mod_timer) from [<c0549c30>]
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired+0x68/0x11c)
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired) from [<c027a7ac>]
(call_timer_fn+0x90/0x17c)
(call_timer_fn) from [<c027ab6c>] (run_timer_softirq+0x2d4/0x2fc)
(run_timer_softirq) from [<c021eaf4>] (__do_softirq+0x218/0x318)
(__do_softirq) from [<c021eea0>] (irq_exit+0x88/0xac)
(irq_exit) from [<c0240130>] (msa_irq_exit+0x11c/0x1d4)
(msa_irq_exit) from [<c0209cf0>] (handle_IPI+0x650/0x7f4)
(handle_IPI) from [<c02015bc>] (gic_handle_irq+0x108/0x118)
(gic_handle_irq) from [<c0558ee4>] (__irq_usr+0x44/0x5c)
...

If __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() is failed in
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(), msec and tmo will be zero, so tov_in_jiffies
is zero and the timer expire for retire_blk_timer is turn to
mod_timer(&pkc->retire_blk_timer, jiffies + 0),
which will trigger cpu usage of softirq is 100%.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Tested-by: Xiao Jiangfeng <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 7204e7bbebb0..ac65e66d1d72 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -552,7 +552,8 @@ static int prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(struct packet_sock *po,
 			msec = 1;
 			div = ecmd.base.speed / 1000;
 		}
-	}
+	} else
+		return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
 
 	mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 29/84] fjes: fix missed check in fjes_acpi_add

[Sasha Levin]

From: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a288f105a03a7e0e629a8da2b31f34ebf0343ee2 ]

fjes_acpi_add() misses a check for platform_device_register_simple().
Add a check to fix it.

Fixes: 658d439b2292 ("fjes: Introduce FUJITSU Extended Socket Network Device driver")
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/fjes/fjes_main.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_main.c b/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_main.c
index 61a9843346ad..1979f8f8dac7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/fjes/fjes_main.c
@@ -181,6 +181,9 @@ static int fjes_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 	/* create platform_device */
 	plat_dev = platform_device_register_simple(DRV_NAME, 0, fjes_resource,
 						   ARRAY_SIZE(fjes_resource));
+	if (IS_ERR(plat_dev))
+		return PTR_ERR(plat_dev);
+
 	device->driver_data = plat_dev;
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 32/84] bnxt_en: Return error if FW returns more data than dump length

[Sasha Levin]

From: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>

[ Upstream commit c74751f4c39232c31214ec6a3bc1c7e62f5c728b ]

If any change happened in the configuration of VF in VM while
collecting live dump, there could be a race and firmware can return
more data than allocated dump length. Fix it by keeping track of
the accumulated core dump length copied so far and abort the copy
with error code if the next chunk of core dump will exceed the
original dump length.

Fixes: 6c5657d085ae ("bnxt_en: Add support for ethtool get dump.")
Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c | 38 +++++++++++++++----
 .../net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.h |  4 ++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c
index 2240c23b0a4c..0a409ba4012a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c
@@ -2778,8 +2778,15 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_dbg_dma_data(struct bnxt *bp, void *msg, int msg_len,
 			}
 		}
 
-		if (info->dest_buf)
-			memcpy(info->dest_buf + off, dma_buf, len);
+		if (info->dest_buf) {
+			if ((info->seg_start + off + len) <=
+			    BNXT_COREDUMP_BUF_LEN(info->buf_len)) {
+				memcpy(info->dest_buf + off, dma_buf, len);
+			} else {
+				rc = -ENOBUFS;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 
 		if (cmn_req->req_type ==
 				cpu_to_le16(HWRM_DBG_COREDUMP_RETRIEVE))
@@ -2833,7 +2840,7 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_dbg_coredump_initiate(struct bnxt *bp, u16 component_id,
 
 static int bnxt_hwrm_dbg_coredump_retrieve(struct bnxt *bp, u16 component_id,
 					   u16 segment_id, u32 *seg_len,
-					   void *buf, u32 offset)
+					   void *buf, u32 buf_len, u32 offset)
 {
 	struct hwrm_dbg_coredump_retrieve_input req = {0};
 	struct bnxt_hwrm_dbg_dma_info info = {NULL};
@@ -2848,8 +2855,11 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_dbg_coredump_retrieve(struct bnxt *bp, u16 component_id,
 				seq_no);
 	info.data_len_off = offsetof(struct hwrm_dbg_coredump_retrieve_output,
 				     data_len);
-	if (buf)
+	if (buf) {
 		info.dest_buf = buf + offset;
+		info.buf_len = buf_len;
+		info.seg_start = offset;
+	}
 
 	rc = bnxt_hwrm_dbg_dma_data(bp, &req, sizeof(req), &info);
 	if (!rc)
@@ -2939,14 +2949,17 @@ bnxt_fill_coredump_record(struct bnxt *bp, struct bnxt_coredump_record *record,
 static int bnxt_get_coredump(struct bnxt *bp, void *buf, u32 *dump_len)
 {
 	u32 ver_get_resp_len = sizeof(struct hwrm_ver_get_output);
+	u32 offset = 0, seg_hdr_len, seg_record_len, buf_len = 0;
 	struct coredump_segment_record *seg_record = NULL;
-	u32 offset = 0, seg_hdr_len, seg_record_len;
 	struct bnxt_coredump_segment_hdr seg_hdr;
 	struct bnxt_coredump coredump = {NULL};
 	time64_t start_time;
 	u16 start_utc;
 	int rc = 0, i;
 
+	if (buf)
+		buf_len = *dump_len;
+
 	start_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
 	start_utc = sys_tz.tz_minuteswest * 60;
 	seg_hdr_len = sizeof(seg_hdr);
@@ -2979,6 +2992,12 @@ static int bnxt_get_coredump(struct bnxt *bp, void *buf, u32 *dump_len)
 		u32 duration = 0, seg_len = 0;
 		unsigned long start, end;
 
+		if (buf && ((offset + seg_hdr_len) >
+			    BNXT_COREDUMP_BUF_LEN(buf_len))) {
+			rc = -ENOBUFS;
+			goto err;
+		}
+
 		start = jiffies;
 
 		rc = bnxt_hwrm_dbg_coredump_initiate(bp, comp_id, seg_id);
@@ -2991,9 +3010,11 @@ static int bnxt_get_coredump(struct bnxt *bp, void *buf, u32 *dump_len)
 
 		/* Write segment data into the buffer */
 		rc = bnxt_hwrm_dbg_coredump_retrieve(bp, comp_id, seg_id,
-						     &seg_len, buf,
+						     &seg_len, buf, buf_len,
 						     offset + seg_hdr_len);
-		if (rc)
+		if (rc && rc == -ENOBUFS)
+			goto err;
+		else if (rc)
 			netdev_err(bp->dev,
 				   "Failed to retrieve coredump for seg = %d\n",
 				   seg_record->segment_id);
@@ -3023,7 +3044,8 @@ static int bnxt_get_coredump(struct bnxt *bp, void *buf, u32 *dump_len)
 					  rc);
 	kfree(coredump.data);
 	*dump_len += sizeof(struct bnxt_coredump_record);
-
+	if (rc == -ENOBUFS)
+		netdev_err(bp->dev, "Firmware returned large coredump buffer");
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.h
index b5b65b3f8534..3998f6e809a9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct bnxt_coredump {
 	u16		total_segs;
 };
 
+#define BNXT_COREDUMP_BUF_LEN(len) ((len) - sizeof(struct bnxt_coredump_record))
+
 struct bnxt_hwrm_dbg_dma_info {
 	void *dest_buf;
 	int dest_buf_size;
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ struct bnxt_hwrm_dbg_dma_info {
 	u16 seq_off;
 	u16 data_len_off;
 	u16 segs;
+	u32 seg_start;
+	u32 buf_len;
 };
 
 struct hwrm_dbg_cmn_input {
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 33/84] net: ena: fix napi handler misbehavior when the napi budget is zero

[Sasha Levin]

From: Netanel Belgazal <netanel@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit 24dee0c7478d1a1e00abdf5625b7f921467325dc ]

In netpoll the napi handler could be called with budget equal to zero.
Current ENA napi handler doesn't take that into consideration.

The napi handler handles Rx packets in a do-while loop.
Currently, the budget check happens only after decrementing the
budget, therefore the napi handler, in rare cases, could run over
MAX_INT packets.

