From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 246BCC74A5B for ; Mon, 13 Mar 2023 18:25:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230511AbjCMSZ4 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Mar 2023 14:25:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:50624 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230502AbjCMSZX (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Mar 2023 14:25:23 -0400 Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 519B57FD51 for ; Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:25:18 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1678731918; x=1710267918; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=2OD/Ff81UHbAQ4A8rBgy4vcg0X9C1hLySVI95ExtnzM=; b=Zi2FVSJdO/JEehI0C/CunK4kmCxLGOWav4z3FD/GLS7AfzNGg5oUyS3E Oq68c3/GTeeNKyBaFpD9FwEE6Vi6dew0o+N1lg2+VPmVYIEUC+2zOhVLz XDBRrCRk8S30Oa/xltB2c9ZaduPQqfvT0kHpzp/tI2T1oyw8+rVrlXK8a Tb/CZR0M2Gj09d2kstA/24gdNs2IUEJUzZrd32QZKzx1g0obbylL7bkgG 6+QkrGlHzly7pmYTXoVl6U2CWqe/NjZzj9cYSAc9yIrXdTdpy8ytpw2vw rxKiZ6DKDczCVX5AXyfkmXQJU7e6hoyQlCVWn76EKWZ50TpVxOccN6hkM w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10648"; a="338772337" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,257,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="338772337" Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Mar 2023 11:22:55 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10648"; a="767809021" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,257,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="767809021" Received: from anguy11-upstream.jf.intel.com ([10.166.9.133]) by FMSMGA003.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 13 Mar 2023 11:22:55 -0700 From: Tony Nguyen To: davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, edumazet@google.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jacob Keller , anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com, Michal Swiatkowski , Marek Szlosek Subject: [PATCH net-next 02/14] ice: convert ice_mbx_clear_malvf to void and use WARN Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:21:11 -0700 Message-Id: <20230313182123.483057-3-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.38.1 In-Reply-To: <20230313182123.483057-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> References: <20230313182123.483057-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org From: Jacob Keller The ice_mbx_clear_malvf function checks for a few error conditions before clearing the appropriate data. These error conditions are really warnings that should never occur in a properly initialized driver. Every caller of ice_mbx_clear_malvf just prints a dev_dbg message on failure which will generally be ignored. Convert this function to void and switch the error return values to WARN_ON. This will make any potentially misconfiguration more visible and makes future refactors that involve changing how we store the malicious VF data easier. Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski Tested-by: Marek Szlosek Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 6 ++---- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 12 ++++-------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c | 16 +++++++--------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index 96a64c25e2ef..7107c279752a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -204,10 +204,8 @@ void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) } /* clear malicious info since the VF is getting released */ - if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) - dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", - vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c index 0e57bd1b85fd..116b43588389 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c @@ -496,10 +496,8 @@ void ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) /* clear all malicious info if the VFs are getting reset */ ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) - if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) - dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", - vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); /* If VFs have been disabled, there is no need to reset */ if (test_and_set_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state)) { @@ -705,10 +703,8 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) ice_eswitch_replay_vf_mac_rule(vf); /* if the VF has been reset allow it to come up again */ - if (ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id)) - dev_dbg(dev, "failed to clear malicious VF state for VF %u\n", - vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, + ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); out_unlock: if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c index 2fe9a9504914..9f6acfeb0fc6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c @@ -392,19 +392,19 @@ ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going * through the overflow detection algorithm. */ -int +void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) { - if (!snap || !all_malvfs) - return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON(!snap || !all_malvfs)) + return; - if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON(bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)) + return; /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ - if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) - return -EIO; + if (WARN_ON(vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)) + return; /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); @@ -416,8 +416,6 @@ ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm. */ snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0; - - return 0; } /** diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h index 582716e6d5f9..be593b951642 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed); int ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, bool *is_mal_vf); -int +void ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id); int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count); -- 2.38.1