[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 05/35] mac80211: remove warning in ieee80211_get_sband()

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 05/35] mac80211: remove warning in ieee80211_get_sband()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 0ee4d55534f82a0624701d0bb9fc2304d4529086 ]

Syzbot reports that it's possible to hit this from userspace,
by trying to add a station before any other connection setup
has been done. Instead of trying to catch this in some other
way simply remove the warning, that will appropriately reject
the call from userspace.

Reported-by: syzbot+7716dbc401d9a437890d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517164715.f537da276d17.Id05f40ec8761d6a8cc2df87f1aa09c651988a586@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index be40f6b16199..a83f0c2fcdf7 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf);
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) {
+	if (!chanctx_conf) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return NULL;
 	}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 06/35] mac80211_hwsim: drop pending frames on stop

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit bd18de517923903a177508fc8813f44e717b1c00 ]

Syzbot reports that we may be able to get into a situation where
mac80211 has pending ACK frames on shutdown with hwsim. It appears
that the reason for this is that syzbot uses the wmediumd hooks to
intercept/injection frames, and may shut down hwsim, removing the
radio(s), while frames are pending in the air simulation.

Clean out the pending queue when the interface is stopped, after
this the frames can't be reported back to mac80211 properly anyway.

Reported-by: syzbot+a063bbf0b15737362592@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517170429.b0f85ab0eda1.Ie42a6ec6b940c971f3441286aeaaae2fe368e29a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c
index 3b3fc7c9c91d..f147d4feedb9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c
@@ -1623,8 +1623,13 @@ static int mac80211_hwsim_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 static void mac80211_hwsim_stop(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 {
 	struct mac80211_hwsim_data *data = hw->priv;
+
 	data->started = false;
 	hrtimer_cancel(&data->beacon_timer);
+
+	while (!skb_queue_empty(&data->pending))
+		ieee80211_free_txskb(hw, skb_dequeue(&data->pending));
+
 	wiphy_dbg(hw->wiphy, "%s\n", __func__);
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 07/35] cfg80211: call cfg80211_leave_ocb when switching away from OCB

[Sasha Levin]

From: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]

If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:

struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
    ...
    union {
        struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
        struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
        struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
        struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // <- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
        struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // <- shares address
        struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
        struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
    } u;
    ...
}

Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.

link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5

Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/wireless/util.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c
index 2731267fd0f9..4fb8d1b14e76 100644
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -1059,6 +1059,9 @@ int cfg80211_change_iface(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
 		case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT:
 			/* mesh should be handled? */
 			break;
+		case NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB:
+			cfg80211_leave_ocb(rdev, dev);
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 12/35] net: ipv4: Remove unneed BUG() function

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 5ac6b198d7e312bd10ebe7d58c64690dc59cc49a ]

When 'nla_parse_nested_deprecated' failed, it's no need to
BUG() here, return -EINVAL is ok.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c  | 2 +-
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 123a6d39438f..7c1859777429 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -1989,7 +1989,7 @@ static int inet_set_link_af(struct net_device *dev, const struct nlattr *nla)
 		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 
 	if (nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, IFLA_INET_MAX, nla, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (tb[IFLA_INET_CONF]) {
 		nla_for_each_nested(a, tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], rem)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
index 4c881f5d9080..884d430e23cb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -5799,7 +5799,7 @@ static int inet6_set_link_af(struct net_device *dev, const struct nlattr *nla)
 		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 
 	if (nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, IFLA_INET6_MAX, nla, NULL, NULL) < 0)
-		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (tb[IFLA_INET6_TOKEN]) {
 		err = inet6_set_iftoken(idev, nla_data(tb[IFLA_INET6_TOKEN]));
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 13/35] mac80211: drop multicast fragments

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]

These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/rx.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index ef8ff0bc66f1..38b5695c2a0c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2250,17 +2250,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
 	frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
 
-	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
-		I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount);
-		goto out_no_led;
-	}
-
 	if (rx->sta)
 		cache = &rx->sta->frags;
 
 	if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
 		goto out;
 
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+		return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
 	I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
 
 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -2386,7 +2384,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
  out:
 	ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
- out_no_led:
 	if (rx->sta)
 		rx->sta->rx_stats.packets++;
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 14/35] net: ethtool: clear heap allocations for ethtool function

[Sasha Levin]

From: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 80ec82e3d2c1fab42eeb730aaa7985494a963d3f ]

