From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
"Breno Leitao" <leitao@debian.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
"Kuniyuki Iwashima" <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
<netdev@vger.kernel.org>, syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 11:53:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230719185322.44255-2-kuniyu@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230719185322.44255-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>
syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it
by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.
108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum
valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use
struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating
sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.
However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the
actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still
fits in struct sockaddr_storage.
Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size.
[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00
x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c
Call trace:
fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
_Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline]
unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline]
unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326
__sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
Fixes: df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 123b35ddfd71..e1b1819b96d1 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len)
((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] = 0;
}
+static int unix_strlen_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr)
+{
+ /* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, the
+ * max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if
+ * CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() know that
+ * the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108
+ * is within __data[]. See also: unix_mkname_bsd().
+ */
+ return strlen(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) +
+ offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
+}
+
static void __unix_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
sk_del_node_init(sk);
@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,
int err;
unix_mkname_bsd(sunaddr, addr_len);
- addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +
- offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
-
+ addr_len = unix_strlen_bsd(sunaddr);
addr = unix_create_addr(sunaddr, addr_len);
if (!addr)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-19 18:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-19 18:53 [PATCH v1 net 0/2] net: Fix error/warning by -fstrict-flex-arrays=3 Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-07-19 18:53 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2023-07-19 22:26 ` [PATCH v1 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd() Willem de Bruijn
2023-07-19 22:34 ` Kees Cook
2023-07-19 23:15 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-07-19 18:53 ` [PATCH v1 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-07-19 21:08 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-07-19 21:15 ` Willem de Bruijn
2023-07-19 21:27 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2023-07-19 21:34 ` Willem de Bruijn
2023-07-19 21:38 ` David Laight
2023-07-19 21:39 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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