In addition to that, this moves all budget related variables to int
calculation and stop mixing u32 to avoid ambiguity

Fixes: 1738cd3ed342 ("net: ena: Add a driver for Amazon Elastic Network Adapters (ENA)")
Signed-off-by: Netanel Belgazal <netanel@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c
index b5d72815776c..e26c195fec83 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amazon/ena/ena_netdev.c
@@ -1197,8 +1197,8 @@ static int ena_io_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	struct ena_napi *ena_napi = container_of(napi, struct ena_napi, napi);
 	struct ena_ring *tx_ring, *rx_ring;
 
-	u32 tx_work_done;
-	u32 rx_work_done;
+	int tx_work_done;
+	int rx_work_done = 0;
 	int tx_budget;
 	int napi_comp_call = 0;
 	int ret;
@@ -1215,7 +1215,11 @@ static int ena_io_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	}
 
 	tx_work_done = ena_clean_tx_irq(tx_ring, tx_budget);
-	rx_work_done = ena_clean_rx_irq(rx_ring, napi, budget);
+	/* On netpoll the budget is zero and the handler should only clean the
+	 * tx completions.
+	 */
+	if (likely(budget))
+		rx_work_done = ena_clean_rx_irq(rx_ring, napi, budget);
 
 	/* If the device is about to reset or down, avoid unmask
 	 * the interrupt and return 0 so NAPI won't reschedule
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 34/84] bpf, mips: Limit to 33 tail calls

[Sasha Levin]

From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@orange.com>

[ Upstream commit e49e6f6db04e915dccb494ae10fa14888fea6f89 ]

All BPF JIT compilers except RISC-V's and MIPS' enforce a 33-tail calls
limit at runtime.  In addition, a test was recently added, in tailcalls2,
to check this limit.

This patch updates the tail call limit in MIPS' JIT compiler to allow
33 tail calls.

Fixes: b6bd53f9c4e8 ("MIPS: Add missing file for eBPF JIT.")
Reported-by: Mahshid Khezri <khezri.mahshid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@orange.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b8eb2caac1c25453c539248e56ca22f74b5316af.1575916815.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c b/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
index 9bda82ed75eb..3832c4628608 100644
--- a/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
+++ b/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ static void emit_const_to_reg(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int dst, u64 value)
 static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int this_idx)
 {
 	int off, b_off;
+	int tcc_reg;
 
 	ctx->flags |= EBPF_SEEN_TC;
 	/*
@@ -598,14 +599,14 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int this_idx)
 	b_off = b_imm(this_idx + 1, ctx);
 	emit_instr(ctx, bne, MIPS_R_AT, MIPS_R_ZERO, b_off);
 	/*
-	 * if (--TCC < 0)
+	 * if (TCC-- < 0)
 	 *     goto out;
 	 */
 	/* Delay slot */
-	emit_instr(ctx, daddiu, MIPS_R_T5,
-		   (ctx->flags & EBPF_TCC_IN_V1) ? MIPS_R_V1 : MIPS_R_S4, -1);
+	tcc_reg = (ctx->flags & EBPF_TCC_IN_V1) ? MIPS_R_V1 : MIPS_R_S4;
+	emit_instr(ctx, daddiu, MIPS_R_T5, tcc_reg, -1);
 	b_off = b_imm(this_idx + 1, ctx);
-	emit_instr(ctx, bltz, MIPS_R_T5, b_off);
+	emit_instr(ctx, bltz, tcc_reg, b_off);
 	/*
 	 * prog = array->ptrs[index];
 	 * if (prog == NULL)
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 37/84] samples: bpf: Replace symbol compare of trace_event

[Sasha Levin]

From: "Daniel T. Lee" <danieltimlee@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit bba1b2a890253528c45aa66cf856f289a215bfbc ]

Previously, when this sample is added, commit 1c47910ef8013
("samples/bpf: add perf_event+bpf example"), a symbol 'sys_read' and
'sys_write' has been used without no prefixes. But currently there are
no exact symbols with these under kallsyms and this leads to failure.

This commit changes exact compare to substring compare to keep compatible
with exact symbol or prefixed symbol.

Fixes: 1c47910ef8013 ("samples/bpf: add perf_event+bpf example")
Signed-off-by: Daniel T. Lee <danieltimlee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191205080114.19766-2-danieltimlee@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 samples/bpf/trace_event_user.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/bpf/trace_event_user.c b/samples/bpf/trace_event_user.c
index d08046ab81f0..d33022447d6b 100644
--- a/samples/bpf/trace_event_user.c
+++ b/samples/bpf/trace_event_user.c
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ static void print_ksym(__u64 addr)
 		return;
 	sym = ksym_search(addr);
 	printf("%s;", sym->name);
-	if (!strcmp(sym->name, "sys_read"))
+	if (!strstr(sym->name, "sys_read"))
 		sys_read_seen = true;
-	else if (!strcmp(sym->name, "sys_write"))
+	else if (!strstr(sym->name, "sys_write"))
 		sys_write_seen = true;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 38/84] samples: bpf: fix syscall_tp due to unused syscall

[Sasha Levin]

From: "Daniel T. Lee" <danieltimlee@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit fe3300897cbfd76c6cb825776e5ac0ca50a91ca4 ]

Currently, open() is called from the user program and it calls the syscall
'sys_openat', not the 'sys_open'. This leads to an error of the program
of user side, due to the fact that the counter maps are zero since no
function such 'sys_open' is called.

This commit adds the kernel bpf program which are attached to the
tracepoint 'sys_enter_openat' and 'sys_enter_openat'.

Fixes: 1da236b6be963 ("bpf: add a test case for syscalls/sys_{enter|exit}_* tracepoints")
Signed-off-by: Daniel T. Lee <danieltimlee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 samples/bpf/syscall_tp_kern.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/bpf/syscall_tp_kern.c b/samples/bpf/syscall_tp_kern.c
index 9149c524d279..8833aacb9c8c 100644
--- a/samples/bpf/syscall_tp_kern.c
+++ b/samples/bpf/syscall_tp_kern.c
@@ -50,13 +50,27 @@ static __always_inline void count(void *map)
 SEC("tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_open")
 int trace_enter_open(struct syscalls_enter_open_args *ctx)
 {
-	count((void *)&enter_open_map);
+	count(&enter_open_map);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint/syscalls/sys_enter_openat")
+int trace_enter_open_at(struct syscalls_enter_open_args *ctx)
+{
+	count(&enter_open_map);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 SEC("tracepoint/syscalls/sys_exit_open")
 int trace_enter_exit(struct syscalls_exit_open_args *ctx)
 {
-	count((void *)&exit_open_map);
+	count(&exit_open_map);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("tracepoint/syscalls/sys_exit_openat")
+int trace_enter_exit_at(struct syscalls_exit_open_args *ctx)
+{
+	count(&exit_open_map);
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 40/84] net: usb: lan78xx: Fix suspend/resume PHY register access error

[Sasha Levin]

From: Cristian Birsan <cristian.birsan@microchip.com>

[ Upstream commit 20032b63586ac6c28c936dff696981159913a13f ]

Lan78xx driver accesses the PHY registers through MDIO bus over USB
connection. When performing a suspend/resume, the PHY registers can be
accessed before the USB connection is resumed. This will generate an
error and will prevent the device to resume correctly.
This patch adds the dependency between the MDIO bus and USB device to
allow correct handling of suspend/resume.

Fixes: ce85e13ad6ef ("lan78xx: Update to use phylib instead of mii_if_info.")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Birsan <cristian.birsan@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
index 50bf4b2080d5..6dd24a1ca10d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
@@ -1823,6 +1823,7 @@ static int lan78xx_mdio_init(struct lan78xx_net *dev)
 	dev->mdiobus->read = lan78xx_mdiobus_read;
 	dev->mdiobus->write = lan78xx_mdiobus_write;
 	dev->mdiobus->name = "lan78xx-mdiobus";
+	dev->mdiobus->parent = &dev->udev->dev;
 
 	snprintf(dev->mdiobus->id, MII_BUS_ID_SIZE, "usb-%03d:%03d",
 		 dev->udev->bus->busnum, dev->udev->devnum);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 41/84] qede: Fix multicast mac configuration

[Sasha Levin]

From: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>

[ Upstream commit 0af67e49b018e7280a4227bfe7b6005bc9d3e442 ]

Driver doesn't accommodate the configuration for max number
of multicast mac addresses, in such particular case it leaves
the device with improper/invalid multicast configuration state,
causing connectivity issues (in lacp bonding like scenarios).

Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_filter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_filter.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_filter.c
index b16ce7d93caf..c3d5d40afec0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_filter.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_filter.c
@@ -1230,7 +1230,7 @@ qede_configure_mcast_filtering(struct net_device *ndev,
 	netif_addr_lock_bh(ndev);
 
 	mc_count = netdev_mc_count(ndev);
-	if (mc_count < 64) {
+	if (mc_count <= 64) {
 		netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, ndev) {
 			ether_addr_copy(temp, ha->addr);
 			temp += ETH_ALEN;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 45/84] bpf: Clear skb->tstamp in bpf_redirect when necessary

[Sasha Levin]

From: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>

[ Upstream commit 5133498f4ad1123a5ffd4c08df6431dab882cc32 ]

Redirecting a packet from ingress to egress by using bpf_redirect
breaks if the egress interface has an fq qdisc installed. This is the same
problem as fixed in 'commit 8203e2d844d3 ("net: clear skb->tstamp in forwarding paths")

Clear skb->tstamp when redirecting into the egress path.

Fixes: 80b14dee2bea ("net: Add a new socket option for a future transmit time.")
Fixes: fb420d5d91c1 ("tcp/fq: move back to CLOCK_MONOTONIC")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191213180817.2510-1-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index e6fa88506c00..91b950261975 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -2007,6 +2007,7 @@ static inline int __bpf_tx_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	skb->dev = dev;
+	skb->tstamp = 0;
 
 	__this_cpu_inc(xmit_recursion);
 	ret = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 46/84] tcp/dccp: fix possible race __inet_lookup_established()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 ]

Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
happening in __inet_lookup_established().

Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
(via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.

They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
another one.

Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.

Fixes: 3b24d854cb35 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20191120083919.GH27852@unicorn.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/rculist_nulls.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 12 +++++++++---
 include/net/sock.h            |  5 +++++
 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c          |  3 ++-
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c    | 16 +++++++--------
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c           |  7 ++++---
 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
index bc8206a8f30e..61974c4c566b 100644
--- a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
+++ b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
@@ -100,6 +100,43 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n,
 		first->pprev = &n->next;
 }
 
+/**
+ * hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu
+ * @n: the element to add to the hash list.
+ * @h: the list to add to.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Adds the specified element to the specified hlist_nulls,
+ * while permitting racing traversals.
+ *
+ * The caller must take whatever precautions are necessary
+ * (such as holding appropriate locks) to avoid racing
+ * with another list-mutation primitive, such as hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu()
+ * or hlist_nulls_del_rcu(), running on this same list.
+ * However, it is perfectly legal to run concurrently with
+ * the _rcu list-traversal primitives, such as
+ * hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(), used to prevent memory-consistency
+ * problems on Alpha CPUs.  Regardless of the type of CPU, the
+ * list-traversal primitive must be guarded by rcu_read_lock().
+ */
+static inline void hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n,
+					    struct hlist_nulls_head *h)
+{
+	struct hlist_nulls_node *i, *last = NULL;
+
+	/* Note: write side code, so rcu accessors are not needed. */
+	for (i = h->first; !is_a_nulls(i); i = i->next)
+		last = i;
+
+	if (last) {
+		n->next = last->next;
+		n->pprev = &last->next;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(hlist_next_rcu(last), n);
+	} else {
+		hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(n, h);
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu - iterate over rcu list of given type
  * @tpos:	the type * to use as a loop cursor.
diff --git a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
index 9141e95529e7..b875dcef173c 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
@@ -106,13 +106,19 @@ struct inet_bind_hashbucket {
 	struct hlist_head	chain;
 };
 
-/*
- * Sockets can be hashed in established or listening table
+/* Sockets can be hashed in established or listening table.
+ * We must use different 'nulls' end-of-chain value for all hash buckets :
+ * A socket might transition from ESTABLISH to LISTEN state without
+ * RCU grace period. A lookup in ehash table needs to handle this case.
  */
+#define LISTENING_NULLS_BASE (1U << 29)
 struct inet_listen_hashbucket {
 	spinlock_t		lock;
 	unsigned int		count;
-	struct hlist_head	head;
+	union {
+		struct hlist_head	head;
+		struct hlist_nulls_head	nulls_head;
+	};
 };
 
 /* This is for listening sockets, thus all sockets which possess wildcards. */
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 4545a9ecc219..f359e5c94762 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -721,6 +721,11 @@ static inline void __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(struct sock *sk, struct hlist_nulls_h
 	hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&sk->sk_nulls_node, list);
 }
 
+static inline void __sk_nulls_add_node_tail_rcu(struct sock *sk, struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
+{
+	hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu(&sk->sk_nulls_node, list);
+}
+
 static inline void sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(struct sock *sk, struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
 {
 	sock_hold(sk);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c
index 5731670c560b..9742b37afe1d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c
@@ -918,11 +918,12 @@ void inet_diag_dump_icsk(struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 		for (i = s_i; i < INET_LHTABLE_SIZE; i++) {
 			struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
+			struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
 
 			num = 0;
 			ilb = &hashinfo->listening_hash[i];
 			spin_lock(&ilb->lock);
-			sk_for_each(sk, &ilb->head) {
+			sk_nulls_for_each(sk, node, &ilb->nulls_head) {
 				struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 
 				if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 7be966a60801..900756b3defb 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -560,10 +560,11 @@ static int inet_reuseport_add_sock(struct sock *sk,
 				   struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb)
 {
 	struct inet_bind_bucket *tb = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash;
+	const struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
 	struct sock *sk2;
 	kuid_t uid = sock_i_uid(sk);
 
-	sk_for_each_rcu(sk2, &ilb->head) {
+	sk_nulls_for_each_rcu(sk2, node, &ilb->nulls_head) {
 		if (sk2 != sk &&
 		    sk2->sk_family == sk->sk_family &&
 		    ipv6_only_sock(sk2) == ipv6_only_sock(sk) &&
@@ -599,9 +600,9 @@ int __inet_hash(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk)
 	}
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sk->sk_reuseport &&
 		sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
-		hlist_add_tail_rcu(&sk->sk_node, &ilb->head);
+		__sk_nulls_add_node_tail_rcu(sk, &ilb->nulls_head);
 	else
-		hlist_add_head_rcu(&sk->sk_node, &ilb->head);
+		__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, &ilb->nulls_head);
 	inet_hash2(hashinfo, sk);
 	ilb->count++;
 	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_RCU_FREE);
@@ -650,11 +651,9 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
 		reuseport_detach_sock(sk);
 	if (ilb) {
 		inet_unhash2(hashinfo, sk);
-		 __sk_del_node_init(sk);
-		 ilb->count--;
-	} else {
-		__sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(sk);
+		ilb->count--;
 	}
+	__sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(sk);
 	sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
 unlock:
 	spin_unlock_bh(lock);
@@ -790,7 +789,8 @@ void inet_hashinfo_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < INET_LHTABLE_SIZE; i++) {
 		spin_lock_init(&h->listening_hash[i].lock);
-		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&h->listening_hash[i].head);
+		INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&h->listening_hash[i].nulls_head,
+				      i + LISTENING_NULLS_BASE);
 		h->listening_hash[i].count = 0;
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index bfec48849735..5553f6a833f3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -2020,13 +2020,14 @@ static void *listening_get_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *cur)
 	struct tcp_iter_state *st = seq->private;
 	struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
 	struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
+	struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
 	struct sock *sk = cur;
 
 	if (!sk) {
 get_head:
 		ilb = &tcp_hashinfo.listening_hash[st->bucket];
 		spin_lock(&ilb->lock);
-		sk = sk_head(&ilb->head);
+		sk = sk_nulls_head(&ilb->nulls_head);
 		st->offset = 0;
 		goto get_sk;
 	}
@@ -2034,9 +2035,9 @@ static void *listening_get_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *cur)
 	++st->num;
 	++st->offset;
 
-	sk = sk_next(sk);
+	sk = sk_nulls_next(sk);
 get_sk:
-	sk_for_each_from(sk) {
+	sk_nulls_for_each_from(sk, node) {
 		if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
 			continue;
 		if (sk->sk_family == afinfo->family)
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 47/84] 6pack,mkiss: fix possible deadlock

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 5c9934b6767b16ba60be22ec3cbd4379ad64170d ]

We got another syzbot report [1] that tells us we must use
write_lock_irq()/write_unlock_irq() to avoid possible deadlock.

[1]

WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-R} usage.
syz-executor826/9605 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
ffffffff8a128718 (disc_data_lock){+-..}, at: sp_get.isra.0+0x1d/0xf0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_synctty.c:138
{HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
  lock_acquire+0x190/0x410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4485
  __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:203 [inline]
  _raw_write_lock_bh+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:319
  sixpack_close+0x1d/0x250 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:657
  tty_ldisc_close.isra.0+0x119/0x1a0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:489
  tty_set_ldisc+0x230/0x6b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:585
  tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2337 [inline]
  tty_ioctl+0xe8d/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2597
  vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
  file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:545 [inline]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x977/0x14e0 fs/ioctl.c:732
  ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:749
  __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:756 [inline]
  __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:754 [inline]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:754
  do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
irq event stamp: 3946
hardirqs last  enabled at (3945): [<ffffffff87c86e43>] __raw_spin_unlock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:168 [inline]
hardirqs last  enabled at (3945): [<ffffffff87c86e43>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x80 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:199
hardirqs last disabled at (3946): [<ffffffff8100675f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S:42
softirqs last  enabled at (2658): [<ffffffff86a8b4df>] spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:383 [inline]
softirqs last  enabled at (2658): [<ffffffff86a8b4df>] clusterip_netdev_event+0x46f/0x670 net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c:222
softirqs last disabled at (2656): [<ffffffff86a8b22b>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:343 [inline]
softirqs last disabled at (2656): [<ffffffff86a8b22b>] clusterip_netdev_event+0x1bb/0x670 net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_CLUSTERIP.c:196

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(disc_data_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(disc_data_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by syz-executor826/9605:
 #0: ffff8880a905e198 (&tty->legacy_mutex){+.+.}, at: tty_lock+0xc7/0x130 drivers/tty/tty_mutex.c:19
 #1: ffffffff899a56c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: mutex_spin_on_owner+0x0/0x330 kernel/locking/mutex.c:413
 #2: ffff8880a496a2b0 (&(&i->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
 #2: ffff8880a496a2b0 (&(&i->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at: serial8250_interrupt+0x2d/0x1a0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:116
 #3: ffffffff8c104048 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}, at: serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x24/0x330 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1823
 #4: ffff8880a905e090 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: tty_ldisc_ref+0x22/0x90 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:288