Several ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. This will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and
might copy the full contents back to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
index 2917af3f5ac1..68ff19af195c 100644
--- a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
+++ b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c
@@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@ static int ethtool_get_any_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr,
 	if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ static int ethtool_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > ops->get_eeprom_len(dev))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	data = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ static int ethtool_self_test(struct net_device *dev, char __user *useraddr)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	test.len = test_len;
-	data = kmalloc_array(test_len, sizeof(u64), GFP_USER);
+	data = kcalloc(test_len, sizeof(u64), GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2281,7 +2281,7 @@ static int ethtool_get_tunable(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	ret = ethtool_tunable_valid(&tuna);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	data = kmalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	ret = ops->get_tunable(dev, &tuna, data);
@@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ static int get_phy_tunable(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	ret = ethtool_phy_tunable_valid(&tuna);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	data = kmalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
+	data = kzalloc(tuna.len, GFP_USER);
 	if (!data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (phy_drv_tunable) {
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 15/35] inet: annotate data race in inet_send_prepare() and inet_dgram_connect()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit dcd01eeac14486b56a790f5cce9b823440ba5b34 ]

Both functions are known to be racy when reading inet_num
as we do not want to grab locks for the common case the socket
has been bound already. The race is resolved in inet_autobind()
by reading again inet_num under the socket lock.

syzbot reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet_send_prepare / udp_lib_get_port

write to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24135 on cpu 0:
 udp_lib_get_port+0x4b2/0xe20 net/ipv4/udp.c:308
 udp_v6_get_port+0x5e/0x70 net/ipv6/udp.c:89
 inet_autobind net/ipv4/af_inet.c:183 [inline]
 inet_send_prepare+0xd0/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
 inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24132 on cpu 1:
 inet_send_prepare+0x21/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:806
 inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x9db4

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index b7260c8cef2e..8267349afe23 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ int inet_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && inet_autobind(sk))
+	if (data_race(!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) && inet_autobind(sk))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	return sk->sk_prot->connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
 }
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ int inet_send_prepare(struct sock *sk)
 	sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
 
 	/* We may need to bind the socket. */
-	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !sk->sk_prot->no_autobind &&
+	if (data_race(!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) && !sk->sk_prot->no_autobind &&
 	    inet_autobind(sk))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 16/35] ping: Check return value of function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb'

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]

Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.

Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/ping.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 248856b301c4..8ce8b7300b9d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -952,6 +952,7 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
 	struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
+	bool rc = false;
 
 	/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
 
@@ -966,14 +967,15 @@ bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 
 		pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk);
-		if (skb2)
-			ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2);
+		if (skb2 && !ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2))
+			rc = true;
 		sock_put(sk);
-		return true;
 	}
-	pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
 
-	return false;
+	if (!rc)
+		pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
+
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ping_rcv);
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 17/35] net: annotate data race in sock_error()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f13ef10059ccf5f4ed201cd050176df62ec25bb8 ]

sock_error() is known to be racy. The code avoids
an atomic operation is sk_err is zero, and this field
could be changed under us, this is fine.

Sysbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sock_alloc_send_pskb / unix_release_sock

write to 0xffff888131855630 of 4 bytes by task 9365 on cpu 1:
 unix_release_sock+0x2e9/0x6e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:550
 unix_release+0x2f/0x50 net/unix/af_unix.c:859
 __sock_release net/socket.c:599 [inline]
 sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1258
 __fput+0x25b/0x4e0 fs/file_table.c:280
 ____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
 task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:174 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x156/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:208
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:290 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:301
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131855630 of 4 bytes by task 9385 on cpu 0:
 sock_error include/net/sock.h:2269 [inline]
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xe4/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2336
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x478/0x1610 net/unix/af_unix.c:1671
 unix_seqpacket_sendmsg+0xc2/0x100 net/unix/af_unix.c:2055
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x25/0x30 net/socket.c:2416
 io_sendmsg fs/io_uring.c:4367 [inline]
 io_issue_sqe+0x231a/0x6750 fs/io_uring.c:6135
 __io_queue_sqe+0xe9/0x360 fs/io_uring.c:6414
 __io_req_task_submit fs/io_uring.c:2039 [inline]
 io_async_task_func+0x312/0x590 fs/io_uring.c:5074
 __tctx_task_work fs/io_uring.c:1910 [inline]
 tctx_task_work+0x1d4/0x3d0 fs/io_uring.c:1924
 task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164
 tracehook_notify_signal include/linux/tracehook.h:212 [inline]
 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:145 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xf8/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:208
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:290 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:301
 do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000068

