From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E60A4C46467 for ; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 05:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230160AbjATFCD (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:02:03 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56222 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230162AbjATFBn (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:01:43 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2FF92BF89B for ; Thu, 19 Jan 2023 20:49:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DDFF3B8266A for ; Thu, 19 Jan 2023 17:00:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F387C433EF; Thu, 19 Jan 2023 17:00:17 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1674147617; bh=WvPEYRJYZm7B+bD+sQgZKiuqSYjBBZE17XK3wUDJ2NM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aDg2cWQYFD+ZgF9LGmicU2mvHjEulBkAXVSozMCs0H1fAt37H1+S9Y34ntLGpRIyB KinSHEJat4LVopVDoSF6QZQYrMhcYwItsU2fKZjFzl9T30IBxXi9VqtR/DuM5mNdps 2L+dQvovSG6SYk6xV7yYPWAwY5uGymYGP2W0y56ltlKLPmZF0NH2jTJgWb11Aqg+pa Oc5jdDWrgFbB10YdxIVJUkP1tIL/RIs7JL15r03bDn4WCPOmk8yRPoVabOlEqckIsS MMmqRaAoICJWUj5gzwuUcG0BkEY8OKq7BcU1Rmrq2V6S4Y/vuzLjD1q1SU+rH+h52I EZr9pMGfJOOQg== Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 09:00:16 -0800 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Sabrina Dubroca Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Frantisek Krenzelok , Gal Pressman , Apoorv Kothari Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Message-ID: <20230119090016.381eb61b@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: References: <20230117180351.1cf46cb3@kernel.org> <20230118185522.44c75f73@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 19 Jan 2023 16:40:39 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > > > IIRC support for KeyUpdates is mandatory in TLS1.3, so currently the > > > kernel can't claim to support 1.3, independent of offloading. > > > > The problem is that we will not be able to rekey offloaded connections. > > For Tx it's a non-trivial problem given the current architecture. > > The offload is supposed to be transparent, we can't fail the rekey just > > because the TLS gotten offloaded. > > What's their plan when the peer sends a KeyUpdate request then? Let > the connection break? I believe so, yes, just open a new connection. TLS rekeying seems to be extremely rare. You mentioned nbd as a potential use case for kernel SW implementation. Can nbd rekey? Is use space responding to control messages in case of nbd?