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 9605 Comm: syz-executor826 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_usage_bug.cold+0x327/0x378 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3101
 valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3112 [inline]
 mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3309 [inline]
 mark_lock+0xbb4/0x1220 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3666
 mark_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3554 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x1e55/0x4a00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3909
 lock_acquire+0x190/0x410 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4485
 __raw_read_lock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:149 [inline]
 _raw_read_lock+0x32/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:223
 sp_get.isra.0+0x1d/0xf0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_synctty.c:138
 sixpack_write_wakeup+0x25/0x340 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:402
 tty_wakeup+0xe9/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:536
 tty_port_default_wakeup+0x2b/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:50
 tty_port_tty_wakeup+0x57/0x70 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:387
 uart_write_wakeup+0x46/0x70 drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:104
 serial8250_tx_chars+0x495/0xaf0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1761
 serial8250_handle_irq.part.0+0x2a2/0x330 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1834
 serial8250_handle_irq drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1820 [inline]
 serial8250_default_handle_irq+0xc0/0x150 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c:1850
 serial8250_interrupt+0xf1/0x1a0 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_core.c:126
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x15d/0x970 kernel/irq/handle.c:149
 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x74/0x160 kernel/irq/handle.c:189
 handle_irq_event+0xa7/0x134 kernel/irq/handle.c:206
 handle_edge_irq+0x25e/0x8d0 kernel/irq/chip.c:830
 generic_handle_irq_desc include/linux/irqdesc.h:156 [inline]
 do_IRQ+0xde/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:250
 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:607
 </IRQ>
RIP: 0010:cpu_relax arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:685 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mutex_spin_on_owner+0x247/0x330 kernel/locking/mutex.c:579
Code: c3 be 08 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 e5 06 59 00 4c 89 e0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 38 00 0f 85 e1 00 00 00 49 8b 04 24 a8 01 75 96 f3 90 <e9> 2f fe ff ff 0f 0b e8 0d 19 09 00 84 c0 0f 85 ff fd ff ff 48 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001eafa20 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffd7
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88809fd9e0c0 RCX: 1ffffffff13266dd
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90001eafa60 R08: 1ffff11013d22898 R09: ffffed1013d22899
R10: ffffed1013d22898 R11: ffff88809e9144c7 R12: ffff8880a905e138
R13: ffff88809e9144c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
 mutex_optimistic_spin kernel/locking/mutex.c:673 [inline]
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:962 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x32b/0x13c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1106
 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1121
 tty_lock+0xc7/0x130 drivers/tty/tty_mutex.c:19
 tty_release+0xb5/0xe90 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1665
 __fput+0x2ff/0x890 fs/file_table.c:280
 ____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
 task_work_run+0x145/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x8e7/0x2ef0 kernel/exit.c:797
 do_group_exit+0x135/0x360 kernel/exit.c:895
 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:906 [inline]
 __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:904 [inline]
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x44/0x50 kernel/exit.c:904
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x43fef8
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffdb07d2338 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000043fef8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00000000004bf730 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: ffffffffffffffd0
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00000000006d1180 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 6e4e2f811bad ("6pack,mkiss: fix lock inconsistency")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
index 54e63ec04907..8c636c493227 100644
--- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
+++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
@@ -654,10 +654,10 @@ static void sixpack_close(struct tty_struct *tty)
 {
 	struct sixpack *sp;
 
-	write_lock_bh(&disc_data_lock);
+	write_lock_irq(&disc_data_lock);
 	sp = tty->disc_data;
 	tty->disc_data = NULL;
-	write_unlock_bh(&disc_data_lock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&disc_data_lock);
 	if (!sp)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c
index 13e4c1eff353..3b14e6e281d4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c
+++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/mkiss.c
@@ -783,10 +783,10 @@ static void mkiss_close(struct tty_struct *tty)
 {
 	struct mkiss *ax;
 
-	write_lock_bh(&disc_data_lock);
+	write_lock_irq(&disc_data_lock);
 	ax = tty->disc_data;
 	tty->disc_data = NULL;
-	write_unlock_bh(&disc_data_lock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&disc_data_lock);
 
 	if (!ax)
 		return;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 48/84] net: marvell: mvpp2: phylink requires the link interrupt

[Sasha Levin]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

[ Upstream commit f3f2364ea14d1cf6bf966542f31eadcf178f1577 ]

phylink requires the MAC to report when its link status changes when
operating in inband modes.  Failure to report link status changes
means that phylink has no idea when the link events happen, which
results in either the network interface's carrier remaining up or
remaining permanently down.

For example, with a fiber module, if the interface is brought up and
link is initially established, taking the link down at the far end
will cut the optical power.  The SFP module's LOS asserts, we
deactivate the link, and the network interface reports no carrier.

When the far end is brought back up, the SFP module's LOS deasserts,
but the MAC may be slower to establish link.  If this happens (which
in my tests is a certainty) then phylink never hears that the MAC
has established link with the far end, and the network interface is
stuck reporting no carrier.  This means the interface is
non-functional.

Avoiding the link interrupt when we have phylink is basically not
an option, so remove the !port->phylink from the test.

Fixes: 4bb043262878 ("net: mvpp2: phylink support")
Tested-by: Sven Auhagen <sven.auhagen@voleatech.de>
Tested-by: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c
index a50977ce4076..04bee450eb3d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c
@@ -3341,7 +3341,7 @@ static int mvpp2_open(struct net_device *dev)
 		valid = true;
 	}
 
-	if (priv->hw_version == MVPP22 && port->link_irq && !port->phylink) {
+	if (priv->hw_version == MVPP22 && port->link_irq) {
 		err = request_irq(port->link_irq, mvpp2_link_status_isr, 0,
 				  dev->name, port);
 		if (err) {
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 49/84] bnx2x: Do not handle requests from VFs after parity

[Sasha Levin]

From: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>

[ Upstream commit 7113f796bbbced2470cd6d7379d50d7a7a78bf34 ]

Parity error from the hardware will cause PF to lose the state
of their VFs due to PF's internal reload and hardware reset following
the parity error. Restrict any configuration request from the VFs after
the parity as it could cause unexpected hardware behavior, only way
for VFs to recover would be to trigger FLR on VFs and reload them.

Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.h |  1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_vfpf.c  | 12 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c
index af57568c922e..df4f77ad95c4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -9995,10 +9995,18 @@ static void bnx2x_recovery_failed(struct bnx2x *bp)
  */
 static void bnx2x_parity_recover(struct bnx2x *bp)
 {
-	bool global = false;
 	u32 error_recovered, error_unrecovered;
-	bool is_parity;
+	bool is_parity, global = false;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BNX2X_SRIOV
+	int vf_idx;
+
+	for (vf_idx = 0; vf_idx < bp->requested_nr_virtfn; vf_idx++) {
+		struct bnx2x_virtf *vf = BP_VF(bp, vf_idx);
 
+		if (vf)
+			vf->state = VF_LOST;
+	}
+#endif
 	DP(NETIF_MSG_HW, "Handling parity\n");
 	while (1) {
 		switch (bp->recovery_state) {
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.h
index eb814c65152f..4dc34de1a09a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ struct bnx2x_virtf {
 #define VF_ACQUIRED	1	/* VF acquired, but not initialized */
 #define VF_ENABLED	2	/* VF Enabled */
 #define VF_RESET	3	/* VF FLR'd, pending cleanup */
+#define VF_LOST		4	/* Recovery while VFs are loaded */
 
 	bool flr_clnup_stage;	/* true during flr cleanup */
 	bool malicious;		/* true if FW indicated so, until FLR */
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_vfpf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_vfpf.c
index 8e0a317b31f7..152758a45150 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_vfpf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_vfpf.c
@@ -2114,6 +2114,18 @@ static void bnx2x_vf_mbx_request(struct bnx2x *bp, struct bnx2x_virtf *vf,
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (vf->state == VF_LOST) {
+		/* Just ack the FW and return if VFs are lost
+		 * in case of parity error. VFs are supposed to be timedout
+		 * on waiting for PF response.
+		 */
+		DP(BNX2X_MSG_IOV,
+		   "VF 0x%x lost, not handling the request\n", vf->abs_vfid);
+
+		storm_memset_vf_mbx_ack(bp, vf->abs_vfid);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* check if tlv type is known */
 	if (bnx2x_tlv_supported(mbx->first_tlv.tl.type)) {
 		/* Lock the per vf op mutex and note the locker's identity.
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 50/84] bnx2x: Fix logic to get total no. of PFs per engine

[Sasha Levin]

From: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>

[ Upstream commit ee699f89bdbaa19c399804504241b5c531b48888 ]

Driver doesn't calculate total number of PFs configured on a
given engine correctly which messed up resources in the PFs
loaded on that engine, leading driver to exceed configuration
of resources (like vlan filters etc.) beyond the limit per
engine, which ended up with asserts from the firmware.

Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
index ee5159ef837e..df5e8c2e8eaf 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static inline u8 bnx2x_get_path_func_num(struct bnx2x *bp)
 		for (i = 0; i < E1H_FUNC_MAX / 2; i++) {
 			u32 func_config =
 				MF_CFG_RD(bp,
-					  func_mf_config[BP_PORT(bp) + 2 * i].
+					  func_mf_config[BP_PATH(bp) + 2 * i].
 					  config);
 			func_num +=
 				((func_config & FUNC_MF_CFG_FUNC_HIDE) ? 0 : 1);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 51/84] bonding: fix active-backup transition after link failure

[Sasha Levin]

From: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 5d485ed88d48f8101a2067348e267c0aaf4ed486 ]

After the recent fix in commit 1899bb325149 ("bonding: fix state
transition issue in link monitoring"), the active-backup mode with
miimon initially come-up fine but after a link-failure, both members
transition into backup state.

Following steps to reproduce the scenario (eth1 and eth2 are the
slaves of the bond):

    ip link set eth1 up
    ip link set eth2 down
    sleep 1
    ip link set eth2 up
    ip link set eth1 down
    cat /sys/class/net/eth1/bonding_slave/state
    cat /sys/class/net/eth2/bonding_slave/state

Fixes: 1899bb325149 ("bonding: fix state transition issue in link monitoring")
CC: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
index 9b8143dca512..f57b86f1373d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
@@ -2223,9 +2223,6 @@ static void bond_miimon_commit(struct bonding *bond)
 			} else if (BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP) {
 				/* make it immediately active */
 				bond_set_active_slave(slave);
-			} else if (slave != primary) {
-				/* prevent it from being the active one */
-				bond_set_backup_slave(slave);
 			}
 
 			netdev_info(bond->dev, "link status definitely up for interface %s, %u Mbps %s duplex\n",
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 52/84] gtp: do not allow adding duplicate tid and ms_addr pdp context

[Sasha Levin]

From: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6b01b1d9b2d38dc84ac398bfe9f00baff06a31e5 ]

GTP RX packet path lookups pdp context with TID. If duplicate TID pdp
contexts are existing in the list, it couldn't select correct pdp context.
So, TID value  should be unique.
GTP TX packet path lookups pdp context with ms_addr. If duplicate ms_addr pdp
contexts are existing in the list, it couldn't select correct pdp context.
So, ms_addr value should be unique.

Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/gtp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c
index d178d5bad7e4..7ca96ba00f20 100644
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -931,24 +931,31 @@ static void ipv4_pdp_fill(struct pdp_ctx *pctx, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 }
 
-static int ipv4_pdp_add(struct gtp_dev *gtp, struct sock *sk,
-			struct genl_info *info)
+static int gtp_pdp_add(struct gtp_dev *gtp, struct sock *sk,
+		       struct genl_info *info)
 {
+	struct pdp_ctx *pctx, *pctx_tid = NULL;
 	struct net_device *dev = gtp->dev;
 	u32 hash_ms, hash_tid = 0;
-	struct pdp_ctx *pctx;
+	unsigned int version;
 	bool found = false;
 	__be32 ms_addr;
 
 	ms_addr = nla_get_be32(info->attrs[GTPA_MS_ADDRESS]);
 	hash_ms = ipv4_hashfn(ms_addr) % gtp->hash_size;
+	version = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[GTPA_VERSION]);
 
-	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pctx, &gtp->addr_hash[hash_ms], hlist_addr) {
-		if (pctx->ms_addr_ip4.s_addr == ms_addr) {
-			found = true;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	pctx = ipv4_pdp_find(gtp, ms_addr);
+	if (pctx)
+		found = true;
+	if (version == GTP_V0)
+		pctx_tid = gtp0_pdp_find(gtp,
+					 nla_get_u64(info->attrs[GTPA_TID]));
+	else if (version == GTP_V1)
+		pctx_tid = gtp1_pdp_find(gtp,
+					 nla_get_u32(info->attrs[GTPA_I_TEI]));
+	if (pctx_tid)
+		found = true;
 
 	if (found) {
 		if (info->nlhdr->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
@@ -956,6 +963,11 @@ static int ipv4_pdp_add(struct gtp_dev *gtp, struct sock *sk,
 		if (info->nlhdr->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+		if (pctx && pctx_tid)
+			return -EEXIST;
+		if (!pctx)
+			pctx = pctx_tid;
+
 		ipv4_pdp_fill(pctx, info);
 
 		if (pctx->gtp_version == GTP_V0)
@@ -1079,7 +1091,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_new_pdp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	err = ipv4_pdp_add(gtp, sk, info);
+	err = gtp_pdp_add(gtp, sk, info);
 
 out_unlock:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 53/84] gtp: fix wrong condition in gtp_genl_dump_pdp()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 94a6d9fb88df43f92d943c32b84ce398d50bf49f ]

gtp_genl_dump_pdp() is ->dumpit() callback of GTP module and it is used
to dump pdp contexts. it would be re-executed because of dump packet size.

If dump packet size is too big, it saves current dump pointer
(gtp interface pointer, bucket, TID value) then it restarts dump from
last pointer.
Current GTP code allows adding zero TID pdp context but dump code
ignores zero TID value. So, last dump pointer will not be found.

In addition, this patch adds missing rcu_read_lock() in
gtp_genl_dump_pdp().

Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/gtp.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c
index 7ca96ba00f20..d64ebf0f9677 100644
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ struct pdp_ctx {
 	struct hlist_node	hlist_addr;
 
 	union {
-		u64		tid;
 		struct {
 			u64	tid;
 			u16	flow;
@@ -1249,43 +1248,46 @@ static int gtp_genl_dump_pdp(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct netlink_callback *cb)
 {
 	struct gtp_dev *last_gtp = (struct gtp_dev *)cb->args[2], *gtp;
+	int i, j, bucket = cb->args[0], skip = cb->args[1];
 	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
-	struct gtp_net *gn = net_generic(net, gtp_net_id);
-	unsigned long tid = cb->args[1];
-	int i, k = cb->args[0], ret;
 	struct pdp_ctx *pctx;
+	struct gtp_net *gn;
+
+	gn = net_generic(net, gtp_net_id);
 
 	if (cb->args[4])
 		return 0;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(gtp, &gn->gtp_dev_list, list) {
 		if (last_gtp && last_gtp != gtp)
 			continue;
 		else
 			last_gtp = NULL;
 
-		for (i = k; i < gtp->hash_size; i++) {
-			hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pctx, &gtp->tid_hash[i], hlist_tid) {
-				if (tid && tid != pctx->u.tid)
-					continue;
-				else
-					tid = 0;
-
-				ret = gtp_genl_fill_info(skb,
-							 NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
-							 cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
-							 cb->nlh->nlmsg_type, pctx);
-				if (ret < 0) {
+		for (i = bucket; i < gtp->hash_size; i++) {
+			j = 0;
+			hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pctx, &gtp->tid_hash[i],
+						 hlist_tid) {
+				if (j >= skip &&
+				    gtp_genl_fill_info(skb,
+					    NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
+					    cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+					    cb->nlh->nlmsg_type, pctx)) {
 					cb->args[0] = i;
-					cb->args[1] = pctx->u.tid;
+					cb->args[1] = j;
 					cb->args[2] = (unsigned long)gtp;
 					goto out;
 				}
+				j++;
 			}
+			skip = 0;
 		}
+		bucket = 0;
 	}
 	cb->args[4] = 1;
 out:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return skb->len;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 54/84] gtp: avoid zero size hashtable

[Sasha Levin]

From: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6a902c0f31993ab02e1b6ea7085002b9c9083b6a ]

GTP default hashtable size is 1024 and userspace could set specific
hashtable size with IFLA_GTP_PDP_HASHSIZE. If hashtable size is set to 0
from userspace,  hashtable will not work and panic will occur.

Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/gtp.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c
index d64ebf0f9677..eeae8617f7ec 100644
--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -664,10 +664,13 @@ static int gtp_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
-	if (!data[IFLA_GTP_PDP_HASHSIZE])
+	if (!data[IFLA_GTP_PDP_HASHSIZE]) {
 		hashsize = 1024;
-	else
+	} else {
 		hashsize = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_GTP_PDP_HASHSIZE]);
+		if (!hashsize)
+			hashsize = 1024;
+	}
 
 	err = gtp_hashtable_new(gtp, hashsize);
 	if (err < 0)
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 55/84] cxgb4: Fix kernel panic while accessing sge_info

[Sasha Levin]

From: Vishal Kulkarni <vishal@chelsio.com>

[ Upstream commit 479a0d1376f6d97c60871442911f1394d4446a25 ]

The sge_info debugfs collects offload queue info even when offload
capability is disabled and leads to panic.