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 9385 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/sock.h | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index f68184b8c0aa..9199ab7ab2da 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -2232,8 +2232,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);
 static inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	int err;
-	if (likely(!sk->sk_err))
+
+	/* Avoid an atomic operation for the common case.
+	 * This is racy since another cpu/thread can change sk_err under us.
+	 */
+	if (likely(data_race(!sk->sk_err)))
 		return 0;
+
 	err = xchg(&sk->sk_err, 0);
 	return -err;
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 18/35] inet: annotate date races around sk->sk_txhash

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit b71eaed8c04f72a919a9c44e83e4ee254e69e7f3 ]

UDP sendmsg() path can be lockless, it is possible for another
thread to re-connect an change sk->sk_txhash under us.

There is no serious impact, but we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
pair to document the race.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / skb_set_owner_w

write to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 30997 on cpu 1:
 sk_set_txhash include/net/sock.h:1937 [inline]
 __ip4_datagram_connect+0x69e/0x710 net/ipv4/datagram.c:75
 __ip6_datagram_connect+0x551/0x840 net/ipv6/datagram.c:189
 ip6_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272
 inet_dgram_connect+0xfd/0x180 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:580
 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1837 [inline]
 __sys_connect+0x245/0x280 net/socket.c:1854
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1864 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1861 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1861
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88813397920c of 4 bytes by task 31039 on cpu 0:
 skb_set_hash_from_sk include/net/sock.h:2211 [inline]
 skb_set_owner_w+0x118/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2101
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x452/0x4e0 net/core/sock.c:2359
 sock_alloc_send_skb+0x2d/0x40 net/core/sock.c:2373
 __ip6_append_data+0x1743/0x21a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1621
 ip6_make_skb+0x258/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x160a/0x16b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1527
 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:642
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0xbca3c43d -> 0xfdb309e0

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 31039 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/sock.h | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 9199ab7ab2da..3c7addf95150 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -1900,7 +1900,8 @@ static inline u32 net_tx_rndhash(void)
 
 static inline void sk_set_txhash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	sk->sk_txhash = net_tx_rndhash();
+	/* This pairs with READ_ONCE() in skb_set_hash_from_sk() */
+	WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash, net_tx_rndhash());
 }
 
 static inline bool sk_rethink_txhash(struct sock *sk)
@@ -2172,9 +2173,12 @@ static inline void sock_poll_wait(struct file *filp, struct socket *sock,
 
 static inline void skb_set_hash_from_sk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
 {
-	if (sk->sk_txhash) {
+	/* This pairs with WRITE_ONCE() in sk_set_txhash() */
+	u32 txhash = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_txhash);
+
+	if (txhash) {
 		skb->l4_hash = 1;
-		skb->hash = sk->sk_txhash;
+		skb->hash = txhash;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 19/35] net/packet: annotate data race in packet_sendmsg()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d1b5bee4c8be01585033be9b3a8878789285285f ]

There is a known race in packet_sendmsg(), addressed
in commit 32d3182cd2cd ("net/packet: fix race in tpacket_snd()")

Now we have data_race(), we can use it to avoid a future KCSAN warning,
as syzbot loves stressing af_packet sockets :)

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index ddb68aa836f7..7892d7074847 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -3033,10 +3033,13 @@ static int packet_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
 
-	if (po->tx_ring.pg_vec)
+	/* Reading tx_ring.pg_vec without holding pg_vec_lock is racy.
+	 * tpacket_snd() will redo the check safely.
+	 */
+	if (data_race(po->tx_ring.pg_vec))
 		return tpacket_snd(po, msg);
-	else
-		return packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
+
+	return packet_snd(sock, msg, len);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 20/35] net: phy: dp83867: perform soft reset and retain established link

[Sasha Levin]

From: Praneeth Bajjuri <praneeth@ti.com>

[ Upstream commit da9ef50f545f86ffe6ff786174d26500c4db737a ]

Current logic is performing hard reset and causing the programmed
registers to be wiped out.

as per datasheet: https://www.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/dp83867cr.pdf
8.6.26 Control Register (CTRL)

do SW_RESTART to perform a reset not including the registers,
If performed when link is already present,
it will drop the link and trigger re-auto negotiation.

