[PATCH 0/11] pull request (net): ipsec 2023-08-15

[PATCH 0/11] pull request (net): ipsec 2023-08-15

[Steffen Klassert]

1) Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_address_filter.
   From Lin Ma.

2) Fix the pfkey sadb_x_filter validation.
   From Lin Ma.

3) Use the correct nla_policy structure for XFRMA_SEC_CTX.
   From Lin Ma.

4) Fix warnings triggerable by bad packets in the encap functions.
   From Herbert Xu.

5) Fix some slab-use-after-free in decode_session6.
   From Zhengchao Shao.

6) Fix a possible NULL piointer dereference in xfrm_update_ae_params.
   Lin Ma.

7) Add a forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH.
   From Lin Ma.

8) Don't leak offloaded policies.
   From Leon Romanovsky.

9) Delete also the offloading part of an acquire state.
   From Leon Romanovsky.

Please pull or let me know if there are problems.

Thanks!

The following changes since commit 3a8a670eeeaa40d87bd38a587438952741980c18:

  Merge tag 'net-next-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next (2023-06-28 16:43:10 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git tags/ipsec-2023-08-15

for you to fetch changes up to f3ec2b5d879ef5bbcb24678914641343cb6399a2:

  xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy (2023-08-01 12:04:43 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------
ipsec-2023-08-15

----------------------------------------------------------------
Herbert Xu (1):
      xfrm: Silence warnings triggerable by bad packets

Leon Romanovsky (2):
      xfrm: delete offloaded policy
      xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy

Lin Ma (5):
      net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read
      net: af_key: fix sadb_x_filter validation
      net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structure
      xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
      xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH

Zhengchao Shao (3):
      xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
      ip6_vti: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
      ip_vti: fix potential slab-use-after-free in decode_session6

 include/net/xfrm.h             |  1 +
 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c              |  4 ++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c             |  4 ++--
 net/key/af_key.c               |  4 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c         |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c          | 22 +++++++++-------------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c |  4 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c          |  8 ++------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c           | 15 +++++++++++++--
 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

[PATCH 01/11] net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

We found below OOB crash:

[   44.211730] ==================================================================
[   44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[   44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97
[   44.212045]
[   44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4
[   44.212045] Call Trace:
[   44.212045]  <TASK>
[   44.212045]  dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50
[   44.212045]  print_report+0xcc/0x620
[   44.212045]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170
[   44.212045]  ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[   44.212045]  kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[   44.212045]  kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0
[   44.212045]  memcmp+0x8b/0xb0
[   44.212045]  xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60
[   44.212045]  ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[   44.212045]  netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430
[   44.212045]  xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0
[   44.212045]  ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[   44.212045]  ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70
[   44.212045]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260
[   44.212045]  ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120
[   44.212045]  ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210
[   44.212045]  ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700
[   44.212045]  ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[   44.212045]  ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   44.212045]  ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700
[   44.212045]  ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[   44.212045]  ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[   44.212045]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50
[   44.212045]  ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190
[   44.212045]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340
[   44.212045]  ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660
[   44.212045]  ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0
[   44.212045]  ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0
[   44.212045]  ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   44.212045]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   44.212045]  ? copyout+0x3e/0x50
[   44.212045]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
[   44.212045]  netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660
[   44.212045]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[   44.212045]  __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10
[   44.212045]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740
[   44.212045]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10
[   44.212045]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[   44.212045]  do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   44.212045]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da
[   44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da
[   44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c
[   44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[   44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001
[   44.212045]  </TASK>
[   44.212045]
[   44.212045] Allocated by task 97:
[   44.212045]  kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[   44.212045]  kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[   44.212045]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
[   44.212045]  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140
[   44.212045]  kmemdup+0x21/0x50
[   44.212045]  xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290
[   44.212045]  netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0
[   44.212045]  __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430
[   44.212045]  xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410
[   44.212045]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
[   44.212045]  xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
[   44.212045]  netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
[   44.212045]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
[   44.212045]  sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0
[   44.212045]  __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230
[   44.212045]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90
[   44.212045]  do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   44.212045]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   44.212045]
[   44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300
[   44.212045]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
[   44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[   44.212045]  allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324)
[   44.212045]
[   44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ...
[   44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
[   44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[   44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
[   44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   44.212045]
[   44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   44.212045]  ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   44.212045]  ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   44.212045]                                ^
[   44.212045]  ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   44.212045]  ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[   44.212045] ==================================================================

By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack
of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass
arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states,
the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak.

  if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) {
    filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]),
        sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
    if (filter == NULL)
      return -ENOMEM;
    // NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!!
  }

This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like
the code in pfkey_dump() function.

Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index c34a2a06ca94..7c91deadc36e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1267,6 +1267,15 @@ static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 					 sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (filter == NULL)
 				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			/* see addr_match(), (prefix length >> 5) << 2
+			 * will be used to compare xfrm_address_t
+			 */
+			if (filter->splen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3) ||
+			    filter->dplen > (sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3)) {
+				kfree(filter);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (attrs[XFRMA_PROTO])
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 02/11] net: af_key: fix sadb_x_filter validation

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

When running xfrm_state_walk_init(), the xfrm_address_filter being used
is okay to have a splen/dplen that equals to sizeof(xfrm_address_t)<<3.
This commit replaces >= to > to make sure the boundary checking is
correct.

Fixes: 37bd22420f85 ("af_key: pfkey_dump needs parameter validation")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/key/af_key.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index ede3c6a60353..b4ea4cf9fad4 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -1848,9 +1848,9 @@ static int pfkey_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_ms
 	if (ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER - 1]) {
 		struct sadb_x_filter *xfilter = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER - 1];
 
-		if ((xfilter->sadb_x_filter_splen >=
+		if ((xfilter->sadb_x_filter_splen >
 			(sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3)) ||
-		    (xfilter->sadb_x_filter_dplen >=
+		    (xfilter->sadb_x_filter_dplen >
 			(sizeof(xfrm_address_t) << 3))) {
 			mutex_unlock(&pfk->dump_lock);
 			return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 03/11] net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structure

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like

* verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx*
* xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype
is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
* copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
...

It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be
structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing
and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes).

This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid
ambiguity.

Fixes: cf5cb79f6946 ("[XFRM] netlink: Establish an attribute policy")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
index 8cbf45a8bcdc..655fe4ff8621 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
 	[XFRMA_ALG_COMP]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) },
 	[XFRMA_ENCAP]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) },
 	[XFRMA_TMPL]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) },
-	[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) },
+	[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) },
 	[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) },
 	[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) },
 	[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 7c91deadc36e..fdc0c17122b6 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
 	[XFRMA_ALG_COMP]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) },
 	[XFRMA_ENCAP]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) },
 	[XFRMA_TMPL]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) },
-	[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) },
+	[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]		= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) },
 	[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) },
 	[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]	= { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) },
 	[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 04/11] xfrm: Silence warnings triggerable by bad packets

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

After the elimination of inner modes, a couple of warnings that
were previously unreachable can now be triggered by malformed
inbound packets.

Fix this by:

1. Moving the setting of skb->protocol into the decap functions.
2. Returning -EINVAL when unexpected protocol is seen.

Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski<maze@google.com>
Fixes: 5f24f41e8ea6 ("xfrm: Remove inner/outer modes from input path")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 22 +++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 815b38080401..d5ee96789d4b 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int optlen = 0;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 
+	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
+
 	if (unlikely(XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_BEETPH)) {
 		struct ip_beet_phdr *ph;
 		int phlen;
@@ -232,6 +234,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 
+	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
+
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -267,6 +271,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 
+	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
+
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
 		goto out;
 
@@ -296,6 +302,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int size = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
 	int err;
 
+	skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
+
 	err = skb_cow_head(skb, size + skb->mac_len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
@@ -346,6 +354,7 @@ xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			return xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(x, skb);
 		break;
 		}
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -366,19 +375,6 @@ static int xfrm_prepare_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 	}
 
-	switch (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->protocol) {
-	case IPPROTO_IPIP:
-	case IPPROTO_BEETPH:
-		skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
-		break;
-	case IPPROTO_IPV6:
-		skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
-		break;
-	default:
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-		break;
-	}
-
 	return xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(x, skb);
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 05/11] xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>

When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets.

The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0
kasan_report+0x11d/0x130
decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
__xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0
xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30
__qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10
neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550
ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550
ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270
ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540
ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890
ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0
addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0
run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30
Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 <fa> 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50
RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d
R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0
cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0
do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0
cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20
start_secondary+0x200/0x290
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b
</TASK>
Allocated by task 939:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410
kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270
__alloc_skb+0x129/0x330
inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230
__ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0
addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00
addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390
process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0
worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0
kthread+0x344/0x440
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80)

As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets.

Fixes: f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
index a3319965470a..b86474084690 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c
@@ -537,8 +537,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 
 	switch (skb->protocol) {
 	case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		if (!dst) {
 			fl.u.ip6.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex;
 			fl.u.ip6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC;
@@ -552,8 +552,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 		}
 		break;
 	case htons(ETH_P_IP):
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		if (!dst) {
 			struct rtable *rt;
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 06/11] ip6_vti: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>

When ipv6_vti device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when ipv6_vti device sends IPv6 packets.