[  144.139871] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  144.139874] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000082d456005 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[  144.139876] Call Trace:
[  144.139887]  sge_queue_start+0x12/0x30 [cxgb4]
[  144.139897]  seq_read+0x1d4/0x3d0
[  144.139906]  full_proxy_read+0x50/0x70
[  144.139913]  vfs_read+0x89/0x140
[  144.139916]  ksys_read+0x55/0xd0
[  144.139924]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1d0
[  144.139933]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  144.139936] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b01493990

Fix this crash by skipping the offload queue access in sge_qinfo when
offload capability is disabled

Signed-off-by: Herat Ramani <herat@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Kulkarni <vishal@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c
index b429b726b987..d320e9afab88 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c
@@ -3035,6 +3035,9 @@ static int sge_queue_entries(const struct adapter *adap)
 	int tot_uld_entries = 0;
 	int i;
 
+	if (!is_uld(adap))
+		goto lld_only;
+
 	mutex_lock(&uld_mutex);
 	for (i = 0; i < CXGB4_TX_MAX; i++)
 		tot_uld_entries += sge_qinfo_uld_txq_entries(adap, i);
@@ -3045,6 +3048,7 @@ static int sge_queue_entries(const struct adapter *adap)
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&uld_mutex);
 
+lld_only:
 	return DIV_ROUND_UP(adap->sge.ethqsets, 4) +
 	       tot_uld_entries +
 	       DIV_ROUND_UP(MAX_CTRL_QUEUES, 4) + 1;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 56/84] net: usb: lan78xx: Fix error message format specifier

[Sasha Levin]

From: Cristian Birsan <cristian.birsan@microchip.com>

[ Upstream commit 858ce8ca62ea1530f2779d0e3f934b0176e663c3 ]

Display the return code as decimal integer.

Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver")
Signed-off-by: Cristian Birsan <cristian.birsan@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
index 6dd24a1ca10d..0f6b8d4689b3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int lan78xx_read_stats(struct lan78xx_net *dev,
 		}
 	} else {
 		netdev_warn(dev->net,
-			    "Failed to read stat ret = 0x%x", ret);
+			    "Failed to read stat ret = %d", ret);
 	}
 
 	kfree(stats);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 58/84] rfkill: Fix incorrect check to avoid NULL pointer dereference

[Sasha Levin]

From: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>

[ Upstream commit 6fc232db9e8cd50b9b83534de9cd91ace711b2d7 ]

In rfkill_register, the struct rfkill pointer is first derefernced
and then checked for NULL. This patch removes the BUG_ON and returns
an error to the caller in case rfkill is NULL.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191215153409.21696-1-pakki001@umn.edu
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/rfkill/core.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/rfkill/core.c b/net/rfkill/core.c
index 1355f5ca8d22..2c0ac44741a0 100644
--- a/net/rfkill/core.c
+++ b/net/rfkill/core.c
@@ -1014,10 +1014,13 @@ static void rfkill_sync_work(struct work_struct *work)
 int __must_check rfkill_register(struct rfkill *rfkill)
 {
 	static unsigned long rfkill_no;
-	struct device *dev = &rfkill->dev;
+	struct device *dev;
 	int error;
 
-	BUG_ON(!rfkill);
+	if (!rfkill)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	dev = &rfkill->dev;
 
 	mutex_lock(&rfkill_global_mutex);
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 61/84] net: gemini: Fix memory leak in gmac_setup_txqs

[Sasha Levin]

From: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f37f710353677639bc5d37ee785335994adf2529 ]

In the implementation of gmac_setup_txqs() the allocated desc_ring is
leaked if TX queue base is not aligned. Release it via
dma_free_coherent.

Fixes: 4d5ae32f5e1e ("net: ethernet: Add a driver for Gemini gigabit ethernet")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c
index 4af78de0e077..01a212097836 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c
@@ -577,6 +577,8 @@ static int gmac_setup_txqs(struct net_device *netdev)
 
 	if (port->txq_dma_base & ~DMA_Q_BASE_MASK) {
 		dev_warn(geth->dev, "TX queue base is not aligned\n");
+		dma_free_coherent(geth->dev, len * sizeof(*desc_ring),
+				  desc_ring, port->txq_dma_base);
 		kfree(skb_tab);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 67/84] net: qlogic: Fix error paths in ql_alloc_large_buffers()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

[ Upstream commit cad46039e4c99812db067c8ac22a864960e7acc4 ]

ql_alloc_large_buffers() has the usual RX buffer allocation
loop where it allocates skbs and maps them for DMA.  It also
treats failure as a fatal error.

There are (at least) three bugs in the error paths:

1. ql_free_large_buffers() assumes that the lrg_buf[] entry for the
first buffer that couldn't be allocated will have .skb == NULL.
But the qla_buf[] array is not zero-initialised.

2. ql_free_large_buffers() DMA-unmaps all skbs in lrg_buf[].  This is
incorrect for the last allocated skb, if DMA mapping failed.

3. Commit 1acb8f2a7a9f ("net: qlogic: Fix memory leak in
ql_alloc_large_buffers") added a direct call to dev_kfree_skb_any()
after the skb is recorded in lrg_buf[], so ql_free_large_buffers()
will double-free it.

The bugs are somewhat inter-twined, so fix them all at once:

* Clear each entry in qla_buf[] before attempting to allocate
  an skb for it.  This goes half-way to fixing bug 1.
* Set the .skb field only after the skb is DMA-mapped.  This
  fixes the rest.

Fixes: 1357bfcf7106 ("qla3xxx: Dynamically size the rx buffer queue ...")
Fixes: 0f8ab89e825f ("qla3xxx: Check return code from pci_map_single() ...")
Fixes: 1acb8f2a7a9f ("net: qlogic: Fix memory leak in ql_alloc_large_buffers")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c
index 783ee6a32b5d..1b5e098b2367 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c
@@ -2757,6 +2757,9 @@ static int ql_alloc_large_buffers(struct ql3_adapter *qdev)
 	int err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < qdev->num_large_buffers; i++) {
+		lrg_buf_cb = &qdev->lrg_buf[i];
+		memset(lrg_buf_cb, 0, sizeof(struct ql_rcv_buf_cb));
+
 		skb = netdev_alloc_skb(qdev->ndev,
 				       qdev->lrg_buffer_len);
 		if (unlikely(!skb)) {
@@ -2767,11 +2770,7 @@ static int ql_alloc_large_buffers(struct ql3_adapter *qdev)
 			ql_free_large_buffers(qdev);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		} else {
-
-			lrg_buf_cb = &qdev->lrg_buf[i];
-			memset(lrg_buf_cb, 0, sizeof(struct ql_rcv_buf_cb));
 			lrg_buf_cb->index = i;
-			lrg_buf_cb->skb = skb;
 			/*
 			 * We save some space to copy the ethhdr from first
 			 * buffer
@@ -2793,6 +2792,7 @@ static int ql_alloc_large_buffers(struct ql3_adapter *qdev)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 
+			lrg_buf_cb->skb = skb;
 			dma_unmap_addr_set(lrg_buf_cb, mapaddr, map);
 			dma_unmap_len_set(lrg_buf_cb, maplen,
 					  qdev->lrg_buffer_len -
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 68/84] net: nfc: nci: fix a possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in nci_uart_tty_receive()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit b7ac893652cafadcf669f78452329727e4e255cc ]

The kernel may sleep while holding a spinlock.
The function call path (from bottom to top) in Linux 4.19 is:

net/nfc/nci/uart.c, 349:
	nci_skb_alloc in nci_uart_default_recv_buf
net/nfc/nci/uart.c, 255:
	(FUNC_PTR)nci_uart_default_recv_buf in nci_uart_tty_receive
net/nfc/nci/uart.c, 254:
	spin_lock in nci_uart_tty_receive

nci_skb_alloc(GFP_KERNEL) can sleep at runtime.
(FUNC_PTR) means a function pointer is called.

To fix this bug, GFP_KERNEL is replaced with GFP_ATOMIC for
nci_skb_alloc().

This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by myself.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/nfc/nci/uart.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/uart.c b/net/nfc/nci/uart.c
index a66f102c6c01..040576dd73bb 100644
--- a/net/nfc/nci/uart.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/uart.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int nci_uart_default_recv_buf(struct nci_uart *nu, const u8 *data,
 			nu->rx_packet_len = -1;
 			nu->rx_skb = nci_skb_alloc(nu->ndev,
 						   NCI_MAX_PACKET_SIZE,
-						   GFP_KERNEL);
+						   GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (!nu->rx_skb)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 		}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 69/84] net: stmmac: Do not accept invalid MTU values

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>

[ Upstream commit eaf4fac478077d4ed57cbca2c044c4b58a96bd98 ]

The maximum MTU value is determined by the maximum size of TX FIFO so
that a full packet can fit in the FIFO. Add a check for this in the MTU
change callback.

Also check if provided and rounded MTU does not passes the maximum limit
of 16K.

Changes from v2:
- Align MTU before checking if its valid

Fixes: 7ac6653a085b ("stmmac: Move the STMicroelectronics driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
index 014fe93ed2d8..ec37ef7521e9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -3604,12 +3604,24 @@ static void stmmac_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev)
 static int stmmac_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
 {
 	struct stmmac_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+	int txfifosz = priv->plat->tx_fifo_size;
+
+	if (txfifosz == 0)
+		txfifosz = priv->dma_cap.tx_fifo_size;
+
+	txfifosz /= priv->plat->tx_queues_to_use;
 
 	if (netif_running(dev)) {
 		netdev_err(priv->dev, "must be stopped to change its MTU\n");
 		return -EBUSY;
 	}
 
+	new_mtu = STMMAC_ALIGN(new_mtu);
+
+	/* If condition true, FIFO is too small or MTU too large */
+	if ((txfifosz < new_mtu) || (new_mtu > BUF_SIZE_16KiB))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	dev->mtu = new_mtu;
 
 	netdev_update_features(dev);
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 70/84] net: stmmac: xgmac: Clear previous RX buffer size

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>

[ Upstream commit 11d55fd9975f8e46a0e5e19c14899544e81e1e15 ]

When switching between buffer sizes we need to clear the previous value.