Signed-off-by: Praneeth Bajjuri <praneeth@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Geet Modi <geet.modi@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/phy/dp83867.c | 6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/dp83867.c b/drivers/net/phy/dp83867.c
index 69d3eacc2b96..c716074fdef0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83867.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83867.c
@@ -792,16 +792,12 @@ static int dp83867_phy_reset(struct phy_device *phydev)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = phy_write(phydev, DP83867_CTRL, DP83867_SW_RESET);
+	err = phy_write(phydev, DP83867_CTRL, DP83867_SW_RESTART);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
 	usleep_range(10, 20);
 
-	/* After reset FORCE_LINK_GOOD bit is set. Although the
-	 * default value should be unset. Disable FORCE_LINK_GOOD
-	 * for the phy to work properly.
-	 */
 	return phy_modify(phydev, MII_DP83867_PHYCTRL,
 			 DP83867_PHYCR_FORCE_LINK_GOOD, 0);
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 22/35] net: caif: fix memory leak in ldisc_open

[Sasha Levin]

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 58af3d3d54e87bfc1f936e16c04ade3369d34011 ]

Syzbot reported memory leak in tty_init_dev().
The problem was in unputted tty in ldisc_open()

static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
...
	ser->tty = tty_kref_get(tty);
...
	result = register_netdevice(dev);
	if (result) {
		rtnl_unlock();
		free_netdev(dev);
		return -ENODEV;
	}
...
}

Ser pointer is netdev private_data, so after free_netdev()
this pointer goes away with unputted tty reference. So, fix
it by adding tty_kref_put() before freeing netdev.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f303e045423e617d2cad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
index d025ea434933..39fbd0be179c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c
@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	rtnl_lock();
 	result = register_netdevice(dev);
 	if (result) {
+		tty_kref_put(tty);
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		free_netdev(dev);
 		return -ENODEV;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 23/35] net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]

tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.

KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.

[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg

write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 7892d7074847..c4eb26f0f1a7 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2682,7 +2682,7 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
 	}
 	if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
 		dev	= packet_cached_dev_get(po);
-		proto	= po->num;
+		proto	= READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	} else {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
@@ -2895,7 +2895,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 
 	if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
 		dev	= packet_cached_dev_get(po);
-		proto	= po->num;
+		proto	= READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	} else {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
@@ -3170,7 +3170,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 			/* prevents packet_notifier() from calling
 			 * register_prot_hook()
 			 */
-			po->num = 0;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0);
 			__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
 			rcu_read_lock();
 			dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
@@ -3180,7 +3180,7 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 		}
 
 		BUG_ON(po->running);
-		po->num = proto;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, proto);
 		po->prot_hook.type = proto;
 
 		if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
@@ -3525,7 +3525,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 
 	sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
 	sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex;
-	sll->sll_protocol = po->num;
+	sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	sll->sll_pkttype = 0;
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex);
@@ -4413,7 +4413,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
 	was_running = po->running;
 	num = po->num;
 	if (was_running) {
-		po->num = 0;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0);
 		__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
@@ -4448,7 +4448,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
 
 	spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
 	if (was_running) {
-		po->num = num;
+		WRITE_ONCE(po->num, num);
 		register_prot_hook(sk);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
@@ -4616,7 +4616,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 			   s,
 			   refcount_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
 			   s->sk_type,
-			   ntohs(po->num),
+			   ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)),
 			   po->ifindex,
 			   po->running,
 			   atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 24/35] net/packet: annotate accesses to po->ifindex

[Sasha Levin]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]

Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.

KCSAN reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname

write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
 packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
 packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index c4eb26f0f1a7..08144559eed5 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -3186,11 +3186,11 @@ static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
 		if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
 			dev_put(dev);
 			po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
-			po->ifindex = -1;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1);
 			packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
 		} else {
 			po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
-			po->ifindex = dev ? dev->ifindex : 0;
+			WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, dev ? dev->ifindex : 0);
 			packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
 		}
 	}
@@ -3504,7 +3504,7 @@ static int packet_getname_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	uaddr->sa_family = AF_PACKET;
 	memset(uaddr->sa_data, 0, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex);
+	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), READ_ONCE(pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex));
 	if (dev)
 		strlcpy(uaddr->sa_data, dev->name, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
 	rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -3519,16 +3519,18 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
 	DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, sll, uaddr);
+	int ifindex;
 
