From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org,
Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>,
Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>,
Mitch Williams <mitch.a.williams@intel.com>,
Sylwester Dziedziuch <sylwesterx.dziedziuch@intel.com>,
Mateusz Palczewski <mateusz.palczewski@intel.com>,
"moderated list:INTEL ETHERNET DRIVERS"
<intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 13:43:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240202124304.GQ530335@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240131131714.23497-1-ivecera@redhat.com>
On Wed, Jan 31, 2024 at 02:17:14PM +0100, Ivan Vecera wrote:
> Currently when PF administratively sets VF's MAC address and the VF
> is put down (VF tries to delete all MACs) then the MAC is removed
> from MAC filters and primary VF MAC is zeroed.
>
> Do not allow untrusted VF to remove primary MAC when it was set
> administratively by PF.
>
> Reproducer:
> 1) Create VF
> 2) Set VF interface up
> 3) Administratively set the VF's MAC
> 4) Put VF interface down
>
> [root@host ~]# echo 1 > /sys/class/net/enp2s0f0/device/sriov_numvfs
> [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 up
> [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0 vf 0 mac fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d
> [root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0
> 23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
> link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
> vf 0 link/ether fe:6c:b5:da:c7:7d brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off
> [root@host ~]# ip link set enp2s0f0v0 down
> [root@host ~]# ip link show enp2s0f0
> 23: enp2s0f0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
> link/ether 3c:ec:ef:b7:dd:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
> vf 0 link/ether 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff, spoof checking on, link-state auto, trust off
>
> Fixes: 700bbf6c1f9e ("i40e: allow VF to remove any MAC filter")
> Fixes: ceb29474bbbc ("i40e: Add support for VF to specify its primary MAC address")
> Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Thanks Ivan,
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-02 12:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-31 13:17 [PATCH net] i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC Ivan Vecera
2024-02-02 12:43 ` Simon Horman [this message]
2024-02-08 11:57 ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Romanowski, Rafal
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-02-08 18:03 Tony Nguyen
2024-02-12 18:11 ` Tony Nguyen
2024-02-13 0:37 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-02-13 0:57 ` Tony Nguyen
2024-02-13 1:10 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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