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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] uaccess: user_access_begin_after_access_ok()
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 16:32:55 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200602162931-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wjgg0bpD0qjYF=twJNXmRXYPjXqO1EFLL-mS8qUphe0AQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 10:18:09AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 9:33 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > It's not clear whether we need a new API, I think __uaccess_being() has the
> > > assumption that the address has been validated by access_ok().
> >
> > __uaccess_begin() is a stopgap, not a public API.
> 
> Correct. It's just an x86 implementation detail.
> 
> > The problem is real, but "let's add a public API that would do user_access_begin()
> > with access_ok() already done" is no-go.
> 
> Yeah, it's completely pointless.
> 
> The solution to this is easy: remove the incorrect and useless early
> "access_ok()". Boom, done.

Hmm are you sure we can drop it? access_ok is done in the context
of the process. Access itself in the context of a kernel thread
that borrows the same mm. IIUC if the process can be 32 bit
while the kernel is 64 bit, access_ok in the context of the
kernel thread will not DTRT.


> Then use user_access_begin() and the appropriate unsage_get/put_user()
> sequence, and user_access_end().
> 
> The range test that user-access-begin does is not just part of the
> ABI, it's just required in general. We have almost thirty years of
> history of trying to avoid it, AND IT WAS ALL BOGUS.
> 
> The fact is, the range check is pretty damn cheap, and not doing the
> range check has always been a complete and utter disaster.
> 
> You have exactly two cases:
> 
>  (a) the access_ok() would be right above the code and can't be missed
> 
>  (b) not
> 
> and in (a) the solution is: remove the access_ok() and let
> user_access_begin() do the range check.
> 
> In (b), the solution is literally "DON'T DO THAT!"
> 
> Because EVERY SINGLE TIME people have eventually noticed (possibly
> after code movement) that "oops, we never did the access_ok at all,
> and now we can be fooled into kernel corruption and a security issue".
> 
> And even if that didn't happen, the worry was there.
> 
> End result: use user_access_begin() and stop trying to remove the two
> cycles or whatever of the limit checking cost. The "upside" of
> removing that limit check just isn't. It's a downside.
> 
>                  Linus

That's true. Limit check cost is measureable but very small.
It's the speculation barrier that's costly.

-- 
MST


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-02 20:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-02  8:45 [PATCH RFC] uaccess: user_access_begin_after_access_ok() Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-02 10:15 ` Jason Wang
2020-06-02 16:33   ` Al Viro
2020-06-02 17:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-06-02 17:44       ` Al Viro
2020-06-02 17:46         ` Al Viro
2020-06-02 20:32       ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2020-06-02 20:41         ` David Laight
2020-06-02 21:58           ` Al Viro
2020-06-03  8:08             ` David Laight
2020-06-02 20:43         ` Linus Torvalds
2020-06-03  6:01           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
     [not found]             ` <CAHk-=wi3=QuD30fRq8fYYTj9WmkgeZ0VR_Sh3DQHU+nmwj-jMg@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-03 16:59               ` Linus Torvalds
2020-06-02 16:30 ` Al Viro
2020-06-02 20:42   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-02 22:10     ` Al Viro
2020-06-03  5:17       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03  1:48 ` Al Viro
2020-06-03  3:57   ` Jason Wang
2020-06-03  4:18     ` Al Viro
2020-06-03  5:18       ` Jason Wang
2020-06-03  5:46         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03  6:23           ` Jason Wang
2020-06-03  6:30             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03  6:36               ` Jason Wang
2020-06-04 16:49                 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-05 10:03                   ` Jason Wang
2020-06-06 20:08                     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03  6:25       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03  5:29   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-03 16:52     ` Al Viro
2020-06-04  6:10       ` Jason Wang
2020-06-04 14:59         ` Al Viro
2020-06-04 16:46           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 10:10       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-04 15:03         ` Al Viro
2020-06-04 16:47           ` Michael S. Tsirkin

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