 	if (peer)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	ifindex = READ_ONCE(po->ifindex);
 	sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
-	sll->sll_ifindex = po->ifindex;
+	sll->sll_ifindex = ifindex;
 	sll->sll_protocol = READ_ONCE(po->num);
 	sll->sll_pkttype = 0;
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), po->ifindex);
+	dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
 	if (dev) {
 		sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
 		sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len;
@@ -4107,7 +4109,7 @@ static int packet_notifier(struct notifier_block *this,
 				}
 				if (msg == NETDEV_UNREGISTER) {
 					packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
-					po->ifindex = -1;
+					WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1);
 					if (po->prot_hook.dev)
 						dev_put(po->prot_hook.dev);
 					po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
@@ -4617,7 +4619,7 @@ static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 			   refcount_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
 			   s->sk_type,
 			   ntohs(READ_ONCE(po->num)),
-			   po->ifindex,
+			   READ_ONCE(po->ifindex),
 			   po->running,
 			   atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
 			   from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(s)),
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 25/35] r8152: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 99718abdc00e86e4f286dd836408e2834886c16e ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
index f5010f8ac1ec..95e27fb7d2c1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
@@ -6054,7 +6054,7 @@ static void rtl8152_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch (stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings));
+		memcpy(data, rtl8152_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8152_gstrings));
 		break;
 	}
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 26/35] sh_eth: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 224004fbb033600715dbd626bceec10bfd9c58bc ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
index 6d84266c03ca..5cab2d3c0023 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/sh_eth.c
@@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ static void sh_eth_get_strings(struct net_device *ndev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch (stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *sh_eth_gstrings_stats,
+		memcpy(data, sh_eth_gstrings_stats,
 		       sizeof(sh_eth_gstrings_stats));
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 27/35] r8169: Avoid memcpy() over-reading of ETH_SS_STATS

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit da5ac772cfe2a03058b0accfac03fad60c46c24d ]

In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time
field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid
intentionally reading across neighboring array fields.

The memcpy() is copying the entire structure, not just the first array.
Adjust the source argument so the compiler can do appropriate bounds
checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
index 3bb36f4a984e..a6bf80b52967 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169_main.c
@@ -1673,7 +1673,7 @@ static void rtl8169_get_strings(struct net_device *dev, u32 stringset, u8 *data)
 {
 	switch(stringset) {
 	case ETH_SS_STATS:
-		memcpy(data, *rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings));
+		memcpy(data, rtl8169_gstrings, sizeof(rtl8169_gstrings));
 		break;
 	}
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 29/35] net: qed: Fix memcpy() overflow of qed_dcbx_params()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit 1c200f832e14420fa770193f9871f4ce2df00d07 ]

The source (&dcbx_info->operational.params) and dest
(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params) are both struct qed_dcbx_params
(560 bytes), not struct qed_dcbx_admin_params (564 bytes), which is used
as the memcpy() size.

However it seems that struct qed_dcbx_operational_params
(dcbx_info->operational)'s layout matches struct qed_dcbx_admin_params
(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config)'s 4 byte difference (3 padding, 1 byte
for "valid").

On the assumption that the size is wrong (rather than the source structure
type), adjust the memcpy() size argument to be 4 bytes smaller and add
a BUILD_BUG_ON() to validate any changes to the structure sizes.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
index 17d5b649eb36..e81dd34a3cac 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_dcbx.c
@@ -1266,9 +1266,11 @@ int qed_dcbx_get_config_params(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 		p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.ver_num |= DCBX_CONFIG_VERSION_STATIC;
 
 	p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.enabled = dcbx_info->operational.enabled;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(dcbx_info->operational.params) !=
+		     sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params));
 	memcpy(&p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params,
 	       &dcbx_info->operational.params,
-	       sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_admin_params));
+	       sizeof(p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.params));
 	p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set.config.valid = true;
 
 	memcpy(params, &p_hwfn->p_dcbx_info->set, sizeof(struct qed_dcbx_set));
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 30/35] mac80211: reset profile_periodicity/ema_ap

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit bbc6f03ff26e7b71d6135a7b78ce40e7dee3d86a ]

