From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
To: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Escape abstract unix socket address
Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2022 14:59:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220406145941.728b4cb5@hermes.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220406102213.2020784-1-ydroneaud@opteya.com>
On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 12:22:13 +0200
Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> wrote:
> Abstract unix socket address are bytes sequences up to
> 108 bytes (UNIX_PATH_MAX == sizeof(struct sockaddr_un) -
> offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)).
>
> As with any random string of bytes, printing them in
> /proc/net/unix should be done with caution to prevent
> misbehavior.
>
> It would have been great to use seq_escape_mem() to escape
> the control characters in a reversible way.
>
> Unfortunately userspace might expect that NUL bytes are
> replaced with '@' characters as it's done currently.
>
> So this patch implements the following scheme: any control
> characters, including NUL, in the abstract unix socket
> addresses is replaced by '@' characters.
>
> Sadly, with such non reversible escape scheme, abstract
> addresses such as "\0\0", "\0\a", "\0\b", "\0\t", etc.
> will have the same representation: "@@".
>
> But will prevent "cat /proc/net/unix" from messing with
> terminal, and will prevent "\n" in abstract address from
> messing with parsing the list of Unix sockets.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
> ---
> net/unix/af_unix.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index e71a312faa1e..8021efd92301 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -3340,7 +3340,8 @@ static int unix_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
> i++;
> }
> for ( ; i < len; i++)
> - seq_putc(seq, u->addr->name->sun_path[i] ?:
> + seq_putc(seq, !iscntrl(u->addr->name->sun_path[i]) ?
> + u->addr->name->sun_path[i] :
> '@');
> }
> unix_state_unlock(s);
Unfortunately, you will break userspace ABI with this.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-06 21:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-06 10:22 [PATCH] af_unix: Escape abstract unix socket address Yann Droneaud
2022-04-06 21:59 ` Stephen Hemminger [this message]
2022-04-07 10:56 ` Yann Droneaud
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