From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Cc: Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@amazon.com>,
sd@queasysnail.net, borisp@nvidia.com, dueno@redhat.com,
fkrenzel@redhat.com, gal@nvidia.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
tariqt@nvidia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 14:43:51 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230125144351.30d1d5ab@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3e9dc325734760fc563661066cd42b813991e7ce.camel@redhat.com>
On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:17:26 -0500 Simo Sorce wrote:
> > We're talking about the Tx direction, the packets are queued to the
> > lower layers of the stack unencrypted, and get encrypted by the NIC.
> > Until TCP gets acks for all the data awaiting offloaded crypto - we
> > must hold onto the keys.
>
> Is this because the NIC does not cache the already encrypted outgoing
> packets?
NIC can't cache outgoing packets, there's too many and NIC is supposed
to only do crypto. TCP stack is responsible for handing rtx.
> If that is the case is it _guaranteed_ that the re-encrypted packets
> are exactly identical to the previously sent ones?
In terms of payload, yes. Modulo zero-copy cases we don't need to get
into.
> If it is not guaranteed, are you blocking use of AES GCM and any other
> block cipher that may have very bad failure modes in a situation like
> this (in the case of AES GCM I am thinking of IV reuse) ?
I don't know what you mean.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-25 22:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-17 13:45 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-17 13:45 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] tls: remove tls_context argument from tls_set_sw_offload Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-18 23:12 ` Vadim Fedorenko
2023-01-17 13:45 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-19 2:10 ` [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Apoorv Kothari
2023-01-17 13:45 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] tls: implement rekey " Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-17 23:16 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-01-18 10:38 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-19 1:25 ` Apoorv Kothari
2023-01-19 15:16 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-18 23:10 ` Vadim Fedorenko
2023-01-19 15:14 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-17 13:45 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] selftests: tls: add key_generation argument to tls_crypto_info_init Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-17 13:45 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] selftests: tls: add rekey tests Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-20 6:51 ` Apoorv Kothari
2023-01-18 2:03 ` [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Jakub Kicinski
2023-01-18 10:06 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-19 2:55 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-01-19 9:27 ` Gal Pressman
2023-01-23 10:13 ` Boris Pismenny
2023-01-24 15:56 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-25 18:47 ` Apoorv Kothari
2023-01-25 18:57 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-01-25 21:17 ` Simo Sorce
2023-01-25 22:43 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2023-01-25 23:05 ` Simo Sorce
2023-01-25 23:08 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-01-25 23:52 ` Simo Sorce
2023-01-19 15:40 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-01-19 17:00 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-01-19 20:51 ` Apoorv Kothari
2023-01-20 1:37 ` Vadim Fedorenko
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