Apparently we never clear these values, so they'll remain set
since the setting of them is conditional. Clear the values in
the relevant other cases.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.316e32d136a9.I2a12e51814258e1e1b526103894f4b9f19a91c8d@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/mlme.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
index 6d3220c66931..fbe26e912300 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c
@@ -4019,10 +4019,14 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 		if (elems.mbssid_config_ie)
 			bss_conf->profile_periodicity =
 				elems.mbssid_config_ie->profile_periodicity;
+		else
+			bss_conf->profile_periodicity = 0;
 
 		if (elems.ext_capab_len >= 11 &&
 		    (elems.ext_capab[10] & WLAN_EXT_CAPA11_EMA_SUPPORT))
 			bss_conf->ema_ap = true;
+		else
+			bss_conf->ema_ap = false;
 
 		/* continue assoc process */
 		ifmgd->assoc_data->timeout = jiffies;
@@ -5749,12 +5753,16 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 					      beacon_ies->data, beacon_ies->len);
 		if (elem && elem->datalen >= 3)
 			sdata->vif.bss_conf.profile_periodicity = elem->data[2];
+		else
+			sdata->vif.bss_conf.profile_periodicity = 0;
 
 		elem = cfg80211_find_elem(WLAN_EID_EXT_CAPABILITY,
 					  beacon_ies->data, beacon_ies->len);
 		if (elem && elem->datalen >= 11 &&
 		    (elem->data[10] & WLAN_EXT_CAPA11_EMA_SUPPORT))
 			sdata->vif.bss_conf.ema_ap = true;
+		else
+			sdata->vif.bss_conf.ema_ap = false;
 	} else {
 		assoc_data->timeout = jiffies;
 		assoc_data->timeout_started = true;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 31/35] mac80211: handle various extensible elements correctly

[Sasha Levin]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 652e8363bbc7d149fa194a5cbf30b1001c0274b0 ]

Various elements are parsed with a requirement to have an
exact size, when really we should only check that they have
the minimum size that we need. Check only that and therefore
ignore any additional data that they might carry.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20210618133832.cd101f8040a4.Iadf0e9b37b100c6c6e79c7b298cc657c2be9151a@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/util.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c
index d8f9fb0646a4..fbf56a203c0e 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/util.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/util.c
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_extension_element(u32 *crc,
 
 	switch (elem->data[0]) {
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_MU_EDCA:
-		if (len == sizeof(*elems->mu_edca_param_set)) {
+		if (len >= sizeof(*elems->mu_edca_param_set)) {
 			elems->mu_edca_param_set = data;
 			if (crc)
 				*crc = crc32_be(*crc, (void *)elem,
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_extension_element(u32 *crc,
 		}
 		break;
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_UORA:
-		if (len == 1)
+		if (len >= 1)
 			elems->uora_element = data;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_MAX_CHANNEL_SWITCH_TIME:
@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_extension_element(u32 *crc,
 			elems->max_channel_switch_time = data;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_MULTIPLE_BSSID_CONFIGURATION:
-		if (len == sizeof(*elems->mbssid_config_ie))
+		if (len >= sizeof(*elems->mbssid_config_ie))
 			elems->mbssid_config_ie = data;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_SPR:
@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ static void ieee80211_parse_extension_element(u32 *crc,
 			elems->he_spr = data;
 		break;
 	case WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_6GHZ_CAPA:
-		if (len == sizeof(*elems->he_6ghz_capa))
+		if (len >= sizeof(*elems->he_6ghz_capa))
 			elems->he_6ghz_capa = data;
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1081,14 +1081,14 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 
 		switch (id) {
 		case WLAN_EID_LINK_ID:
-			if (elen + 2 != sizeof(struct ieee80211_tdls_lnkie)) {
+			if (elen + 2 < sizeof(struct ieee80211_tdls_lnkie)) {
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
 				break;
 			}
 			elems->lnk_id = (void *)(pos - 2);
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_CHAN_SWITCH_TIMING:
-			if (elen != sizeof(struct ieee80211_ch_switch_timing)) {
+			if (elen < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ch_switch_timing)) {
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 			elems->sec_chan_offs = (void *)pos;
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_CHAN_SWITCH_PARAM:
-			if (elen !=
+			if (elen <
 			    sizeof(*elems->mesh_chansw_params_ie)) {
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
 				break;
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_WIDE_BW_CHANNEL_SWITCH:
 			if (!action ||
-			    elen != sizeof(*elems->wide_bw_chansw_ie)) {
+			    elen < sizeof(*elems->wide_bw_chansw_ie)) {
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 			ie = cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_WIDE_BW_CHANNEL_SWITCH,
 					      pos, elen);
 			if (ie) {
-				if (ie[1] == sizeof(*elems->wide_bw_chansw_ie))
+				if (ie[1] >= sizeof(*elems->wide_bw_chansw_ie))
 					elems->wide_bw_chansw_ie =
 						(void *)(ie + 2);
 				else
@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 			elems->cisco_dtpc_elem = pos;
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_ADDBA_EXT:
-			if (elen != sizeof(struct ieee80211_addba_ext_ie)) {
+			if (elen < sizeof(struct ieee80211_addba_ext_ie)) {
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ _ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc(const u8 *start, size_t len, bool action,
 							  elem, elems);
 			break;
 		case WLAN_EID_S1G_CAPABILITIES:
-			if (elen == sizeof(*elems->s1g_capab))
+			if (elen >= sizeof(*elems->s1g_capab))
 				elems->s1g_capab = (void *)pos;
 			else
 				elem_parse_failed = true;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 34/35] net: ll_temac: Add memory-barriers for TX BD access