Fixes: d6ddfacd95c7 ("net: stmmac: Add DMA related callbacks for XGMAC2")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2.h     | 2 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_dma.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2.h
index 0a80fa25afe3..209745294751 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2.h
@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@
 #define XGMAC_DMA_CH_RX_CONTROL(x)	(0x00003108 + (0x80 * (x)))
 #define XGMAC_RxPBL			GENMASK(21, 16)
 #define XGMAC_RxPBL_SHIFT		16
+#define XGMAC_RBSZ			GENMASK(14, 1)
+#define XGMAC_RBSZ_SHIFT		1
 #define XGMAC_RXST			BIT(0)
 #define XGMAC_DMA_CH_TxDESC_LADDR(x)	(0x00003114 + (0x80 * (x)))
 #define XGMAC_DMA_CH_RxDESC_LADDR(x)	(0x0000311c + (0x80 * (x)))
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_dma.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_dma.c
index 1c3930527444..27942c53b567 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_dma.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_dma.c
@@ -379,7 +379,8 @@ static void dwxgmac2_set_bfsize(void __iomem *ioaddr, int bfsize, u32 chan)
 	u32 value;
 
 	value = readl(ioaddr + XGMAC_DMA_CH_RX_CONTROL(chan));
-	value |= bfsize << 1;
+	value &= ~XGMAC_RBSZ;
+	value |= bfsize << XGMAC_RBSZ_SHIFT;
 	writel(value, ioaddr + XGMAC_DMA_CH_RX_CONTROL(chan));
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 71/84] net: stmmac: RX buffer size must be 16 byte aligned

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>

[ Upstream commit 8d558f0294fe92e04af192e221d0d0f6a180ee7b ]

We need to align the RX buffer size to at least 16 byte so that IP
doesn't mis-behave. This is required by HW.

Changes from v2:
- Align UP and not DOWN (David)

Fixes: 7ac6653a085b ("stmmac: Move the STMicroelectronics driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
index ec37ef7521e9..437b1b2b3e6b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
 #include "dwxgmac2.h"
 #include "hwif.h"
 
-#define	STMMAC_ALIGN(x)		__ALIGN_KERNEL(x, SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
+#define	STMMAC_ALIGN(x)		ALIGN(ALIGN(x, SMP_CACHE_BYTES), 16)
 #define	TSO_MAX_BUFF_SIZE	(SZ_16K - 1)
 
 /* Module parameters */
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 72/84] net: stmmac: Always arm TX Timer at end of transmission start

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>

[ Upstream commit 4772f26db8d1fb568c4862c538344a1b5fb52081 ]

If TX Coalesce timer is enabled we should always arm it, otherwise we
may hit the case where an interrupt is missed and the TX Queue will
timeout.

Arming the timer does not necessarly mean it will run the tx_clean()
because this function is wrapped around NAPI launcher.

Fixes: 9125cdd1be11 ("stmmac: add the initial tx coalesce schema")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
index 437b1b2b3e6b..7ee0e46539c0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
@@ -2997,6 +2997,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_tso_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 
 	tx_q->tx_tail_addr = tx_q->dma_tx_phy + (tx_q->cur_tx * sizeof(*desc));
 	stmmac_set_tx_tail_ptr(priv, priv->ioaddr, tx_q->tx_tail_addr, queue);
+	stmmac_tx_timer_arm(priv, queue);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 
@@ -3210,6 +3211,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t stmmac_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 
 	tx_q->tx_tail_addr = tx_q->dma_tx_phy + (tx_q->cur_tx * sizeof(*desc));
 	stmmac_set_tx_tail_ptr(priv, priv->ioaddr, tx_q->tx_tail_addr, queue);
+	stmmac_tx_timer_arm(priv, queue);
 
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 75/84] net, sysctl: Fix compiler warning when only cBPF is present

[Sasha Levin]

From: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>

[ Upstream commit 1148f9adbe71415836a18a36c1b4ece999ab0973 ]

proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been firstly introduced
in commit 2e4a30983b0f ("bpf: restrict access to core bpf sysctls")
under CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT. Then, this ifdef has been removed in
ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv
allocations"), because a new sysctl, bpf_jit_limit, made use of it.
Finally, this parameter has become long instead of integer with
fdadd04931c2 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
and thus, a new proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() has been
added.

With this last change, we got back to that
proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted() is used only under
CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT, but the corresponding ifdef has not been
brought back.

So, in configurations like CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y && CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT=n
since v4.20 we have:

  CC      net/core/sysctl_net_core.o
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c:292:1: warning: ‘proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
  292 | proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Suppress this by guarding it with CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT again.

Fixes: fdadd04931c2 ("bpf: fix bpf_jit_limit knob for PAGE_SIZE >= 64K")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191218091821.7080-1-alobakin@dlink.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index d67ec17f2cc8..6cec08cd0bb9 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT
 static int
 proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp,
@@ -291,6 +292,7 @@ proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 
 	return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
+# endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT */
 
 static int
 proc_dolongvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 80/84] net: hisilicon: Fix a BUG trigered by wrong bytes_compl

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 90b3b339364c76baa2436445401ea9ade040c216 ]

When doing stress test, we get the following trace:
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:26!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: hip04_eth
CPU: 0 PID: 2003 Comm: tDblStackPcap0 Tainted: G           O L  4.4.197 #1
Hardware name: Hisilicon A15
task: c3637668 task.stack: de3bc000
PC is at dql_completed+0x18/0x154
LR is at hip04_tx_reclaim+0x110/0x174 [hip04_eth]
pc : [<c041abfc>]    lr : [<bf0003a8>]    psr: 800f0313
sp : de3bdc2c  ip : 00000000  fp : c020fb10
r10: 00000000  r9 : c39b4224  r8 : 00000001
r7 : 00000046  r6 : c39b4000  r5 : 0078f392  r4 : 0078f392
r3 : 00000047  r2 : 00000000  r1 : 00000046  r0 : df5d5c80
Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 32c5387d  Table: 1e189b80  DAC: 55555555
Process tDblStackPcap0 (pid: 2003, stack limit = 0xde3bc190)
Stack: (0xde3bdc2c to 0xde3be000)
[<c041abfc>] (dql_completed) from [<bf0003a8>] (hip04_tx_reclaim+0x110/0x174 [hip04_eth])
[<bf0003a8>] (hip04_tx_reclaim [hip04_eth]) from [<bf0012c0>] (hip04_rx_poll+0x20/0x388 [hip04_eth])
[<bf0012c0>] (hip04_rx_poll [hip04_eth]) from [<c04c8d9c>] (net_rx_action+0x120/0x374)
[<c04c8d9c>] (net_rx_action) from [<c021eaf4>] (__do_softirq+0x218/0x318)
[<c021eaf4>] (__do_softirq) from [<c021eea0>] (irq_exit+0x88/0xac)
[<c021eea0>] (irq_exit) from [<c0240130>] (msa_irq_exit+0x11c/0x1d4)
[<c0240130>] (msa_irq_exit) from [<c0267ba8>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x110/0x148)
[<c0267ba8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0201588>] (gic_handle_irq+0xd4/0x118)
[<c0201588>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0558360>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x58)
Exception stack(0xde3bdde0 to 0xde3bde28)
dde0: 00000000 00008001 c3637668 00000000 00000000 a00f0213 dd3627a0 c0af6380
de00: c086d380 a00f0213 c0a22a50 de3bde6c 00000002 de3bde30 c0558138 c055813c
de20: 600f0213 ffffffff
[<c0558360>] (__irq_svc) from [<c055813c>] (_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x54)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Pre-modification code:
int hip04_mac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
{
[...]
[1]	priv->tx_head = TX_NEXT(tx_head);
[2]	count++;
[3]	netdev_sent_queue(ndev, skb->len);
[...]
}
An rx interrupt occurs if hip04_mac_start_xmit just executes to the line 2,
tx_head has been updated, but corresponding 'skb->len' has not been
added to dql_queue.

And then
hip04_mac_interrupt->__napi_schedule->hip04_rx_poll->hip04_tx_reclaim

In hip04_tx_reclaim, because tx_head has been updated,
bytes_compl will plus an additional "skb-> len"
which has not been added to dql_queue. And then
trigger the BUG_ON(bytes_compl > num_queued - dql->num_completed).

