From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9A3BAC154 for ; Mon, 14 Aug 2023 15:21:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7A63BC433C8; Mon, 14 Aug 2023 15:21:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1692026490; bh=21qKNzNxPDfwgDE8vrKO7hvz6hkx7i2KtgQh0A7uQEY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=QlLnqAwod8qr+qnrWizKJLr0QAlVPJe7byBm615TN6deShPujk5mavGHpOcZJWWcA eIfqL4CF/PqebRzPhNeWjiPUUjJowwblTaBV1MzBFb1suIpIRanEhSW996sg+briwU B20Vd88jQ3COmKHrRRTOiZUUnrXEroU7SoHMVBTA5ebiRYxtKjS9KeRQWY0rmaVCDa TTqK/CZLciQkiP6ovrHFtrgSssanGyLUOIZW4RX32mokX200wTtZDy3qZha/PCyZT9 Df2ebIMWcezUDm6gs3cMxAK9RvJnEQCsMW0X73bjx/UqzIbS/jw7MXOYpgG+6FxDUX nEyp0ewPF5Ngg== Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 08:21:28 -0700 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Sabrina Dubroca Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Vadim Fedorenko , Frantisek Krenzelok , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Apoorv Kothari , Boris Pismenny , John Fastabend , Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman , Marcel Holtmann Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 3/6] tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3 Message-ID: <20230814082128.632d2b03@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: References: <20230811184347.1f7077a9@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, 14 Aug 2023 17:06:10 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > 2023-08-11, 18:43:47 -0700, Jakub Kicinski wrote: > > On Wed, 9 Aug 2023 14:58:52 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca wrote: > > > TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW); > > > TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW); > > > conf = TLS_SW; > > > > Should we add a statistic for rekeying? > > Hmpf, at least I shouldn't be incrementing the existing stats on every > update, especially not TLSCURR* :/ > > I don't see much benefit in tracking succesful rekeys. Failed rekeys > seem more interesting to me. What would we get from counting succesful > rekeys? No huge benefit from counting rekeys, the main (only?) one I see is that when user reports issues we can see whether rekeys were involved (given that they are fairly rare). It could help narrow down triage.