[Sasha Levin]

From: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>

[ Upstream commit 28d9fab458b16bcd83f9dd07ede3d585c3e1a69e ]

Add a couple of memory-barriers to ensure correct ordering of read/write
access to TX BDs.

In xmit_done, we should ensure that reading the additional BD fields are
only done after STS_CTRL_APP0_CMPLT bit is set.

When xmit_done marks the BD as free by setting APP0=0, we need to ensure
that the other BD fields are reset first, so we avoid racing with the xmit
path, which writes to the same fields.

Finally, making sure to read APP0 of next BD after the current BD, ensures
that we see all available buffers.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
index 030185301014..fb977bc4d838 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
@@ -774,12 +774,15 @@ static void temac_start_xmit_done(struct net_device *ndev)
 	stat = be32_to_cpu(cur_p->app0);
 
 	while (stat & STS_CTRL_APP0_CMPLT) {
+		/* Make sure that the other fields are read after bd is
+		 * released by dma
+		 */
+		rmb();
 		dma_unmap_single(ndev->dev.parent, be32_to_cpu(cur_p->phys),
 				 be32_to_cpu(cur_p->len), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		skb = (struct sk_buff *)ptr_from_txbd(cur_p);
 		if (skb)
 			dev_consume_skb_irq(skb);
-		cur_p->app0 = 0;
 		cur_p->app1 = 0;
 		cur_p->app2 = 0;
 		cur_p->app3 = 0;
@@ -788,6 +791,12 @@ static void temac_start_xmit_done(struct net_device *ndev)
 		ndev->stats.tx_packets++;
 		ndev->stats.tx_bytes += be32_to_cpu(cur_p->len);
 
+		/* app0 must be visible last, as it is used to flag
+		 * availability of the bd
+		 */
+		smp_mb();
+		cur_p->app0 = 0;
+
 		lp->tx_bd_ci++;
 		if (lp->tx_bd_ci >= lp->tx_bd_num)
 			lp->tx_bd_ci = 0;
@@ -814,6 +823,9 @@ static inline int temac_check_tx_bd_space(struct temac_local *lp, int num_frag)
 		if (cur_p->app0)
 			return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
 
+		/* Make sure to read next bd app0 after this one */
+		rmb();
+
 		tail++;
 		if (tail >= lp->tx_bd_num)
 			tail = 0;
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 35/35] net: ll_temac: Avoid ndo_start_xmit returning NETDEV_TX_BUSY

[Sasha Levin]

From: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>

[ Upstream commit f6396341194234e9b01cd7538bc2c6ac4501ab14 ]

As documented in Documentation/networking/driver.rst, the ndo_start_xmit
method must not return NETDEV_TX_BUSY under any normal circumstances, and
as recommended, we simply stop the tx queue in advance, when there is a
risk that the next xmit would cause a NETDEV_TX_BUSY return.

Signed-off-by: Esben Haabendal <esben@geanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
index fb977bc4d838..b1caf56b2584 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/ll_temac_main.c
@@ -938,6 +938,11 @@ temac_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	wmb();
 	lp->dma_out(lp, TX_TAILDESC_PTR, tail_p); /* DMA start */
 
+	if (temac_check_tx_bd_space(lp, MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {
+		netdev_info(ndev, "%s -> netif_stop_queue\n", __func__);
+		netif_stop_queue(ndev);
+	}
+
 	return NETDEV_TX_OK;
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2