The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802e08edc2 by task swapper/0/0
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707-00001-g84e2cad7f979 #410
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0
kasan_report+0x11d/0x130
decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890
__xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0
vti6_tnl_xmit+0x3e6/0x1ee0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700
sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30
__qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10
neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550
ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550
ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270
ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540
ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890
ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0
addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870
call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580
expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0
run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910
__do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905
irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0
</IRQ>
Allocated by task 9176:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410
kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270
__alloc_skb+0x129/0x330
netlink_sendmsg+0x9b1/0xe30
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Freed by task 9176:
kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x160/0x1c0
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11b/0x220
kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x490
skb_free_head+0x17f/0x1b0
skb_release_data+0x59c/0x850
consume_skb+0xd2/0x170
netlink_unicast+0x54f/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x926/0xe30
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190
____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920
___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0
__sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802e08ed00
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640
The buggy address is located 194 bytes inside of
freed 640-byte region [ffff88802e08ed00, ffff88802e08ef80)

As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets.

Fixes: f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
index 10b222865d46..73c85d4e0e9c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
@@ -568,12 +568,12 @@ vti6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 		    vti6_addr_conflict(t, ipv6_hdr(skb)))
 			goto tx_err;
 
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		break;
 	case htons(ETH_P_IP):
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto tx_err;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 07/11] ip_vti: fix potential slab-use-after-free in decode_session6

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>

When ip_vti device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field
of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then,
slab-use-after-free may occur when ip_vti device sends IPv6 packets.
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in
_decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended
only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during
transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before
sending packets.

Fixes: f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c b/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c
index 53bfd8af6920..d1e7d0ceb7ed 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_vti.c
@@ -287,12 +287,12 @@ static netdev_tx_t vti_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 
 	switch (skb->protocol) {
 	case htons(ETH_P_IP):
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET);
 		break;
 	case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
-		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
+		xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, AF_INET6);
 		break;
 	default:
 		goto tx_err;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 08/11] xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at
xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the
xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current
implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly
dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140
Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c
RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571
RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818
R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die+0x1f/0x70
 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500
 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40
 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40
 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260
 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140
 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10
 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260
 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0
 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10
 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410
 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210
 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0
 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70
 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0
 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190
 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340
 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660
 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0
 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0
 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90
 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
 ? copyout+0x3e/0x50
 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210
 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10
 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0
 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50
 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0
 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660
 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700

This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit
adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD.

Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index fdc0c17122b6..8f74dde4a55f 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs,
 	struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH];
 	struct nlattr *mt = attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH];
 
-	if (re) {
+	if (re && x->replay_esn && x->preplay_esn) {
 		struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn;
 		replay_esn = nla_data(re);
 		memcpy(x->replay_esn, replay_esn,
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 09/11] xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>

The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change
message to user space") added one additional attribute named
XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy
(net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).

However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4
bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which
leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing
nlattrs.

To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then
leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into
x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to
userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).

The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just
completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which
enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read.

Fixes: 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 8f74dde4a55f..f06d6deb58dd 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3044,6 +3044,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
 	[XFRMA_SET_MARK]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[XFRMA_IF_ID]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH]   = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrma_policy);
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 10/11] xfrm: delete offloaded policy

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>

The policy memory was released but not HW driver data. Add
call to xfrm_dev_policy_delete(), so drivers will have a chance
to release their resources.

Fixes: 919e43fad516 ("xfrm: add an interface to offload policy")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index f06d6deb58dd..ad01997c3aa9 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2345,6 +2345,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 					    NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
 		}
 	} else {
+		xfrm_dev_policy_delete(xp);
 		xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true);
 
 		if (err != 0)
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 11/11] xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy

[Steffen Klassert]

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>

In destruction flow, the assignment of NULL to xso->dev
caused to skip of xfrm_dev_state_free() call, which was
called in xfrm_state_put(to_put) routine.

Instead of open-coded variant of xfrm_dev_state_delete() and
xfrm_dev_state_free(), let's use them directly.

Fixes: f8a70afafc17 ("xfrm: add TX datapath support for IPsec packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
 include/net/xfrm.h    | 1 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 ++------
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 151ca95dd08d..363c7d510554 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1984,6 +1984,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_dev_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 		if (dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free)
 			dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free(x);
 		xso->dev = NULL;
+		xso->type = XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED;
 		netdev_put(dev, &xso->dev_tracker);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 49e63eea841d..bda5327bf34d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1324,12 +1324,8 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
 			struct xfrm_dev_offload *xso = &x->xso;
 
 			if (xso->type == XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_PACKET) {
-				xso->dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_delete(x);
-				xso->dir = 0;
-				netdev_put(xso->dev, &xso->dev_tracker);
-				xso->dev = NULL;
-				xso->real_dev = NULL;
-				xso->type = XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED;
+				xfrm_dev_state_delete(x);
+				xfrm_dev_state_free(x);
 			}
 #endif
 			x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH 0/11] pull request (net): ipsec 2023-08-15

[Jakub Kicinski]

On Tue, 15 Aug 2023 11:52:59 +0200 Steffen Klassert wrote:
> ipsec-2023-08-15

Looks merged, 5fc43ce03b in net, thanks!