To solve the problem described above, we put
"netdev_sent_queue(ndev, skb->len);"
before
"priv->tx_head = TX_NEXT(tx_head);"

Fixes: a41ea46a9a12 ("net: hisilicon: new hip04 ethernet driver")
Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c
index e8936ae46add..718afa4be2a0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c
@@ -456,9 +456,9 @@ hip04_mac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	skb_tx_timestamp(skb);
 
 	hip04_set_xmit_desc(priv, phys);
-	priv->tx_head = TX_NEXT(tx_head);
 	count++;
 	netdev_sent_queue(ndev, skb->len);
+	priv->tx_head = TX_NEXT(tx_head);
 
 	stats->tx_bytes += skb->len;
 	stats->tx_packets++;
-- 
2.20.1

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 46/84] tcp/dccp: fix possible race __inet_lookup_established()

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Fri, 27 Dec 2019 at 23:17, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 ]
>
> Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
> happening in __inet_lookup_established().
>
> Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
> (via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
> I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.
>
> They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
> so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
> another one.
>
> Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
> merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
> hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.

The kernel panic reported on all devices,
While running LTP syscalls accept* test cases on stable-rc-4.19 branch kernel.
This report log extracted from qemu_x86_64.

Reverting this patch re-solved kernel crash.

metadata:
  git branch: linux-4.19.y
  git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
  git commit: 4e040169e8b7f4e1c50ceb0f6596015ecc67a052
  git describe: v4.19.92-112-g4e040169e8b7
  make_kernelversion: 4.19.93-rc1
  kernel-config:
http://snapshots.linaro.org/openembedded/lkft/lkft/sumo/intel-corei7-64/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19/396/config

Crash log,

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000040000001
[   23.578222] PGD 138f25067 P4D 138f25067 PUD 0
er run is 0h 15m[   23.578222] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   23.578222] CPU: 1 PID: 2216 Comm: accept02 Not tainted 4.19.93-rc1 #1
[   23.578222] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
[   23.578222] RIP: 0010:__inet_lookup_listener+0x12d/0x300
 00s
[ts t_buffe r 23.578222] Code: 18 48 85 db 0f 84 fe 00 00 00 48 83 eb
68 0f 84 f4 00 00 00 0f b7 75 d0 44 8b 55 10 45 89 f1 45 31 ff 31 c0
45 89 de 89 75 b0 <4c> 3b 63 30 75 43 66 44 3b 6b 0e 75 3c 0f b6 73 13
40 f6 c6 20 75
[   23.578222] RSP: 0018:ffff9e0dbba83c38 EFLAGS: 00010206
[   23.578222] RAX: ffff9e0db6ff8a80 RBX: 000000003fffffd1 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   23.578222] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[   23.578222] RBP: ffff9e0dbba83c88 R08: 000000000100007f R09: 0000000000000000
[   23.578222] R10: 000000000100007f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffbeb2fe40
[   23.578222] R13: 000000000000d59f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000006
[   23.578222] FS:  00007fbb30e57700(0000) GS:ffff9e0dbba80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.578222] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.578222] CR2: 0000000040000001 CR3: 000000013276c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[   23.578222] Call Trace:
[   23.578222]  <IRQ>
[   23.578222]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x4fe/0xc80
[   23.578222]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0xaf/0x390
[   23.578222]  ip_local_deliver+0x1a1/0x200
[   23.578222]  ? ip_sublist_rcv+0x420/0x420
[   23.578222]  ip_rcv_finish+0x88/0xd0
s.c:55: INFO: Te[   23.578222]  ip_rcv+0x142/0x200
[   23.578222]  ? ip_rcv_finish_core.isra.18+0x4e0/0x4e0
st is[ us ing guar  23.578222]  ? process_backlog+0x6d/0x230
[   23.578222]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x57/0x80
ded [bu ffe rs
 ac2c3.578222]  __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
[   23.578222]  process_backlog+0xd4/0x230
[   23.578222]  net_rx_action+0x13e/0x420
[   23.578222]  ? __do_softirq+0x9b/0x426
[   23.578222]  __do_softirq+0xc7/0x426
[   23.578222]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x255/0x660
[   23.578222]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
[   23.578222]  </IRQ>
[   23.578222]  do_softirq.part.19+0x4d/0x60
[   23.578222]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xd9/0xf0
[   23.578222]  ip_finish_output2+0x27e/0x660
[   23.578222]  ip_finish_output+0x235/0x370
[   23.578222]  ? ip_finish_output+0x235/0x370
[   23.578222]  ip_output+0x76/0x250
[   23.578222]  ? ip_fragment.constprop.50+0x80/0x80
[   23.578222]  ip_local_out+0x3f/0x70
[   23.578222]  __ip_queue_xmit+0x1ea/0x5f0
[   23.578222]  ? __lock_is_held+0x5a/0xa0
[   23.578222]  ip_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[   23.578222]  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x57c/0xb60
[   23.578222]  tcp_connect+0xccd/0x1030
[   23.578222]  tcp_v4_connect+0x515/0x550
[   23.578222]  __inet_stream_connect+0x249/0x390
[   23.578222]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7f/0xf0
[   23.578222]  inet_stream_connect+0x3b/0x60
[   23.578222]  __sys_connect+0xa3/0x120
[   23.578222]  ? kfree+0x203/0x240
[   23.578222]  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1e3/0x350
[   23.578222]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x22/0xf0
[   23.578222]  ? do_syscall_64+0x17/0x1a0
[   23.578222]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xef/0x180
[   23.578222]  ? do_syscall_64+0x17/0x1a0
[   23.578222]  __x64_sys_connect+0x1a/0x20
[   23.578222]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0
[   23.578222]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[   23.578222] RIP: 0033:0x7fbb31a1c927
[   23.578222] Code: 44 00 00 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48
83 ec 10 e8 0b f9 ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2a 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 45 f9 ff ff
8b 44
[   23.578222] RSP: 002b:00007fbb30e56e00 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002a
[   23.578222] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 00007fbb31a1c927
[   23.578222] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007fbb31e4bff0 RDI: 0000000000000008
[   23.578222] RBP: 00007fbb31e4bff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000010
[   23.578222] R10: 000000000000010b R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000010
[   23.578222] R13: 0000000000412b64 R14: 0000000000000054 R15: 0000000000000000
[   23.578222] Modules linked in: fuse
[   23.578222] CR2: 0000000040000001
[   23.578222] ---[ end trace f7e2316fdadfb18a ]---
[   23.578222] RIP: 0010:__inet_lookup_listener+0x12d/0x300
[   23.578222] Code: 18 48 85 db 0f 84 fe 00 00 00 48 83 eb 68 0f 84
f4 00 00 00 0f b7 75 d0 44 8b 55 10 45 89 f1 45 31 ff 31 c0 45 89 de
89 75 b0 <4c> 3b 63 30 75 43 66 44 3b 6b 0e 75 3c 0f b6 73 13 40 f6 c6
20 75
[   23.578222] RSP: 0018:ffff9e0dbba83c38 EFLAGS: 00010206
[   23.578222] RAX: ffff9e0db6ff8a80 RBX: 000000003fffffd1 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   23.578222] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[   23.578222] RBP: ffff9e0dbba83c88 R08: 000000000100007f R09: 0000000000000000
[   23.578222] R10: 000000000100007f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffbeb2fe40
[   23.578222] R13: 000000000000d59f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000006
[   23.578222] FS:  00007fbb30e57700(0000) GS:ffff9e0dbba80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   23.578222] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   23.578222] CR2: 0000000040000001 CR3: 000000013276c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
[   23.578222] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
ept02.c:127: INFO: Starting listener on port: 54687
[   23.578222] Kernel Offset: 0x3c200000 from 0xffffffff81000000
(relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[   23.578222] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in
interrupt ]---

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 46/84] tcp/dccp: fix possible race __inet_lookup_established()

[Sasha Levin]

On Thu, Jan 02, 2020 at 01:31:22PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
>On Fri, 27 Dec 2019 at 23:17, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
>>
>> [ Upstream commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 ]
>>
>> Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
>> happening in __inet_lookup_established().
>>
>> Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
>> (via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
>> I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.
>>
>> They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
>> so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
>> another one.
>>
>> Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
>> merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
>> hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.
>
>The kernel panic reported on all devices,
>While running LTP syscalls accept* test cases on stable-rc-4.19 branch kernel.
>This report log extracted from qemu_x86_64.
>
>Reverting this patch re-solved kernel crash.

I'll drop it until we can look into what's happening here, thanks!

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 46/84] tcp/dccp: fix possible race __inet_lookup_established()

[Michal Kubecek]

On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 10:32:26AM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 02, 2020 at 01:31:22PM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On Fri, 27 Dec 2019 at 23:17, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > 
> > > From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > > 
> > > [ Upstream commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 ]
> > > 
> > > Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
> > > happening in __inet_lookup_established().
> > > 
> > > Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
> > > (via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
> > > I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.
> > > 
> > > They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
> > > so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
> > > another one.
> > > 
> > > Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
> > > merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
> > > hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.
> > 
> > The kernel panic reported on all devices,
> > While running LTP syscalls accept* test cases on stable-rc-4.19 branch kernel.
> > This report log extracted from qemu_x86_64.
> > 
> > Reverting this patch re-solved kernel crash.
> 
> I'll drop it until we can look into what's happening here, thanks!

It was already discussed here:

  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+G9fYv3=oJSFodFp4wwF7G7_g5FWYRYbc4F0AMU6jyfLT689A@mail.gmail.com

and fixed version should be in 4.19, 4.14 and 4.9 stable branches now.

Michal Kubecek